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Abstract 
The thesis presents a comparative analysis of the scope and objectives of four EU 
regions’ European policies and programmes. It evaluates the extent to which 
regions’ European engagement is targeted to achieving regional economic 
development on the one hand and European social integration and identity 
construction on the other hand. The analysis starts with a comparative evaluation 
of the four case study regions’ European policies and is substantiated by the 
findings of over 60 interviews with regional political elites and civil servants in the 
four case study regions: Germany’s Brandenburg; Belgium’s Wallonia; France’s 
Nord – Pas de Calais; and the South West of England. This thesis advances a more 
comprehensive understanding of regional governments as European actors, 
whether political elites and civil servants aim to promote European identity-building 
through their policies, as well as which regional characteristics further impact the 
scope and objectives of their European policies. This thesis provides evidence-based 
answers to the research question posed: What are the scope and objectives of 
regions’ European policies and what role does European identity play in them? 
 
The thesis research has grown out of the context of regions’ EU integration; the 
multi-level governance approach; the increase of regions’ political authority vis-à-
vis European politics; and the uncertainty on whether regional political actors 
(political elites and civil servants) aim to foster a European identity. Research has 
not yet observed, compared and analysed the objectives of regions’ European 
policies in terms of European identity-building. This thesis research has taken an 
important step in pioneering this area of research by undertaking case studies in 
four EU regions. 
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Chapter One 
What role do regions and European identity play in European integration 
and politics? An Introduction; Literature review; Hypotheses and Chapters’ 
outline 
 
European integration has broadened and deepened all regions’ ability to participate 
in European politics. Its scope and depth however varies and greatly depends on 
regions’ socio-political, socio-economic and socio-cultural characteristics. The sub-
national level of some EU Members’ governments, such as the German Länder as 
well as the Belgian and French regions, has since the beginning of the European 
project become increasingly institutionalised. These regions now have the political 
authority to design their own European policies in addition to participating the 
programmes offered by the European Commission’s Directorate General for 
Regional Policy, amongst others. Yet, what are the objectives of their European 
policies? Do regions aim to foster merely economic development or also European 
social integration and identity-building? Can economic collaboration and integration 
occur without the supportive framework of social integration? 
 
Based on the decades-long history of the European project, extensive research on 
the effect of European integration on the role and involvement of regional 
governments has been conducted. Also research on conceptualising and measuring 
levels of European identity across the EU has been conducted in order to assess 
whether citizens accept or reject a European identity and gauge whether they 
support European integration. However, it has not yet been researched whether 
representatives of regional governments intend to develop social cohesion through 
fostering a European identity as part of their European engagement; whether 
European identity develops as a natural bi-product of collaboration; or whether 
identity-building does not feature at all in regions’ European engagement. In the 
absence of such evidence-based research, it cannot be conclusively explained 
whether the 97 regions’ European policies are indeed aiming to bring the citizens of 
Europe closer together, or whether their European engagement is of a purely 
economic nature, distinct from cultivating a European identity. With public funding 
increasingly supporting regional European policies, more clarity about their 
objectives is required. The current gap in both political science research and 
literature places the spotlight on the question: What are the scope and objectives of 
regions’ European policies and what role does European identity play in them? This 
thesis addresses this research question and sheds new light on the socio-economic 
objectives of comparative EU regions’ European policies and programmes.  
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Due to the diversity of the European Union Member States and their respective 
regions, there is great variation in regions’ ability, scope and objectives to engage 
in European politics. Indeed, there are 97 NUTS 1 (Nomenclature of Territorial Units 
of Statistics, the European Commission’s geocode standard for sub-national levels) 
regions within the 27 EU Member States, offering such variation. The European 
engagement of EU regions in some cases is limited to managing EU funds from the 
Cohesion Policy, which deliver economic growth within the region; whereas other 
regions have the authority and capacity to design their own European policy and 
influence the European policy designed by their national government. Thus, 
European engagement in the context of this thesis encompasses all European 
political activity of a regional government and regional government agencies – 
whether they have designed this policy themselves or are participating in a top-
down European policy or programme, as designed by their national government or 
supra-national institution such as the EU. Regions’ European policies typically 
include the management of EU funding for infrastructure or European cooperation 
within both public and private sectors. Regions developing their own European 
policies typically engage in European-wide best-practice sharing across a range of 
policy areas relevant to them; developing political partnerships with governments 
of other EU regions; identifying cooperation opportunities between both public and 
private sectors across the EU to foster innovation, competitiveness and regional 
economic growth; or developing educational partnerships and exchanges for school 
/ university students and lifelong learning participants. Thereby, the objectives of 
regions’ European policies can be purely economic development related, or also 
include a European-wide social integration and identity-building dimension.  
 
Whilst the overarching objective of regions’ European engagement is regional socio-
economic cohesion and development, it leaves to the imagination of both policy and 
political decision makers whether the priority to pursue is the strengthening of their 
regional economies and social integration in the EU, or whether in the tradition of 
the general Liberal Intergovernmentalist position on European integration, 
European policies and programmes are to strengthen economic cooperation 
exclusively. With more than a third of the EU budget allocated for the Union’s 
regional policy (Cohesion Policy 2007 – 2013) and an increasing number of regional 
governments positively responding to pursuing and managing European 
opportunities, it becomes necessary to assess why some regions participate more 
than others, and whether, indeed, the core objective of EU regions’ European 
engagement is to foster economic development and integration exclusively, or 
whether the core objective also includes a sociological dimension of fostering a 
European identity? And if the answer is affirmative, why do some political actors 
deliberately cultivate and reinforce a European identity through their regions’ 
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European engagement, whilst others pointedly block the concept of a European 
identity from their European portfolio?  
 
Learning from EU regions case studies, this thesis will provide new insights into the 
missing links that marked decades of discussions in academic and political circles 
about the evolution and the making of both EU regions’ European policies and 
programmes and the fostering of a European identity as well as a more complete 
understanding of the evolution and objectives of EU regions’ European policies and 
programmes. In doing so, the thesis will present both the range and scope of EU 
regions’ European engagement, be it self-designed and / or EU-designed European 
policies and programmes implemented by the respective regions. Based on 
interviews with regional political elites and civil servants, perceptions of the link 
between European identity and the region’s European engagement will be 
characterised and analysed. Due to the great variation amongst regional 
characteristics across the EU, regional idiosyncrasies will be identified and 
investigated in order to better understand and properly appreciate how they both 
challenge and foster a region’s European engagement. The thesis will also analyse 
the value-added of European regional networks, which were originally designed to 
dually bridge the gap between regional idiosyncrasies and facilitate European 
engagement and cooperation amongst EU regions.  
 
This thesis provides a comprehensive study on the state of region’s European 
engagement, whether European identity is an intended component found within 
their policies and programmes, and how in turn this shapes and impacts the scope 
of their European engagement. This research empirically answers the research 
question: What are the scope and objectives of regions’ European policies and what 
role does European identity play in them?   
 
This chapter will serve as a road map, drawing together political science research 
which has provided the context and boundaries of the research question of this 
thesis, and it will identify and clarify this thesis’s new contributions.  
 
Researchers have used both theoretical and empirical approaches to explain the 
variation in both scope and objectives of regions’ European engagement. 
Theoretical debates have focused on the contrasting views of the objectives of 
European integration and the European engagement pursued by political actors. 
Primarily framing the debate have been the two grand theories posited by 
representatives of the Neo-Functionalism and Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
schools; the latter setting economic boundaries to their engagement and the former 
suggesting  spill-overs from economic to political and social objectives. 
 15 
 
Contributions to the debate have also been made by scholars focusing on the 
pursuit of political objectives and the impact and influence of Multi-Level 
Governance  Its protagonists traditionally focus on the various levels of national 
(including subnational) and supra-national governments involved in European 
policies and programmes. Thus, theory-based explanations suggest that objectives 
of European engagement reflect not merely economic ones executed by national 
political elites; they suggest instead that, at the regional level, the seeking and 
realising of political and social objectives are an integral part of both their European 
engagement and the European integration process. 
 
This theoretical approach needs to be supplemented by evidence-based empirical 
research and its findings to more comprehensively grasp the objectives of regions’ 
European engagement. This would also provide more conclusive insights and 
answers as to whether the social domain, including a European identity, is being 
fostered through European engagement. Bolstering the empirical approach, political 
scientists have studied the effect of EU institutionalisation on regions’ European 
engagement; the variation of political authority in a range of European regions; the 
effect of transition of political authority on regions’ level and scope of policy 
engagement; and whether EU Regional policy indeed fosters participation and 
engagement of all EU regions. However, from an empirical perspective, there is to 
date no discussion on whether the regions’ various European policies and 
programmes foster a European identity or not. That notwithstanding, the discussion 
of how European identity may come to life and be  encouraged through regional 
characteristics or enhanced European engagement still needs to be held, and its 
launch in this thesis is both timely and  a useful starting point to this research.  
 
 
How European integration theories have shaped the discourse on the 
objectives of the European Project and the level of government involved  
European integration theories have developed explanations of EU Member States’ 
objectives for the European project and the actors involved at the national, 
supranational and subnational levels. The theories have evolved alongside the 
European Project, rising from the ashes of World War II and manifesting itself 
institutionally through the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); the 
European Economic Community (EEC); and, finally, through the Maastricht Treaty, 
the European Union. European integration theories emerged to explain why 
European cooperation occurred and what the primary drivers of its objectives were. 
They also tried their hand at predicting where the process of European integration 
might be leading to. Based on the initial years of European cooperation, Ernst B. 
Haas presented his theory of Neofunctionalism in which he predicted that political, 
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economic and social spill-overs would occur as nation states shift their authority 
and jurisdiction to a new centre, or a “new political community, superimposed over 
the pre-existing ones” (Haas, 1958:16). Thus, a new, supranational government 
would be established with authority to oversee economic, political and social 
objectives. This new body could also be expected to address, implicitly and/or 
explicitly, the issue of European identity within the context of the European policies 
and programmes it was charged to design and implement.  
 
Andrew Moravcsik critically distinguished his theory on Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism from Haas’ Neofunctionalism, explaining that nation states 
would remain the dominant actors throughout the process of European integration; 
that they would only cooperate when all other approaches and instruments had 
been exhausted; and only agree to compromise to the lowest common denominator 
– whilst at all times securely maintaining the upper hand and control of the levers 
of political authority over the European institutions (Moravcsik, 1991:49-50). The 
objectives of European policies and programmes would primarily be of an economic 
nature and the actors involved in European politics and certainly EU politics would 
be limited to those at the nation state level. This very narrow interpretation may 
owe much to the then prevailing belief that the pursuit of the objectives of 
European cooperation and politics are optimally achieved in the context of 
efficiently and effectively tackling predominantly economic domestic challenges 
(Börzel & Risse, 2009: 1-2). However, the European Union clearly states in its 
Regional Policy, which, with receiving over a third of the EU budget clearly lies at 
the core of the EU’s work, that its objective is to foster socio-economic 
development, and that it is to be run by regions, the sub-national level of 
government. It becomes quite clear that Liberal Intergovernmentalism neither 
offers an adequate explanation for the objectives of the European project nor for 
the actors involved. The same criticism must be made of Neo-Functionalism. Whilst 
it posits that functional spill-overs occur and embrace the social domain into the 
European project; it also fails to capture the political elites’ reticence to transfer 
their authority to the supranational level. Both theories have not fully advanced an 
accurate explanation of the objectives of the European project; and they have not 
accurately explored the actors and levels of government involved in the European 
project – and, in turn, the objectives of regions’ European engagement.  Whilst it is 
still highly contested whether European policies and programmes first and foremost 
foster an economic outlook on cooperation or whether it also provides  pillars for 
the indispensable social underpinning to European integration, Börzel (2005) 
concludes that both the scope and level of European integration continue to 
increase over time, from its beginnings in 1958 with the formation of the EEC, to 
2004, following the Nice Treaty, thus encompassing policy areas reaching beyond 
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those with strict economic objectives. However, the question remains: What is the 
scope of regions’ role in EU and European politics?  
 
Whilst Moravcsik describes states as sovereign and autonomous actors within 
European politics, Marks (in Hooghe, 1996) contends that there are several layers 
of actors in European politics, including the subnational, national and supranational 
layers. Marks thus accords the regions quintessential actor attributes in European 
politics. His Multi-level Governance approach is at odds with the two leading 
approaches explaining European integration: Liberal Intergovernmentalism and 
Neofunctionalism (Hooghe & Marks, 2001).  Marks; Hooghe & Blank further develop 
this approach by arguing that since the 1980s, decision-making in the European 
Union has had multi-level governance characteristics, as opposed to the prevailing 
governance of sovereign states (Marks; Hooghe & Blank, 1996:372). Though the 
authors do not reject the mainstream perception that state executives are the most 
important actors in European politics, they do ascertain that the subnational, 
regional governments are fully involved in the making of European politics: “While 
national arenas remain important for the formation of state executive preferences, 
the multi-level model rejects the view that subnational actors are nested 
exclusively within them. Instead, subnational actors operate in both national and 
supranational arenas. […] States do not monopolise links between domestic and 
European actors, but are one among a variety of actors contesting decisions that 
are made at a variety of levels” (Marks; Hooghe & Blank, 1996:346). Hooghe & 
Marks (1996) have also identified and localized a growing mobilisation of 
subnational government representatives in Brussels. By the mid-90s, nearly 100 
regional Brussels offices and a substantial number and variety of interregional 
associations and agencies were established; they comprised both institutionalised 
associations, such as the Committee of the Regions, and independently set up 
agencies (Hooghe & Marks, 1996:258-259). Regions have thus served notice that 
they have every intention of becoming more visible actors in EU and European 
politics, giving justification to the Multi-level Governance approach.  
 
Indeed, further research has continued to shed light on the extent of regions’ 
involvement in the EU and European politics. According to findings by Marks, 
Hooghe & Blank (1996) regions have gained access to European institutions as well 
as the European project in the 1980s and 1990s. Hooghe characterised the 
increasing visibility and voice of the regions in the European integration process as 
‘sub-national mobilisation’ (Hooghe, 1995). Opportunities for increased mobilisation 
and engagement on the European sub-national level have been provided, amongst 
others, by the European institutions by way of inviting regions to manage the 
Cohesion Policy programmes and through systematic policy and programme 
 18 
 
consultations. With regions joining national and supranational actors at the 
European table, the process of European integration has indeed brought the Multi-
level Governance theory to life as they seek not only access to European 
institutions but also to systematically pursue their very particular European 
interests directly with their European counterparts (Hooghe & Marks, 1996). The 
Multi-level Governance approach has, over the course of the past fifteen years, 
offered a more inclusive analysis of the regions as actors in the European project 
and thereby rendered the further study of regions’ policy scope and objectives 
indispensable. Identifying actors within the process requires further explanations of 
their objectives and scope of engagement.  
 
Bauer and Börzel (2010) introduce to this debate the notion of the European policy 
scope of regions in order to determine their role within European politics. Though 
their findings echo those of Hooghe and Marks (1996) on the increased 
institutionalisation of regions into the European process, Bauer and Börzel’s (2010) 
findings also stipulate that whilst all regions have gained the political authority 
necessary to be included in policy consultation processes, central governments in 
the capitals of Europe have been able to maintain the upper hand in the making of 
EU policy (Börzel, 2010:258). Furthermore, Hooghe and Marks (2008) have 
evaluated whether European integration and with it the institutionalisation of 
regions into the European project automatically makes regions the beneficiaries of a 
devolution of political authority at the expense of central governments. They have 
found that whilst there has been a vast overall increase in regional authority within 
the researched time frame 1950 to 2000, the evolution of regional authority in the 
newly acceded EU regions has been particularly noticeable (Hooghe & Marks, 
2008). Taken together, a thorough analysis of available data supports the 
contention that the Multi-level Governance approach is very much in evidence. 
Regions are in fact European actors and therefore part and parcel in the evolution 
and implementation of European projects. It follows that, therefore, regions must 
be(come) an integral part of any theory aimed at equitably describing and 
assessing the process of European integration. 
 
That said, whilst a Multi-level Governent theory postulates that regions are actors 
in the European integration process, and that their levels of authority are increasing 
as they extend the scope of their involvement in European politics, the theories do 
not extrapolate what their objectives are within the context of European politics. Is 
their predominant motive the pursuit of economic benefits, or is there a significant 
social dimension at work that fosters European identity? After appraising the 
various theoretical explanations of European integration, the research question of 
this thesis is more relevant as ever: What are the objectives, challenges and 
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benefits of regions’ European policies and programmes and what role does 
European identity play in their European engagement? Both Neo-Functionalism and 
Liberal Intergovernmentalism have posited their interpretations of the objectives of 
Nation states’ European engagement, and both have encountered their limitations. 
However, Neo-Functionalism quite rightly identifies the social objectives which have 
developed in EU Policy in addition to the purely economic ones. As the Multi-level 
Governance theory has explained, and political scientists have empirically affirmed, 
regions are increasingly engaging in European politics. Yet with 27 EU Member 
States, considerable variation of engagement is to be expected. The next steps in 
this research therefore seek to hone in on political scientists’ findings on the 
comparative institutionalisation of regions across the EU, the variation in scope of 
regions’ European engagement, and their underlying objectives. 
 
 
Comparative levels of regions’ political authority within European 
Governments  
Institutionalisation 
As is the case with literature on European integration theories, research on 
comparative European governments is beginning to incorporate regions as new 
actors in European politics in their data collection and analysis. Thus far, the 
research conducted on regions has looked primarily at shifts in political authority, 
whether acquired through deliberate acts of power devolution by central 
governments, or as a consequence of power struggles between central and regional 
governments. Research, whilst still limited in scope and depth, also offers first 
comparisons of some regions’ levels of political authority and capacity to act 
independently from their respective national governments in the European project. 
And as this section will identify, considerably more comparative European 
government research is needed to comprehensively understand regions’ role within 
European politics and their objectives and perceptions vis-à-vis their respective 
European policies and programmes. 
   
Firstly, it is important to be cognizant of the fact that in all the EU regions merely a 
minority of them are institutionalised as sub-national political actors in their own 
right. Whilst some countries have regions with considerable autonomy and political 
authority, such as regions in federal states such as Belgium and Germany, many 
regions lack all the attributes characteristic of influential institutionalised regional 
governments: political actors who by virtue of established governance - and 
governmental - institutions and structures are credible decision-makers and 
implementers. These regions’ political authority is expressed primarily in terms of 
their administrative character, according to Hooghe; Marks & Schakel (2010:52). 
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The six decades between 1950 and 2006 “has been an era of regionalization. Not 
every country has become regionalized but, where reform has taken place, it has 
generally been in the direction of greater regional authority. [29 out of 31 
countries’ regions have become more regionalized. 86% of the reforms have 
increased regional authority]” (Hooghe; Marks & Schakel, 2010: 52). Furthermore, 
Hooghe; Marks & Schakel (2010) have found that the scope of regions’ policy 
portfolio is widening, granting additional political authority to regions (Hooghe; 
Marks & Schakel, 2010:56). 
 
Why are regions becoming increasingly institutionalised and who are the main 
beneficiaries of this development? Marks; Hooghe & Blank (1996) argue that it was 
a long-term goal of the European Commission to institutionalise regions’ European 
engagement.  By creating the Advisory Council for Local and regional Authorities in 
1988, the Commission provided subnational entities with a potentially powerful 
platform to represent their views on the Cohesion Policy to the Commission – and 
beyond. Five years later, in 1993, the Commission established the Committee of 
the Regions to facilitate the regions’ institutionalisation into the EU. Pressure from 
the German Länder and Belgian regions provided additional incentives to accelerate 
this process. Hooghe; Marks & Schakel (2010) have also found that regions from 
centralised states did undergo regional reforms to acquire the required political 
authority and competence to manage dedicated EU funding to the regions (Hooghe; 
Marks & Schakel, 2010:59). Hooghe & Marks (2001) proceed to argue that Multi-
level Governance is not only in the interest of European regions. National 
governments, they declare, have an intrinsic interest in the development of Multi-
level Governance schemes because the diffusion of political authority to the 
regional level provides central governments with additional bargaining leverage and 
power in the EU arena by, for instance, claiming domestic constraints and requiring 
countries with less dispersed political authority to further compromise (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2001:72). National governments have, however, delegated various levels of 
political authority to their respective regions. The only commonality has been that 
European politics are the prerogative of and nested within national governments’ 
domain (Hooghe & Marks, 2003). Beyond that, divergence abounds. 
 
A principal source of divergence amongst EU regions and indeed discord has its 
origin in the regions’ national government systems. Demmke & Moilanen (2010) 
have documented considerable variation in OECD member countries’ respective 
organisation of public administration and civil service at the subnational levels 
(Demmke & Moilanen, 2010:46-467), and Keating (1999) has found that regions in 
federal government systems have more political authority to engage in European 
politics than do regions governed by unitary government systems. In this setting 
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political authority typically takes the form of administrative agencies and not the 
mantle and reign of institutionalised regional governments. Empirical research 
conducted by Jeffery (2000) has produced ample evidence that, indeed, sub-
national authorities “constitutionally endowed with extensive internal competencies 
are likely to exert stronger influence over European policy than their more weakly 
endowed counterparts” (Jeffery, 2000:12). He underpins his findings by applying 
Loughlin’s typology of the internal structure of the EU member states: including 
federal states (Austria, Belgium, Germany), regionalised unitary states (France, 
Italy, Spain, and arguably Portugal), decentralised unitary states (Denmark, 
Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden), and centralised unitary states (Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg and pre-devolution UK) (Loughlin, 1997 in Jeffery, 2000). Jeffery 
(2000) however cautions that constitutionally set political authority delegated to 
the sub-national authorities can differ from country to country, even if they are in 
one defined government category. In fact, variations can even occur among regions 
of the same country (Jeffery, 2000:18), further adding to the levels of complexity 
in understanding regions’ degree of institutionalisation and of political authority to 
engage in European politics. 
 
In their attempt to better comprehend the depth and breadth of this complexity, 
Jones & Scully (2010) studied the effect of regions’ variation in subnational political 
organisation and allocation of political authority and its impact to engage in 
European politics. They arrived at their conclusion by both looking at the 
subnational levels of political organisation in the EU and comparing the EU regions 
as statistically defined by the European Commission’s Nomenclature of Territorial 
Units for Statistics (NUTS). Whilst Germany, for example, had already existing 
administrative regions at the NUTS 1 level (the Bundesländer), the UK’s regions 
were drawn specifically to meet the NUTS criteria, thus grouping together Devon; 
Dorset; Summerset; Gloucestershire, Wiltshire and Bristol and Bath areas; as well 
as Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly in order to make the ‘South West of England’ 
region (Jones & Scully, 2010:7). Thus, the regions as defined by the European 
Commission have, in some cases, been intentionally drawn onto existing 
subnational political structures, such as in the example of the UK. Jones & Scully 
(2010) have also identified a number of EU member states of particular interest to 
regions because of member states’ varying regional political authority and the way 
regions were either naturally designed or superimposed by the European 
Commission’s statistical approach. In their analysis of EU regions, they identified a 
number of distinct variants. These included France, a traditionally centralist sate 
which underwent regional reforms; England, a country in which there are regions 
which have no administrative capacities; Germany, which has constitutionally 
embedded regions; and Belgium, which has devolved even more political authority 
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to its regions (Jones & Scully, 2010:7-10). When previously drawn regional 
boundaries and government structures are redrawn to better suit EU project criteria 
and expectations, the notion is that such makeshift governments would not have 
the same policy jurisdiction as long standing institutionalised governments. This 
supposition will be further field-tested through research conducted in the four 
regions Jones & Scully (2010) highlighted as being of particular interest – at the 
regional level and within the context of their national governments. By focusing on 
four case studies, some similarities and dissimilarities between EU regions will 
become visible and, in turn, shed light on the reasons for the variation in scope of 
regions’ European engagement. 
 
 
Comparative levels of political authority for regions to engage in European 
politics 
Past and present scholarly literature and research have identified and analysed both 
the variation amongst EU regions’ political authority and their capacity to engage in 
European politics. They have also made the argument that subnational political 
organisations do not naturally fit into the European Commission’s definition of a 
region, forcing regions to adapt to the Commissions NUTS system. Four countries 
have been highlighted as particularly interesting examples of variation in regional 
political authority and European engagement by Jones & Scully (2010). They 
include the United Kingdom; France; Belgium and Germany. Other researchers, 
notably including Keating & Jones; Balmer; Harvie; Gerstenlauer; Palmer; Hooghe; 
Marks and Schakel, have further investigated these regions and countries due to 
their comparative value. In further pinpointing the variation found in these 
countries’ levels of regional political authority, a clearer understanding of regions’ 
comparative ability to engage in European politics will emerge.  
 
According to Harvie (1994), what sets the UK apart from other EU member states is 
its comparative lack of regional governance: “Most Westminster models looked at 
federalism and sulked patriotically, Britain being now the only substantial state 
within the European Communities which had no regional legislatures” (Harvie, 
1994:1). Keating & Jones (1995) also have identified this comparative lack of 
regional political authority: “The United Kingdom faces the problem that its regional 
institutions are woefully underequipped for the competitive challenge of the internal 
market. Compared with German Länder or even the French […] regions, UK regions 
lack institutional identity, a capacity for autonomous decision-making and planning, 
and networks of social and economic interests” (Keating & Jones, 1995:113). This 
lack reflects in part the absence of elected regional representatives able to push the 
national government for consensus and compromise. It also deprives them of the 
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opportunity to represent themselves at the European level with optimal political 
authority (Keating & Jones, 1995:112-113). These findings thus concur that the UK 
lacks in both regional institutionalisation and political authority and is thus not able 
to optimally participate and engage in the European political decision-making 
processes. Regions in the UK, such as the South West of England, are therefore at 
a distinct disadvantage vis-à-vis many of their European counterparts.  
 
Whilst France has historically also centralised the powers of government, it 
underwent regional reforms in 1982/83 and 1986 by instituting elected regional 
councils and providing regional governments with the capacity and the tools to 
engage in European cooperation (Harvie, 1994:58 and Balmer in Keating & Jones, 
1995:168). Though this has improved France’s regions’ position to participate in 
European politics, regional councils are still constrained by the central government 
and cannot represent themselves to the same degree as German Bundesländer or 
Belgian regions. Nonetheless, the French regions are involved in the regional policy 
decision-making process as part of the Community Support Framework, which 
integrated regions into the process at the time Jacques Delores headed the 
European Commission (Balmer in Keating & Jones, 1995:187). 
 
In comparison to the UK and France, Belgium provides ample evidence of the 
regionalisation of Europe, as it has undergone decentralisation and producing, in 
the process, three very strong regions (Hooghe in Keating & Jones, 1995:137 and 
Hooghe; Marks & Schakel, 2010). The regions and (language) communities have 
acquired in the constitutional reforms of 1993 a high degree of political authority. 
In fact, Belgian dual federalism encourages the regions to directly deal with the 
European institutions and participate in European and EU policy-making (Hooghe in 
Keating & Jones, 1995:141-142). The federal government plays a co-ordination role 
whilst the regional governments and the communities have the political authority to 
manage their international affairs (Hooghe in Keating & Jones, 1995:148). 
 
Similar to Belgium, Germany’s regions also enjoy some of the highest levels of 
political authority when compared to their European counterparts: they are 
“autonomous states with original legislative, executive, juridical, and budgetary 
competencies” (Gerstenlauer in Keating & Jones, 1995:191). According to the 
Grundgesetz (basic law) Article 23 GG, the Bundesländer have the political 
authority to participate in both domestic decision-making processes and European 
law decision-making (Palmer in Bourne (Ed.), 2004:56). Being fully in charge in the 
Bundesrat, the Bundesländer can participate in the decision-making process of 
European policies during the consultation and implementation processes through 
their votes and, if necessary, veto (Palmer in Bourne (Ed.), 2004:57). In fact, the 
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regions’ involvement in EU affairs is constitutionally guaranteed (Gerstenlauer in 
Keating & Jones, 1995:209). This includes being involved in preparing policy 
positions at the federal level; having a representative of the Bundesrat represent 
the positions of the German federation in both the Bundestag and at the Council of 
Ministers where the policy positions are being discussed.  Thus, the regional 
government is involved throughout the entire policy-making cycle, whilst this 
previously would have only fallen under the political authority of the federal 
government. To make their influence fully felt however, the regions must reach a 
two-third majority in the Bundesrat, thus requiring compromise and coordination 
(Gerstenlauer in Keating & Jones, 1995: 210). Palmer correctly points out that 
harmonizing distinct regional interests and preferences can cause tensions among 
the sixteen Bundesländer (Palmer in Bourne (Ed.), 2004:58-60). For the German 
regions, however, it has been more beneficial both in terms of voice and visibility as 
well as impact to endure the tension-causing search for compromise with their 
regional German counterparts whilst participating in European policy decision-
making.  
 
An evaluation of the most current research and body of literature on comparative 
European governments has produced evidence of substantial differences in the 
scope and depth of political authority granted to and assumed by regions across the 
EU. The country examples reviewed have highlighted the variation across four 
countries in particular: the UK which has no institutionalised regional government; 
France, which has undergone regional reforms in order to expand the regions’ 
European political authority; Belgium, which has decentralised and granted its 
regions the political authority to manage their own international affairs, with some 
coordination at the federal level; and Germany, which has always granted its 
regions the political authority to participate in decision-making processes and 
alongside European integration made amendments to its basic law (Grundgesetz) to 
include European policy-making to the regional capacities. The scholarly literature 
has provided sufficient data and analysis for a comprehensive understanding and 
appreciation of the variation amongst both EU Member States and their regions as 
regards their political authority to engage in European politics. However, it has not 
yet produced evidence-based data that makes it sufficiently clear which actual 
European policies and programmes these regions decide on and implement, what 
variation is found within the scope and objectives of their European engagement, 
and what the causes of this are. In view of the rising presence and influence of the 
regions in the European political landscape in general and in EU relevant policies 
and politics in particular, it is of essence to gain an understanding of their scope of 
policies and programmes within the framework of European politics.  
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A common regional European policy? 
Bringing some harmony to the manifold variation of 97 EU regions’ scope of political 
authority to engage in European policies and programmes, the European 
Commission’s Directorate General for Regional Policy (DG REGIO) proposed a policy 
designed to, in principle, enable all regions to equally participate and integrate. The 
origin of this comprehensive EU regional policy dates back to 1975 with the creation 
of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). It was the first policy which 
linked the European Economic Community as well as regional and local authorities – 
bypassing the member states (Armstrong, H.W. in Jones & Keating, 1995:34). The 
UK played a key role in formulating the scope of the ERDF’s regional policy in 
response to both its legacy of crafting and implementing a far-sighted regional 
policy within its national borders and its continued need for regional development 
(Armstrong, H.W. in Jones & Keating, 1995:35). The British prime minister at the 
time, the Labour Party’s Harold Wilson, favoured regionalisation and regional 
governance in the UK, policies which were at odds with those championed by the 
Conservative Party. The EU’s Regional Policy has always maintained a strong focus 
on developing the region, facilitating convergence in regions experiencing industrial 
decline, and tackling problematic socio-economic issues such as youth 
unemployment and long-term unemployment (Armstrong, H.W. in Jones & Keating, 
1995:43). Indeed, economic development objectives have routinely proven to 
produce positive impacts on regions’ economic convergence by improving 
infrastructures, skills, employability of citizens and by both building and 
strengthening a positive business environment (Meeusen & Villaverde (Eds.), 
2002:79). With European enlargement and the ensuing strain on the ERDF’s budget 
however, the policy started to concentrate its limited resources to the most 
disadvantaged regions (Armstrong, H.W. in Jones & Keating, 1995:45). The 
Regional Policy’s underlying theme has thus been the development of regions’ 
economies; putting it squarely in line with the economic objectives identified by 
Liberal-Intergovernmentalism, and thus at odds with the economic, political and 
social objectives advanced by Neo-Functionalism. The added complexity of the 
Cohesion Policy, whose primary raison d’être and mandate is to give EU members 
equal access to economic and social integration opportunities and to provide the 
funding for  projects and  programmes designed to positively affect this mandate, 
further compounds the complexity and quest to harmonise the multitudinal 
variations among the 97 EU regions.   For research has documented, regions’ 
access to engage in the European Cohesion Policy’s projects and programmes is not 
equal, thus raising the spectre of further variation and stratification among its 
members.  
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Bache identifies 1988 as the turning point in European Union Regional Policy: “The 
1988 reform of the structural funds is widely accepted as being the most significant 
after the creation of regional policy in 1975” (Bache, 1998:67). Prior to 1988 
national governments were clearly the dominant actors within the decision-making 
process of the regional policy (Bache, 1998:137). However, from 1988 onwards, 
the European Commission insisted on the adherence to what it called a ‘partnership 
principle’ to ensure the involvement of subnational actors in the process (Bache, 
1998:137). The EC thus “challenge[d] established hierarchical relationships 
between central and subnational governments” (Bache, 1998:141). Variation 
amongst the regions, however, persisted. It reflected member states’ respective 
will to delegate (or not delegate) more political authority into the hands of the 
subnational political elite and civil servants. Bache (1998) in reference to these 
developments coined the term ‘gatekeeper’ to characterise national governments’ 
(Bache, 1998:142) decisions to either fully embrace a multi-level governance 
approach or to maintain a firm grip on preserving the intergovernmental approach.  
 
According to Chapman there are no regional governments which manage the 
Cohesion Programme in the UK. Instead, there is “a complex array of organisations 
at various territorial levels” including the Government Office, Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs), and Partnerships as ‘intermediary bodies’ (Chapman in Baun & 
Marek (Eds.), 2008:46) with decision-making powers fully maintained by the 
central government in London. This stands in contrast to the approach taken by 
both the new EU member states which have determined to decentralise the 
implementation of the cohesion policy (Baun & Marek (Eds.) 2008,254), as well as 
the position taken by one of the EU’s founding members Germany, which 
designated the regional governments (political elite as well as civil servants) as the 
appropriate implementation authorities and indispensable party in the decision-
making process (Sturm & Schorlemmer in Baun & Marek (Eds), 2008:71-71). The 
EU thus embraces fundamentally differing approaches: whilst the British clearly 
favour the intergovernmental approach, the Germans champion the multi-level 
governance approach. Sturm & Schorlemmer (in Baun & Marek (Eds.), 2008) 
advance the argument that, in addition to its federal government influenced 
processes, Germany makes for an interesting case study for the EU Cohesion Policy 
because of the country’s vast economic divide, between former East Germany and 
the West (Sturm & Schorlemmer in Baun & Marek (Eds.), 2008:71). These 
examples manifest that even within the Cohesion Policy Member states and their 
regions take different and distinct approaches – whilst the UK’s central government 
harnesses its implementation, the German federal government’s approach is highly 
decentralised and multi-levelled. This, in turn, also makes for a variation in scope of 
regions’ European policies and programmes.  
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One component of the EU’s Cohesion Policy may, however, remedy the variation in 
regions’ engagement. European regional networks have been created to help 
provide access to the EU regional policy and much needed resources to all regions. 
Keating (1999) suggests that networks play a complementary role in mobilising 
regions to participate in European affairs by connecting cities and regions and 
organising their interests and goals, regardless of the strength or weakness of their 
regional and / or national governments European level of engagement. 
Jachtenfuchs (2001) also highlighted the growing importance of networks in the 
context and approach of multi-level governance: “With their emphasis on informal, 
loose structures that extend across and beyond hierarchies […], the network 
concept seemed to be the main opponent of intergovernmentalism which stressed 
clear hierarchies and privileged channels of access” (Jachtenfuchs, 2001:253-254). 
Networks have been established through EU-funded programmes, but they have 
also been founded by regions independently from the EU in order to foster 
European-wide cooperation and to bring about economic development. However, 
given the lack of conclusive research conducted on European regional networks and 
their impact on, for example, regions’ European engagement and the formulation 
and pursuit of a common regional European policy, further studies are 
indispensable to better understand their place in the EU’s multi-faceted European 
integration and policy environment. 
 
What has become very evident is that there is an inexplicable lack of research on 
regions’ European policies and programmes, the scope of their respective European 
engagement, and their objectives. And within the body of research conducted on 
European integration, the institutionalisation of regions, and the variation in levels 
of regions’ political authority, gaps remain in assessing the scope of regions’ 
European policies and programmes and their objectives The significance of shaping 
a European identity through a range of European policies and programmes will now 
be discussed and evaluated.   
 
What role does European identity play in regions’ European engagement? 
The study of identity in a political science context attempts to better understand 
and evaluate whether citizens identify with their governments, and, thus by 
extension, determine the legitimacy of a government’s democratic representation 
(Bruter, 2005; Barker, 2001; Habermas, 1992; Rousseau, 1762). Eurobarometer 
surveys conducted by the European Commission periodically examine the levels of 
European identity of citizens across the EU. In general, citizens across the European 
Union are increasingly supportive of the notion of a European identity (Bruter, 
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2005). The data produced covers all EU Member States; however it does not 
generate data that originates at the regional level, and  it does not yet distinguish 
between the level of support for a European identity between  political decision-
makers and implementers and whether they intend to facilitate a European identity 
through their European policies and programmes. Is the promotion of social 
cohesion intentional and integral part of the regions’ European engagement, or is it 
merely a by-product of economic cooperation, development and cohesion? The 
body of scholarly literature on the subject reveals data and knowledge gaps about 
regional politicians’ and civil servants’ objectives and intentions with regard to the 
European politics they are instrumental in designing, deciding and implementing. 
This section will present and analyse the research and findings on European identity 
in the fields of political science and sociology. It will do so in an effort to more 
tangibly define European identity and to properly reflect its significance in the study 
of EU and European politics. European identity has been defined as a concept of 
unity to provide and instil an overarching sense of belonging to the quintessential 
actors involved in the shaping and making of European affairs and its integration 
and to citizens. By feeling a common sense of belonging, a common sense of 
purpose, shared responsibility and thus shared tasks and cooperation ensue 
(Stråth, 2002: 388-390). Fligstein (2008) further posits that perceived 
commonalities will develop over time, as will a feeling of solidarity and common 
identification (Fligstein, 2008:127). Bruter further differentiates between the 
adoption of a cultural European identity, which is socially constructed, and the 
acquisition of a civic European identity, which is linked to the full gamut of 
European-driven interventions by the state and its multiple layers and levels of 
government and institutions that govern communities (Bruter, 2004 and Bruter, 
2003:11). Both, civic and political European identity can be intentionally supported 
by national and supranational political elites (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009:3). 
Research on European identity has thus identified a body of data, findings and 
interpretations to persuasively establish a theoretical link between citizens’ 
European identity and the state of European institutions. Yet the question remains: 
If it is important for citizens to identity with their institutions, and a European 
identity would legitimise European policies and programmes – do these policies 
then aim to cultivate a European identity?  
 
Political scientists analyse European identity in order to verify a link between the 
people and the state, thus justifying and legitimising the state in representing its 
citizens. National political elites play a key role in building public support for 
European integration, yet often they primarily act to further what they consider to 
be in their national interest (Smith, 1992). When national political elites do not hold 
a unified position in support of European integration, they can foster euroscepticism 
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amongst the citizenry (Hooghe & Marks, 2005:436). Political elites, when taking 
polarising positions, mobilise public opinion against European integration and, by 
extension, the fostering of a European identity (Hooghe & Marks, 2004:418). This 
has dire consequences for the EU, as Hooghe & Marks have explained: “Political 
institutions that lack emotional resonance are unlikely to last” (Hooghe & Marks, 
2008:117). Therefore, publically demonstrated unity at the political elite level plays 
an important role in garnering and consolidating public support for European 
integration and European identity; with European identity in turn supporting 
European integration (Hooghe & Marks, 2008). However, Risse (2010) is concerned 
about the public displays of reticence by some of the EU’s key member states. He 
singles out the UK, the third largest EU member state, for not taking part in the 
Schengen agreement, the European Monetary Union, or the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights; and for not participating in a mainstream European party and thus being 
able to influence European decisions in Parliament (Risse, 2010:251). Given the 
lack of public support for European integration at present, Risse expects citizens to 
be less supportive of European politics and less inclined to assume a European 
identity. Risse (2010) furthermore suggests that a lack of connectedness between 
the citizens and the political elites and institutions, would set off euroscepticism and 
threaten the sustainability of European institutions and EU politics. On the other 
hand, however, Risse has also found that in both France and Germany, the political 
elites have been consistently supportive of the European project. He routinely 
reminds policy makers and the public in his writings that in the aftermath of WWII 
both countries gave European integration high national priority (while being mindful 
of their differing motivations: for Germany it meant a way to escape its militarist 
reputation and for France an opportunity to externalise its values). Whatever their 
particular motivation, Risse believes that the interest of the national political elites 
to support European integration cultivated a European identity amongst the citizens 
in continental Europe; whilst the British citizens were particularly sensitised to the 
destiny and values of the English nation by its political leadership (Risse, 2005:6). 
 
Adding numbers to the argument, Spence (1998) and Hooghe (2003) find that 
political elites can influence the level of European identity; they also identify certain 
groups in civil society and public service which generate remarkable levels of 
variation with respect to their responsiveness to the notion of a European identity. 
In her research on political elites and European identity formation, Spence (1998) 
found that 94% of top decision-makers in EU member states were in favour of the 
EU membership whereas only 48% of citizens were in favour of their EU 
membership (Spence, 1998:1). Risse (2005) explains that the political elites 
identify more with Europe and the EU than citizens do as Europe is more ‘real’ to 
their daily lives and thus to them (Risse, 2005:6). Hooghe (2003) presents 
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research on the support for Europeanisation based on thirteen policies and the 
Multi-level Governance approach. She identified considerable variation amongst the 
different groups: while European Commission elites are 64.7% in support of the 
Europeanisation of policies, a mere 55.6% of national elites and 53% of citizens are 
in favour (Hooghe, 2003:284). Despite these variations - between citizens and 
elites at national levels and the European Commission elites level -, Hooghe’s 
(2003) findings show that citizens’ and administrative political elites’ level of 
support for Europeanisation within ‘their’ respective countries are very similar. And 
Spence (1998) found that the variation between the national and European 
Commission levels of support for ‘Europeanised’ policies in 2003 is smaller than the 
variation between elites’ and citizens’ support toward EU membership in 1998. 
Though these two studies have researched slightly different aspects of support for 
the European Union, they both represent sub-fields of European integration and 
document that, in general, the gap between citizens’ values and those of political 
elites at national and European levels is narrowing. Taking into account the 
important role regions play in European politics and European integration, the 
review of existing research on European identity have, so far, failed to include the 
perceptions of the political elites and civil servants at the regional level. Particularly 
in light of Hooghe’s finding on the variation between national elites’ and citizens’ 
levels of support for the Europeanisation of policies, it is imperative to learn which 
side of the argument regional level political elites’ and civil servants’ are on – what 
are their perceptions on their respective region’s involvement in European politics.  
 
In addition to the scholarly literature on European identity’s role in legitimising EU 
and European politics, as well as the impact of (supra-) national political elites on 
citizens’ European identity formation, a number of academics have looked into 
additional factors shaping a European identity. Bruter (2003) has argued that 
symbols, such as the EU flag and the EURO currency help citizens identify with the 
EU and foster a European identity. Also a country’s government and governance 
system have been identified as influential factors in the formation of multi-level–
identities. Citizens governed by federal government systems are used to and 
comfortable with multi-level government involvement (subnational, national 
supranational) and multi-level identities (local, regional, national); and thus more 
readily add and adopt a European identity level than citizens who have experienced 
very centralised government systems and a national/single-level identity (Risse, 
2005). Duchesne & Frognier (1995) have further researched factors influencing 
citizens’ identity-building inputs, and they have isolated the following: education 
level; income; gender; size of locality; and age (Duchesne & Frognier in 
Niedermayer & Sinnot (Eds.), 1995:209). 
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Geography is also impacting the formation of a European identity, and for the 
following reasons: First, the divide of Europe following WWII into two distinct 
political and geographical entities (one part East and one part West, separated by 
the Oder-Neisse-Line) kept alive a conflict-ridden past with painful memories; but it 
also put in focus socio-economic inequalities (Meinhof, 2010:781). Meinhof argues 
that: “people in these communities, by looking across their borders – over rivers or 
brooks, meadows or mountains – literally look across a socio-economic fault-line 
which divides the richer from the poorer in today’s Europe. Thus it comes as no 
surprise that the construction of identity for many of the people living on these 
borders works itself through a system of in-grouping and out-grouping” (Meinhof, 
2010:789).The identity of communities in these geographical border areas has thus 
been shaped according to a geo-political past as well as a socio-economic present. 
Second, it has been found that whether a person lives in a rural or an urban area 
also influences the European identity formation. Leconte explains that there is more 
euroscepticism in rural areas than in urban ones, as people in rural areas are less 
connected with other Europeans (Leconte, 2010:96). Hence, if more interactions 
and European experiences took place, the people in these areas would be more 
disposed to embracing a European identity instead of adopting eurosceptic 
sentiments and attitudes. Furthermore, Leconte (2010) identifies the geographic 
location of a region as influential in terms of the scope and depth of citizens’ levels 
of European identity and euroscepticism: she anticipates regions on a border to 
other European regions to have higher levels of European identity, whereas regions 
more isolated from European borders would exhibit higher levels of euroscepticism. 
Leconte’s hypothesis, if supported by evidence-based, empirical data in future, 
would help explain both the natural disposition of all European regions and whether 
peripheral regions’ exposure to more European interactions and experiences would 
foster a European identity on par with the EU’s core regions.   
 
Citizens’ extent of European engagement and exposure has been identified by 
several social scientists as a further influential factor in the formation of a European 
identity.  Risse has found that, as Europeans socialise, they construct a European 
identity in time (Risse, 2010). Risse’s findings have been supported by Checkel & 
Katzenstein (2009:3). They conclude that European identity develops as a social 
process through increased interactions in networks, among others. Increased 
interactions between European students have also been found to contribute to the 
development of a European identity. A respondent in one of Bruter’s focus groups 
explained that she had experienced Europe during her Erasmus year, making 
friends with other European students. She said that she felt more European in that 
special European ‘Erasmus environment’ than she would have at home, in her own 
environment (Bruter, 2004:22). Fligstein agrees with this finding by explaining that 
 32 
 
almost 200,000 university students participate in the ERASMUS European exchange 
programme every year, which provides ample opportunities of interacting with 
European counterparts, finding similarities and, ultimately, shaping a European 
identity (Fligstein, 2008:139). Thus, experiencing Europe first-hand and engaging 
in activities with other Europeans helps to construct a European identity for 
individuals. And, as Bruter predicts, the more citizens are exposed to European 
experiences, the more overall levels of European identity will grow (Bruter, 
2004:31). 
 
Regarding the influence and impact of citizens’ European interactions shaping a 
European identity, Fligstein (2008) looks specifically at the discrepancies amongst 
the different social classes and their access to Europeans professionally and in their 
free time. He found that white collar workers who interact more with other 
Europeans tend to feel more European than blue collar workers who interact less 
with other Europeans. (Fligstein, 2008; and Fligstein, 2009 in Checkel & 
Katzenstein). “Business people, educators, academics, consultants, government 
employees, and lawyers are all likely to have travelled for business and to meet 
their counterparts across Europe. Young people are likely to travel, for pleasure and 
also for schooling.” (Fligstein, 2008:139). These people are the ones who, 
according to Fligstein’s findings, eventually see themselves as Europeans (Fligstein, 
2008:156). He also adds that the European project has so far been a process 
primarily actively involving the political elite, businessmen, women and the well-
educated, and for the blue collar class to also feel more European, the European 
project must include and place them more prominently in their policies and 
programmes (Fligstein, 2008:156). This would possibly narrow prevailing European 
identity discrepancies between political elites and citizens.  
 
Political scientists and sociologists have presented theoretical and empirical 
research results on European identity. Whilst there has not yet been an agreement 
amongst social scientists on the definition of European identity, a consensus is 
emerging about its key features. The link between the EU and European identity 
formation has been explored and explained and a number of factors supporting the 
facilitation of a European identity identified and outlined. However, as Bruter 
(2003) cautions, there is a gap in the research on European identity as there is to 
date no data explaining whether or not administrative political elites intend to 
convey to their citizens a European identity through their policies and programmes 
(Bruter 2003:1172). And whilst, as already indicated, research on Multi-level 
Governance has sufficiently documented that there are several levels of actors 
involved in European affairs (e.g. the supranational, the national and the 
subnational), research on European identity has not taken into account the role 
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political elites at the regional level of government play. It has thus far also failed to 
account the role of civil servants, who implement European policies and 
programmes. These omissions constitute a significant knowledge gap and lack of 
understanding about the perception of the link between the European identity of 
citizens and the European engagement of their respective regions, as well as the 
intention and ability of regional political administrative elites and civil servants to 
foster a European identity through their European policies and programmes. 
 
In addition to this knowledge gap, research also needs to address the scope and 
objectives of regions’ European policies and programmes. Though there is a general 
understanding in political science to date on the comparative political authority of 
regional governments across Europe, their actual objectives for and output of 
European policies and programmes has not yet been researched. In order to have a 
more complete understanding about the objectives of regional governments’ 
respective European policies and programmes and the role of European identity, it 
is imperative that political science literature pays more attention to the analysis of 
regions as European actors. Furthermore, whilst European integration theories have 
included regional level aspects in their explanation of actors in EU and European 
politics, complementary theories have not yet been advanced which tackle the 
questions on the objectives of regions’ European engagement. Whilst Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism has clearly identified the pursuit and realisation of economic 
benefits to be a top objective to national actors and, by extension, also of national 
interest; Multi-level Governance has not yet clearly identified and elaborated 
regions’ objectives. It therefore does not propose a comprehensive explanation of 
regions’ European engagement.  
 
This literature review has identified major gaps in political science research; gaps 
which harbour the question: What are the objectives, challenges and benefits of 
regions’ European policies and programmes and what role does European identity 
play in their European engagement? This knowledge gap needs to be addressed 
through empirical research in the field. This thesis attempts to both address and 
remedy the existing deficits in this area.  
 
 
In response to the identified research – and knowledge – gaps on the objectives of 
EU regions’ European engagement, this thesis endeavours to ask and provide 
conclusive answers to questions which have thus far eluded the academic 
community both from an empirical and theoretical perspective. Firstly, this thesis 
will investigate whether regions include a social European integration and European 
identity building dimension within their European policy, or whether they only 
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include policies which will foster economic benefits for the respective regions. A 
comparative analysis will probe to which extent European identity building plays a 
role within the case studies. Swiftly following this policy analysis, the findings must 
be corroborated by dependable and authoritative sources –in this case those who 
have designed and implemented regions’ European policies. Therefore, the two 
perspectives of political elite decision-makers and civil servant implementers are 
authoritative sources and, taken together, dependable. In previous research it has 
been suggested, that political leaders have a higher level of European identity than 
ordinary citizens; and that top decision-makers’ policy choices are shaped by and 
reflect their personal interests. But do political elites actually transform their keener 
interest in Europe into an intention to cultivate a European identity through their 
European policies? This has not yet been empirically studied. And further, how does 
this translate to the apparatus implementing the European policies; do these civil 
servants feel European and wish to build a European identity through their work? 
As they manage the policies on a day-to-day basis, they too have ample 
opportunity to cultivate a European identity through their work. The objectives and 
perceptions of elite politicians and civil servants involved in regions’ European 
policies must be studied to answer the research question of this thesis. And, thirdly, 
to complete the initial research on whether European identity-building plays a 
significant role in EU regions’ European policy, it must be investigated whether 
European regional networks intend do cultivate a European identity in order to 
enhance European cooperation. European regional networks are very popular with 
EU regions and feature in nearly all regions’ European policies. Networks have been 
designed to help regions engage more in European politics. Based on the 
proposition in scholarly research that there is a two-way correlation between 
enhanced European engagement and European identity-building, networks may use 
identity-building amongst its membership as a tool to foster enhanced European 
cooperation. Or European identity may emerge as a result of enhanced European 
cooperation within the network. In either of these two cases, regions participating 
in European regional networks have a high likelihood of developing a European 
identity through their participation. Thus, it will be significant to learn whether 
directors and members of such a popular network perceive the network to 
intentionally build a European identity and how this may affect regions’ European 
engagement and policy, provided that network participation features in nearly all 
regions’ European policies. In the following, hypotheses on these three core areas 
encompassed by the research question will be presented.   
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Hypotheses 
In the core research on the scope of regions’ European engagement (Keating, 1995 
and Hooghe, Marks & Schakel, 2010), national government systems have been 
found to have the greatest impact in shaping regional authority and capacity. 
Therefore, regions operating in federal government systems and be expected to 
manage a broader range of policy areas and programmes than regions in unitary 
states. It therefore stands to reason that political elites in federal states have more 
authority to promote a European identity in their European policies than political 
elites in unitary states (Risse, 2010). However, as Bruter (2003) points out, there is 
no evidence to support the claim that political elites act on their interests and 
indeed intend to develop identity related European policies in addition to economic 
development related policies. Studies on European identity have shown us that 
levels of European identity vary amongst the EU Member States – also amongst the 
EU Member States with very similar government systems. Therefore the extent of 
political authority to develop a broader or more narrowly scoped European policy 
cannot be the sole determinant of whether a policy is European identity related or 
not. Interests of the political decision-makers must still play an important role in 
determining the nature of a policy – whether it is purely economic or also 
incorporates an identity-building character. Therefore, the first hypothesis of this 
thesis claims that: 
     
Hypothesis 1 
If an administrative political elite has a personal interest in European identity, this 
will result in that political elite’s region’s European policy featuring identity-building 
objectives, as opposed to the policy only being economy related.  
 
 
Once the policy has been determined by the political elites, the regional civil 
servants take charge in the daily implementation of that European policy. Civil 
servants often interact on a daily basis with their European counterparts. In 
contrast to their political elites, they are not directly elected and are thus not 
directly restricted by public opinion and elections. They are also not in direct 
contact with a political party, which Hooghe & Marks (2004) have found to hold a 
firm grip on a politician’s position on European integration. And more, whilst 
administrative political elite’s daily work and interactions are split between the 
regional, national and European political arena, Civil servants, on a daily basis, 
manage the implementation process of the European policy and in light of this 
typically engage only with their European counterparts or connect constituents from 
their own region with those of another European region. Thus, civil servants engage 
more with Europeans than their political elites do. Fligstein (2008) has found that 
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the extent of European integration impacts the extent of European identity-building. 
According to this, it can be anticipated that civil servants managing European 
policies feel more European than their political elites do. Also, it can be assumed 
that civil servants recognise that a common identity eases work relations, thus 
identifying the value of building a European identity through their work. Therefore, 
the second hypothesis of this thesis claims that: 
 
Hypothesis 2 
Regional civil servants implementing regions’ European policies have developed a 
stronger personal interest in European identity-building and focus more on this in 
their work than political elites do.     
 
 
Once the political elites and civil servants’ objectives to build a European identity 
through their policies and work have been assessed, it is helpful to evaluate 
whether European regional networks intend to cultivate a European identity through 
their work. European regional networks feature a significant part of this research on 
EU region’s European policies, as nearly all EU regions participate in such a network 
within the scope of their respective European policies. Drawing on the challenges 
presented by government systems on regions’ ability to engage in European 
politics, European regional networks were launched to help regions overcome 
political authority impediments and engage in European affairs (Checkel & 
Katzenstein, 2009). Fligstein (2008) suggests (yet has no evidence in support) that 
the heightened interactions within networks cultivate a European identity. If, 
indeed, regional participation in such networks builds a European identity, then in 
turn the regions which participate as part of their European policy would be building 
a European identity. Thus, even if political elites and civil servants did not intent to 
design and implement an identity-related European policy, this might still be an 
unintended outcome of their policy.  Therefore, the third hypothesis of this thesis 
claims that: 
 
Hypothesis 3 
European regional networks are likely to intentionally build a European identity so 
regions participating in the networks cultivate a European identity and in turn 
cooperate with greater ease amongst the European membership. 
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PhD Thesis Chapters Outline 
 
Chapter 1:  
What role do regions and European identity play in European integration 
and European politics? 
This first chapter is dedicated to setting the stage of the research project. It 
introduces the context of EU region’s European engagement as well as the role of 
European identity in regions’ European policies. This section identifies and explains 
regional reforms which have contributed to both to the expansion and contraction 
of regional political authority in European politics. Relevant research and its findings 
on the scope of regions’ European policies will also be presented, as will be an 
overview of the opportunities – and constraints - provided to regions by the 
European Commission’s Directorate General for Regional Policy within the 
framework of socio-economic convergence and development at the regional level. 
Finally, the expected socio-economic benefits of cooperation to both regions and 
the EU at large are discussed –through either the strengthening of regional 
economies or the shaping of a European identity. This chapter will also introduce 
the research question about the scope and objectives of regions’ European policies 
and programmes on the one hand and the role of European identity within their 
European engagement on the other hand. The analysis will lay the groundwork for 
the definition of the research model by identifying gaps in our understanding of 
regional governments’ European engagement and the relationship between policy 
and practice. Finally, an overview of all chapters will be presented. 
 
Chapter 2:  
Model and Methodology 
The second chapter discusses the research model and methodology. It will explain 
how the hypotheses which grew out of the first chapter will be addressed and 
gauged in the course of this thesis research. This model will be explained. 
Furthermore, the methodology applied in bringing the research model to life will be 
presented.  
 
Chapter 3:  
Regional characteristics affecting the scope and objectives of European 
policy 
The third chapter introduces the 97 EU regions (according to the NUTS 1 definition 
set by the European Commission) through a quantitative comparative analysis. It 
provides a descriptive analysis of the European regions - their regional 
characteristics and features. In turn, it will be assessed how these characteristics 
and features manifest themselves in the 97 regions’ European engagement and 
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their levels of European identity. These are vital clarifications to the understanding 
of EU regions’ European politics; they will also contribute to the development of a 
justification for the selection of the four case study regions.  
 
Chapter 4:  
Comparative regions’ European policies  
The fourth chapter explores the scope of the four case study regions’ European 
policies and specifically assesses to which extent the respective regions’ policies 
build a European identity. The analysis includes policies and programmes designed 
and implemented by the regions themselves, and those which have been dispensed 
by the European Commission’s Directorate General for Regional Policy. This section 
is based on both a documents analysis of the four case study regions’ European 
directorates and the European Commission’s Regional Policy, as well as on 
interview findings from officials of the Directorate General for Regional Policy. This 
chapter will also look at the regional characteristics and features more closely, 
analysing their influence and impact on the scope of the four case study regions’ 
European engagement. This chapter will be complemented by Chapters 5 and 6, 
which will present regional political elites’ and civil servants’ perceptions on the 
scope of both their respective regions’ European engagement and the role of 
European identity.  
 
Chapter 5:  
Is European policy European? - The political case  
Chapter five explores the four case study regions’ political administrative elite’s role 
in building a European identity through the respective regions’ European policy. It 
assesses whether political elites intend to design identity-related European policies 
or purely economy-related policies. After studying the scope and objectives of EU 
regions’ European engagement in Chapter 4 and the regional characteristics and 
features which influence the scope and objectives of regions’ European policies in 
Chapter 3, this chapter sheds new light on the role and influence of regional 
political decision-makers within the European directorates. The findings are based 
on semi-structured interviews with regional political elites from the four case study 
regions.  
 
Chapter 6:  
Is European policy European? - The administrative case  
Chapter six presents the findings of semi-structured interviews with regional 
government civil servants involved in European politics. This chapter complements 
the previous chapter on the political elites’ intent to build a European identity 
through their European policies. Its focus on civil servants offers additional insights 
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on whether civil servants feel more European than the political elites and in turn 
cultivate a European identity through their implemented work. The civil servants 
also assess the role of political elites in reinforcing a European identity through the 
European policy they design. Further interview findings include a discussion on 
which regional characteristics and features have an impact on the scope and 
objectives of the respective regions’ European policies.  
 
Chapter 7:  
European Regional Networks – enhancing European engagement and 
identity-building?  
With nearly all EU regions participating in European Regional Networks as part of 
their European policy, it becomes vital to conduct an evidence based assessment on 
whether networks cultivate a European identity through their work. This chapter 
presents a case study on ‘ERRIN’, a European regional network. By providing a 
review of the network as well as presenting the findings from thirteen semi-
structured interviews with network members, it will be determined to which extent 
European Networks can facilitate cooperation, integration, and support the 
emergence of European identity.  
 
Chapter 8:  
The scope and objectives of regions’ European engagement – lessons 
learned and more questions revealed 
Chapter eight provides a final analysis on the comparative scope of EU regions’ 
European policies, as well as to which extent European identity plays a role in the 
regions’ European engagement. For this, conclusions will be offered on the 
influence of regional characteristics and features which can either challenge or 
facilitate a region’s European engagement. Furthermore, conclusions on the 
regions’ political elites and civil servants, as well as DG REGIO officials and 
European regional network participants will be provided in order to analyse the link 
between regions’ European engagement and the facilitation of a European identity. 
The chapter will end by placing the research findings into a larger context and 
addressing questions which have arisen in the course of the research and would 
make for both interesting and indispensable further research. 
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Chapter 2 
Model and Methodology 
 
The literature review in the previous chapter has illustrated two key research gaps 
in the field of comparative European politics and governments. Firstly, although 
research on Multi-level Governance has identified regions as actors in European 
politics, no research has yet been conducted on the objectives within the scope of 
regions’ European policies and programmes. Whilst research on European identity 
has found that its levels have been increasing over time; it has not yet been clearly 
identified and established whether regional political elites and civil servants 
deliberately and explicitly intend to both facilitate and foster a European identity 
through their European policies and programmes. Secondly, evidence has been 
gathered to support the claim that political elites have higher levels of European 
identity than citizens, the difference being 94% to 48% (Spence, 1998:1). However 
not only political elites are involved in the shaping and implementation of regions’ 
European policies – and thus have influence over its objectives. Perhaps even more 
so than the political elites, regional civil servants, on a daily basis, manage the 
implementation of the European policies. Whether they feel European and act upon 
this interest can have a significant impact on the objectives of regions’ European 
policies. This, too, needs to be studied in order to assess the role of both political 
elites and civil servants in facilitating the role of European identity within the 
European policy.  These resulting research and literature gaps contribute to an 
incomplete understanding of the regional levels’ participation in the making of 
European politics – and whether the objectives of their European engagement are 
of a pure economic nature or also consider European identity. The political science 
field needs to close these research gaps and produce the necessary data for a 
better understanding about the actors in regional level European politics, their 
policy and programmes outputs, and the underlying objectives of their European 
engagement. These concepts, which to date remain understudied, directly feed into 
the research question of this thesis: “What are the scope and objectives of regions’ 
European politics and what role does European identity play in them?” This thesis 
seeks to present, on the basis of empirical research, comprehensive and conclusive 
answers to this core research question. It will do so primarily on the strength of the 
chosen research model and methodologies applied.  
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Research Model  
The research model entails five stages and has been developed in order to garner 
an evidence-based understanding of the objectives of regions’ European policies, 
and who or what shapes the scope of these objectives - be it only political elites as 
the decision-makers; civil servants as the implementers; or even regional 
characteristics such as government system and geographic location which 
predetermine the relevance and capacity of a region to engage in European politics. 
The research model chosen is best suited to achieve these research aims, help 
close prevailing research gaps, and thus offer new research contributions to the 
field of comparative European governments and European identity.  
 
Research Design Stage 1: Regional characteristics affecting the scope and 
objectives of European policy 
What are the regions’ similarities and differences, and how do these potentially 
influence the extent of their European engagement? Research prior to this thesis 
indicates that prevailing national government systems in the various EU regions 
significantly influence the level of acquired political authority in engaging in 
European politics. It also suggests that regions located on a border to another 
European region may be more disposed to participate in European politics and, in 
the process, build a European identity. Furthermore, European Regional Network 
participation has been identified as a supportive mechanism for regions to engage 
in European politics. These and a number of other regional characteristics and 
features influence regions’ European engagement. In order to establish a 
descriptive analysis of the state of the European policies and programmes of the 97 
EU regions, a more comprehensive study on such regional characteristics and 
features and how they potentially influence and impact regions’ European 
engagement and levels of European identity will be presented in this thesis.  
 
Research Design Stage 2: Regions’ European Policies and Programmes 
This stage of the research design has two steps. The first step reviews the 
European policies and programmes available to all of the 97 EU regions, whilst the 
second step delves deeper into the actual European policies of four case study 
regions, respectively. The European policies and programmes available to all 97 EU 
regions, regardless of their regional characteristics and features, are the initiatives 
designed and provided by the European Commission’s Directorate General for 
Regional Policy through its Cohesion Policy. Its evolution up to the current Cohesion 
Policy will be presented alongside the analysis of its objectives. Researching the 
scope and objective of each of the 97 EU regions’ European policies and 
programmes would require qualitative research beyond the capacity of this thesis. 
Therefore, four regional case studies reflecting regional variations will be identified 
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and evaluated. The chosen case study regions are: Germany’s Brandenburg; 
Belgium’s Wallonia; France’s Nord – Pas de Calais; and the UK’s South West of 
England. The case study regions selected are representative examples of EU 
regions, and they showcase typical regional characteristics and features identified in 
the literature as potentially impacting scope and objectives of regions’ European 
engagement. The criteria for the case study selection will be further discussed later 
in this chapter, in the methodology section in Chapter 4. 
 
Research Design Stages 3 and 4: Perceptions of political elites and civil 
servants+ 
Once the four case study regions’ European policies have been presented and 
analysed and both the variations in their European engagement and their set 
objectives have been established, semi-structured interviews will be conducted with 
both the regions’ European  policy and political decision-makers (research model 
step 3) and  implementers (research model step 4). These interviews will provide 
opportunities to gauge in more detail their respective mandates and missions; 
policies and programmes, as well as their evolution over time. They will also 
provide opportunities to take the measure of the regional political elites as well as 
civil servants’ perceptions of the policies and programmes and what their 
differences may be. All of the information collected and analysed will provide a 
more comprehensive understanding of whether regions’ European policies and 
programmes intend to reach beyond the scope of economic cooperation and 
development, and whether they intend to foster a European identity. By conducting 
semi-structured interviews with both the political elites and civil servants, this 
research will present and assess two different levels of actors involved in regions’ 
European politics and ascertain nuances in as well as verification of perceptions. 
 
Research Design Stage 5: How do networks influence regions’ European 
engagement and identity-building 
Research findings explicate that, in theory, European regional networks have the 
ability to construct and develop a European identity throughout their participating 
members by enhancing the European-wide engagement of their membership. As 
nearly all EU regions participate in such network, this could have a highly significant 
impact on identity-building in Europe. Thus, it remains to be studied, firstly, 
whether European regional networks facilitate regions’ European engagement – 
particularly where great challenges posed by regions’ characteristics and features 
persist. And secondly, it must be studied whether in turn the networks also 
cultivate a European identity throughout their membership. In this vein, a case 
study on a European regional network will be presented. Both network selection 
criteria and justification will be further explained in the methodology section on 
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Chapter 7. Semi-structured interviews conducted with the network membership and 
a review and assessment of network documents to cross-reference statements 
made about its evolution, aims and objectives built the foundation of a thorough 
analysis that was to determine whether the network enhances engagement and 
identity-building throughout its European membership.  
 
This five-stage research design identifies regions’ varied European policy objectives 
and how they go about participating, designing and implementing their European 
policies and programmes. What impact the regional actors’ European identity 
considerations have on their respective European policies will also be addressed and 
assessed. The chosen research model will thus bring to life the research question: 
What are the scope and objectives of regions’ European policies and what role does 
European identity play in them? It will also make a substantial contribution to the 
studies of European government, EU politics and political science at large by closing 
gaps past and current scholarly research and literature have not systematically 
addressed and pave the path for further and future research to be undertaken on 
European regions policies and politics.  
 
 
Research Methodology 
The methodology chosen and designed makes it possible to ascertain a more 
comprehensive understanding of one of the key research questions that has long 
eluded both the academic community and policy and political decision-makers: 
What are the scope and objectives of regions’ European policies and programmes 
and what role does European identity play in their European engagement? As 
indicated in the research model, the research will commence by presenting a 
panorama of all 97 EU regions. This will be followed by an analysis of regions’ 
European policies and programmes. Building on this, semi-structured interviews 
with regional political elites and civil servants dealing with European policies and 
programmes will offer personal accounts of the respective regions’ European 
engagement and the role European identity plays within it. In addition, a European 
regional network will be presented in order to study whether networks are capable 
of enhancing regions’ European-wide engagement and, subsequently, influencing 
the course and conduct of European identity-building.  
 
The methodology selected for this research is predominantly qualitative, although 
the review of regional characteristics’ impacts on their European policies’ scope and 
objectives will provide a descriptive quantitative analysis of the 97 EU regions. For 
the quantitative analysis, data on all 97 regions will be collected and then analysed 
to identify similarities and variations across regional profiles. This approach will help 
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understand the variation in regions’ characteristics and features and how they 
impact their European engagement. The regions’ European policies and 
programmes section will consist of a qualitative documents analysis of both the four 
case study regions and the European Commission’s Directorate General for Regional 
Policy’s Cohesion Policy, accessible to all 97 EU regions. This section will offer first 
empirical insights into the comparative actual output of regions’ European policy; it 
will also highlight the variation amongst the four case study regions.  
 
This original research will then be complemented by an investigation of the 
perceptions of regional political elites and civil servants through semi-structured 
interviews and a qualitative analysis. Taken together, information and insights 
gained will clarify the objectives, intentions, and perceptions on implementation 
outcomes of the four chosen regions’ European policies and programmes. The 
interviews will also clarify which regional characteristics and features impact both 
scope and objectives of their European policies and programmes. The research 
conducted on European regional networks will undergo a qualitative documents 
analysis and be complemented by semi-structured interviews conducted with the 
network’s regional membership. These serve the purpose of better understanding 
whether networks are able to help regions engage and cooperate more with their 
European counterparts and cultivate a European identity through their initiatives. 
The initial quantitative study of the thesis research allows properly framing and 
forming an empirical understanding of the 97 EU regions, whereas the ensuing 
qualitative research on the vast majority of this thesis grants a comprehensive 
understanding of the role of European identity in four case study regions’ European 
policy and in one of the most commonly subscribed regional European policies – 
participating in a European regional network. Following a brief discussion on the 
case study selection, this chapter’s section will provide a detailed account of the 
methodology chosen for this thesis research.  
 
Regional case study selection 
In Chapter 1, Germany, Belgium, France and the UK were highlighted by political 
scientists for being of particular interest to the study of regional European politics. 
The four countries, it was argued, provide a range of regional characteristics 
influential in determining the scope of regions’ European engagement and levels of 
European identity. These regional characteristics include political elites’ interests; 
participation in a European regional network; the government system; geographic 
location (proximity to a European border); duration of EU membership; and 
whether a region shares the same language or similar heritage with another 
European region.  Which regions best showcase these characteristics and are thus 
more relevant to study than others?  
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Political scientists researching European regions’ level of political authority in order 
to determine the opportunity and constraints in engaging in European politics have 
posited that the government system (federal vs. unitary) impacts the scope of 
regions’ authority and activity. They have also emphasized the usefulness in further 
researching regions in Germany, Belgium, France and the UK, as these offer 
significant explanations of national governments’ impact on regions’ participation in 
European politics. Belgium was highlighted because of its on-going decentralisation 
process. The East German regions were set apart from others because they 
demonstrate the dichotomy between East and West in the post WWII world era and 
they provides a unique window into fairly recent exposure and outlook changes 
among East Germans (being formerly more oriented toward the East, and, more 
recently, being more integrated into West Germany and oriented toward the EU). 
Furthermore, the German regions extent of decentralization differs from that 
prevalent in Belgium, and it thus offers a further variation in the analysis of 
government systems. The French regions have also been identified as appropriate 
case studies as they have received generous national political support to engage in 
European politics through the country’s regionalisation reforms. And British regions, 
particularly English ones operating within a currently re-centralising government 
system, have been described as deliberately isolated regions in terms of their 
European engagement. Hence, regions within these four countries offer valuable 
data about their respective national government systems’ influence and impacts 
with regard to both objectives and scope of their European policies and 
programmes. 
 
In addition to the regions’ governmental and political characteristics, they also offer 
diversity in terms of geographic location.  The literature review indicates that 
regions located alongside a European border should, in theory, have a higher extent 
of European engagement and a more natural and organic approach to fomenting a 
European identity.  Assessing their diversity in geographic proximity to a European 
border, the four regions studied are expected to also yield a variety of explanations 
vis-à-vis the impact of their respective geographic locations on their European 
engagement and European identity levels.  
 
The EU’s Cohesion Policy provides all EU regions with opportunities to participate in 
European regional networks. The number of European regional networks in which 
regions participate however have not yet been studied. Therefore more 
sophisticated selection criteria cannot be advanced at this point. However, because 
networks have been identified as important facilitators of regions’ European 
engagement on the one hand, while very little empirical research has been 
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conducted with regard to their respective range and depth on the other hand, this 
thesis will present a two-fold study on a European regional network by providing an 
introductory review and illustrating how it is perceived within the context and 
confines of the chosen four case studies’ European engagement. 
 
Political science research has also drawn on the significance of the ‘time factor’ 
when studying levels of European identity. It has been empirically demonstrated 
that levels of European identity increase with and over time. Identifying with 
Europe and feeling European simply takes time. Therefore, it can be expected that 
levels of European identity would be higher in areas which have been members of 
the EU and participated in European programmes for a longer period of time than 
the newer member states’. A country comparison based on EU membership 
duration could help establish a clearer understanding on the variation in levels of 
European identity across the EU. The four countries highlighted in the literature for 
providing appropriate variation, however, do not offer great variation in the 
duration of their EU membership – with the exception of the German region of 
Brandenburg, which only reunited with West Germany and thereby joined the EU in 
1990. Hence, the relationship between being an EU Member State and the 
respective levels of feeling a European identity must be further studied and 
compared in order to establish whether time, indeed, matters.  
 
Findings would potentially reflect greater variety if case studies presented both 
founding EU Member States and newly joined EU Member States (from the 2004 
and 2007 enlargement periods), with regions in newer EU Member States being less 
mature and therefore ‘in greater need’ to be studied. Government systems in newer 
EU member States are, in many cases, still transitioning into democracies with 
brand new sub-national structures. Secondly, regions in the new EU Member States 
are just starting to engage in European politics and most regions had not yet set up 
regional European offices or even regional websites during the duration of this 
research. Thirdly, as this thesis is covering new ground within the field of political 
science, a qualitative research design and approach promises to produce a new 
level of knowledge and understanding. Finally, the primary tool employed in this 
exploration is semi-structured interviewing. All interviews will be conducted in the 
interviewees’ mother tongue or regional language to ensure accuracy and to put 
the interviewee at ease. This path-breaking research will be conducted on regions 
which were EU members prior to the 2004 enlargement phases.  
 
Additional impacts on the scope of regions’ European engagement and the level of 
European identity and whether political elites and civil servants foment a European 
identity is expected to be caused by both regional heritage and language. Do 
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regions with a similar heritage work better together on a European scale? Do 
citizens identify more with citizens of regions which share a similar heritage? Do 
they work engage more naturally and identify more with each other if they speak 
the same language? The impact of heritage and language have not yet been 
studied and therefore these initial findings ought to be captured as they, based on 
intuition, ‘naturally’ influence how people work together and perceive themselves – 
and each other. The four countries offer and employ a variety in languages; in 
some cases the regional language is distinct from other European languages, and in 
other cases they are very commonly spoken languages across Europe. Also the four 
countries offer a variety of distinct and shared heritage backgrounds.  
 
Drawing these multiple regional characteristics and features together, the case 
study selection criteria include: national government system; geographic proximity 
to a European border; European regional network participation; duration of EU 
membership; and regions’ language and heritage. Based on these, the regions 
presented in Table 2.1 have been selected for the research of this thesis. 
 
Table 2.1: Regional Case Study Selection Criteria based on existing 
scholarly research and literature 
Region 
Government 
system 
Geographic Border 
Proximity 
Network 
Participation 
EU 
Membership 
since 
Language 
Brandenburg, 
Germany 
Federal 
On a border now, 
previously not 
Very 
regularly 
1990 
German 
(uncommon) 
Wallonia, Belgium Federal On a border 
Very 
regularly 
Founder 
French 
(common) 
Nord–Pas de Calais, 
France 
Unitary On a border 
Regularly 
but very 
selectively 
Founder 
French 
(common) 
South West of 
England, UK 
Unitary Not on a border Marginally 1973 
English 
(common) 
 
Firstly, these regions are located in the four countries identified by political 
scientists as being particularly useful to study as they harbour the characteristics 
anticipated to impact the scope and objectives of regions’ European engagement 
and level of European identity. Additionally, the selected regions within those four 
countries also offer unique evidence. Although Brandenburg and Wallonia are both 
in federal states, their respective government systems still offer variation in levels 
of regional political authority. Furthermore, even though they are now both located 
on a European border (very few regions in federal states are not on a European 
border as they are predominantly located in the core of the EU), Wallonia borders 
to regions of the founding states of the European Community, whereas 
Brandenburg was part of East Germany during the Community’s founding years, 
and, upon joining the EU in 1990, bordered to Poland, a non EU Member State for 
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fourteen years. Therefore, Brandenburg has a unique history of European 
integration to unfold during this qualitative research project. And finally, 
Brandenburg and Wallonia can tell their respective stories on how language affects 
European engagement and identity-building, as they offer variation on this criterion 
as well. For the two regions in unitary states, of course their respective government 
systems also significantly vary in the level of regional authority. And this makes 
them such useful case studies. French regions have had the benefit of 
regionalisation and gaining political authority to engage in European politics from 
the 80s. English regions also benefitted from regionalisation, only much late in the 
late 1990s, and are very likely to lose them again under a Conservative 
government. In addition to the very important variation in the level of political 
authority of the regional ‘governments’ in England and France, there is also 
significant variation on their geographic location as well as their membership 
duration. Therefore, these regions present valuable differences in their regional 
characteristics and history, and thus make for very unique and useful case studies. 
Regional European representatives of these four regions agreed to participate in 
semi-structured interviews and provide documentation and personal reflections on 
the scope and objectives of their regions’ European policies and programmes. 
Details of this methodology will be further elaborated later in this chapter, when 
presenting the methodology for Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
Before continuing with the methodological discussion of this thesis research, the 
definition of a ‘regional government’ remains to be clarified. The European 
Commission’s (Eurostat) definition of a region as outlined by the NUTS 
(Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) level 1 has been selected and 
adopted as the level of analysis for the ‘region’ (Source: European Commission 
Website: Eurostat on Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics, NUTS). Its 
focus is the sub-national level, which has the authority to manage EU funding and, 
in some EU Member States, to design and implement European policies and 
programmes. This is the appropriate level of analysis for the four case studies. In 
Germany, the regional government is the ‘Landesregierung’ and the 
institutionalised body in charge of its European politics is the ‘Ministry for Economy 
and European Affairs’. It manages EU funding allocated to the region, applying for 
additional EU funding for public and private sector European cooperation projects, 
and it manages the region’s own European policy and mandate. Brandenburg has a 
high level of operational capacity as it is in a federal, decentralised state. This is a 
NUTS 1 regional classification. In Belgium, the decentralisation has established 
three regions: Flanders, Brussels Capital and Wallonia. The Walloon region’s 
European politics are managed by the WBI (‘Wallonia Bruxelles Intérnational’). As 
Brandenburg’s ‘Ministry for Economy and European Affairs’, Wallonia’s WBI also has 
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a high level of operational capacity and manages EU funding allocated to the 
region; applies for additional funding for European cooperation projects; and 
decides and implements its own European policy. This is also a NUTS 1 regional 
classification. In France, the regional reforms have established NUTS 1 regions, 
which manage the regions’ European affairs, the ‘Conseil Régional’. Similar to 
Brandenburg and Wallonia, Nord – Pas de Calais also has the operational capacity 
to manage EU funding allocated to the region and apply for additional funding for 
European cooperation projects. The region also has the political authority to design 
and implement a European policy. The extent of political authority to do this, 
however, is less than in Brandenburg and Wallonia. In the United Kingdom, the 
NUTS 1 regional classification has been implemented especially in order to manage 
EU funding to the region.  Here, the NUTS 1 level of regional government is the 
Regional Development Agency, which does not carry the same institutionalised 
weight as the regional governments in the other three countries. As such, the 
Regional Development Agency in the South West of England does not have the 
political authority to design and implement its own European policy. It merely exists 
to manage the EU funding allocated to the region under negotiation between the 
British central government and the EU. The Regional Development Agency also has 
the political authority to identify EU funded projects relevant to the region and 
assist regional actors from the public and private sectors to in applying for these 
European cooperation projects. However, with changes in central government from 
Labour to Conservative Coalition, the English Regional Development Agencies are 
undergoing authority and funding cuts and are to be gradually shut down; with 
their competencies divided between the Local Enterprise Partnerships and central 
government. Before this transition is complete, however, the NUTS 1 level of 
analysis is the appropriate level to investigate the regions’ European policies and 
programmes and also offers valuable variation.   
  
Methodology for the review of 97 EU regions’ European policy impacts 
(Chapter 3) 
The third chapter’s principal objective is to present a review of the 97 EU regions –
who are they, what are their characteristics, and how might this affect regions’ 
European engagement? In view of the great number of EU regions, this research 
has embraced a quantitative methodology. Regional characteristics and features are 
studied so that similarities and differences amongst the regions can be isolated and 
identified. They are also expected to influence the regions’ capacities to engage in 
European politics. However, there is a substantial lack of available data on the 
European regions as most of the existing data has been collected at the national 
level. This will be further discussed in this chapter’s section as well as in the 
analysis of Chapter 3. 
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Regional characteristics, features and profiles 
The regional characteristics and features, which were identified in previous research 
as exercising potential influence on a region’s European engagement, will be 
investigated in Chapter 3. These include, amongst others, the national government 
system, the geographical proximity of the region to a European border, a region’s 
participation in a European regional network, and the extent of time a region has 
been a member of the EU. In addition to these, further regional characteristics will 
be assessed in order to see whether these influence a region’s European 
engagement or the levels of European identity.  In the absence of any data on the 
scope of regions’ European engagement, an attempt to devise a proxy value to 
accommodate for its lack this made. Also, as there is no existing data on the 
regions’ levels of European identity, it cannot be evaluated which regions have 
higher levels of European identity than others, and why. To answer both of these 
questions, extensive research on all 97 EU regions would need to be conducted. 
This thesis research instead aims to conduct an in depth study investigating the 
current phenomenon of regions becoming European actors. It will probe in four 
case studies the underlying regional characteristics impacting the scope and 
objectives of their European engagement.  
 
Therefore, because of the lack of precise regional data, a descriptive quantitative 
analysis will be conducted in Chapter 3 to present the 97 EU regions and identify 
which data needs to be collected in future research. Then, the subsequent chapters 
will employ a qualitative methodology to thoroughly investigate four case study 
regions and, on a small scale, identify what the scope of their engagement is and 
which factors cause the variation.  
 
The independent variables in this chapter include: 
 National government system 
 Regional geographic location and proximity to a European border 
 European regional network participation 
 EU membership duration 
 Regional GDP (PPS) (as an indicator of the amount of Cohesion Policy 
funding regions receive, and thus  an indication of the potential scope and 
objective of their European engagement) 
 Amount of EU funding received (as an indicator of their European 
engagement) 
 Region’s official language 
 
The dependent variables in this chapter are: 
 A region’s European engagement 
 A region’s level of European identity  
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Data sources 
A range of data will articulate what regions are, what their characteristics are, and 
how this affects their European engagement. Firstly, the regions are studied at the 
NUTS 1 level. Though not all EU Member States have ‘natural’ regions at this level,  
all have ‘constructed’ and implemented them in order to engage in the Cohesion 
Policy – a domain of European engagement shared by all EU regions. Secondly, to 
answer the question about the regions’ characteristics, the following section will 
present the selected data sources which, according to the relevant literature, have 
been identified as potentially affecting regions’ European engagement. 
 
In the absence of data on the scope of regions’ European engagement or the extent 
of funding regions receive from the EU’s Cohesion Policy to participate in European 
programmes, a number of proxy variables have been selected and analysed to 
glean regions’ participation in EU-funded European programmes. The first proxy 
variable represents the extent of funding regions received from the EU’s Cohesion 
Policy to engage in European policies and programmes. The amount of funding 
regions receive reflects proportionally regions’ GDP per capita. While the European 
Commission’s Directorate General for Regional Policy (DG REGIO) maintain a data 
set at a national level, the variation in regions’ European engagement in the EU’s 
Cohesion Policy’s programmes cannot be evaluated based on this data. To establish 
this evaluative basis, further data collection on all 97 EU regions would become 
necessary. In order to ascertain an indication of regions’ European engagement in 
terms of their participation in Cohesion Policy programmes, Chapter 3 will present 
the regions’ GDP/PPS (purchasing power standard), as this determines the amount 
of funding regions receive; the chapter will also present the amount of funding each 
EU Member State receives, as this in turn provides an indication of the distribution 
of funding across the EU. The GDP/PPS data reflects the values published in 1990 
and 2010, while the Cohesion Policy funding allocated to each of the 27 EU Member 
States displays the value for the 2007 – 2013 period. To further study the sub-
national allocation of funding based on existing data, Chapter 3 will also investigate 
the amount of funding each EU Member State received divided by that country’s 
population. The population data used for this exercise has been made available by 
the European Commission’s Eurostat service.  
 
Data on the duration of EU membership per EU Member State is available on the 
European Union’s website (European Union Website, Information on EU Member 
States). Membership duration is categorised as Old EU Member States (the original 
EU-15 Member States) and New EU Member States (the states which joined the EU 
from 2004 onwards). 
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Data on the national government systems of the respective 27 EU Member States is 
available on each of the country’s websites as well as in various political science 
literature (Lijphart, 1999; Hooghe, Marks & Schakel, 2010). The government 
systems were categorised as 1= Unitary; and 2 = Federal, respectively.  
 
Data on the geographic location of regions and information on whether they share a 
border with another EU region is provided by the EU Commission’s Directorate 
General for Regional Policy website (Source: European Commission’s Directorate 
General for Regional Policy on Cohesion Policy funding in EU Member States’ 
regions). By studying the map on which the borders of NUTS 1 regions are drawn 
in, a data set was assembled that categorised (1) regions which are located directly 
on a border to a region of another EU member state; and (2) regions which do not 
share a border with another EU region.  
 
Data on the official regional languages is provided on the regions’ and countries’ 
government websites. The languages were then categorised as either being 
languages commonly spoken in the EU or not. Although all (23) languages of the 27 
EU Member States are official EU languages, the working languages are English and 
French. Thus, regions in which the official regional language is either English or 
French are categorised under 2, and regions in which the official language is neither 
English nor French are categorised under 1.  
 
Data on the regions’ participation in European regional networks was retrieved from 
a survey sent to all 97 regions’ Brussels offices. 46 out of 97 regions responded to 
the survey and 100% stated that they participate in regional networks. However, 
they were not certain as to the exact number of European regional networks the 
region participates in.  
 
Also, the levels of European identity are investigated in this thesis research. 
European identity at national levels has been researched by the European 
Commission’s Eurobarometer surveys. Results from the surveys conducted in 1990 
and 2006 were used for this thesis research. The question asked in both surveys 
was whether people feel European. The possible answers were ‘don’t know’; ‘yes’; 
‘sometimes’, ‘no’; and ‘never’. For the purpose of this study, the answer 
‘’sometimes’ was counted as ‘yes’ and the answer ‘never’ was counted as ‘no’. The 
answer ‘don’t know’ was excluded as it could not be counted toward ‘yes’ or ‘no’. 
Exceptionally, in the 2010 survey, the Eurobarometer provided one additional 
answer to the same question: ‘not really’. For the purpose of this study, ‘not really’ 
was counted as ‘no’ and the remaining possible answers were counted as with the 
previous surveys. Unfortunately, no data exists on the levels of European identity 
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amongst the 97 EU regions. Therefore, in the absence of data on either the extent 
of EU funding provided to each region or the number of projects and programmes 
each region engages with; and the lack of data on the level of European identity in 
each region, it is not possible to verify the correlation between the amount of 
funding, extent of European engagement and the level of European identity at the 
regional level. The lack of data on both the amount of EU funding provided to each 
region and the number of EU funded projects and programmes each region 
participates on the one hand and the lack of reliable information about the range of 
each region’s European policies and programmes on the other hand presents a real 
dilemma for this investigation in the absence of proxy data for the regions’ 
European engagement. As a correlation cannot be established between independent 
variable and dependent variable at the regional level, a regression analysis based 
on regional data can also not be conducted. Thus, due to the lack of regional data, 
a quantifiable and conclusive analysis of the effect of regional idiosyncrasies on 
regions’ European engagement cannot be exercised at this time. That said, the 
third chapter provides a descriptive analysis of the 97 regions’ idiosyncrasies; what 
the regions have in common and what their differences are.  
 
 
Methodology for comparative regions’ European policies (Chapter 4)  
This chapter reviews the European regional policies and programmes in which all EU 
regions can participate, as well as the European policies and programmes of the 
four case study regions. The aim of this chapter is to present the scope and 
objectives of regions’ European engagement. In doing so, this chapter produces a 
policy and documents analysis.  
 
The policies of the European Commission’s Directorate General for Regional Policy 
have been collected from its website and their key elements highlighted and 
summarised in this chapter. In a second step a critical analysis investigated the 
objectives of these policies, as well as how these objectives have changed over 
time. Semi-structured interviews with European Commission officials responsible for 
the design and implementation of the Regional Policy were conducted to provide 
insider accounts of its evolution and to prompt explanations of the priorities set for 
the Cohesion Policy’s next funding period. The first interview was held with a 
representative of the Policy Development Unit. This representative was selected 
because she has been a senior member of the Unite and has had both significant 
experience and oversight responsibilities of the Unit. Her account of the internal 
decision-making mechanisms and the setting of objectives and priorities is 
therefore particularly valuable. The second interviewee was recruited for her 
longstanding experience with the Territorial Cooperation Unit which oversees one of 
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the programmes of the Cohesion Policy. The Territorial Cooperation Unit is by all 
counts the most significant domain of regions’ European engagement beyond 
funding allocations for convergence and competitiveness development within 
regions; to have a proper understanding and account of this programme’s 
objectives is therefore imperative.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with desk and programme officers 
responsible for Cohesion Policy design and formulation in three of the four case 
study regions, as well as desk officers dealing with territorial cooperation among 
three of the four case study regions. The regional desk officers were identified and 
recruited by  a web-based process and based on their area of expertise of  the case 
study regions. Three of the four desk officers were in Brussels during the week in 
which the interviews took place; one of the regional desk officers was not able to 
conduct the interview. The senior representative of the Territorial Cooperation Unit 
organised for the desk officers of the four case study regions to discuss their 
accounts during the week of the interviews; with one desk officer again not able to 
attend the interviews. Table 2.2 below lists the interviewees within the European 
Commission’s Directorate General for Regional Policy. 
 
Table 2.2: Interviewees from the European Commission’s Directorate 
General for Regional Policy (DG REGIO) 
Number DG REGIO Unit 
Role of 
interviewee 
Experience 
in this role 
Interview 
duration  
1 
Policy 
Development 
(Directorate B) 
A senior 
representative 
10-15 years 48 minutes 
2 
Territorial 
Cooperation 
(Directorate 
D.1) 
A senior 
representative 
5-10 years 65 minutes 
3 
Territorial 
Cooperation 
(Directorate D1) 
Desk Officer, 
Brandenburg 
2-5 years 12 minutes 
4 
Territorial 
Cooperation 
(Directorate D1) 
Desk Officer, SWUK 5-10 years 13 minutes 
5 
Territorial 
Cooperation 
(Directorate D1) 
Desk Officer, 
Wallonie 
2-5 years 9 minutes 
6 
Programmes and 
Projects 
(Directorate F.2) 
Desk Officer, 
Wallonie 
2-5 years 18 minutes 
7 
Programmes and 
Projects 
(Directorate 
H.3) 
Desk Officer, NPDC 5-10 years 12 minutes 
8 
Programmes and 
Projects 
(Directorate E.2) 
Desk Officer, SWUK 5-10 years 22 minutes 
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The interviews took place in the officials’ offices in Brussels, and they lasted 
between 10 minutes and 65 minutes. Interviews with the senior representatives 
routinely lasted longer, reflecting their wider range of involvement and experience, 
particularly as it is related to the evolution of the policies and programmes. They 
also were more willing to discuss in greater detail their perceptions and 
assessments. This pattern was mirrored in the interviews conducted with desk 
officers; the greater their engagement and experience, the more expansive their 
accounts and the more comfortable they were in discussing their perceptions and 
assessments on the regions’ scope and objectives in their European engagement.  
 
Senior representatives were asked questions about their perceptions of the 
evolution of the EU’s Regional Policy and the current Cohesion Policy. Further 
questions were asked about what, within the Cohesion Policy, will be prioritised 
within the next funding period. Furthermore, desk officers dealing with the case 
study regions were asked questions about their perceptions of their respective 
region’s scope of European engagement.   
 
All interviewees were asked about their perception of whether the Cohesion Policy 
and the Regional Policy in general foster a European identity through the range of 
programmes and projects offered and implemented. Interviewees were given the 
freedom to raise and elaborate on issues they deemed particularly important in the 
course of the interview. The interviews also served the purpose to ensure that the 
regions’ scope of European engagement with respect to EU funded programmes had 
been fully understood before travelling to the individual case study regions. The 
interviews were conducted in English. Brief notes were taken during the interviews 
and completed immediately following the exchanges. The interview material was 
also used to complement the documents’ analysis of the EU’s Regional Policy and 
Cohesion Policy.  
 
European policy documents from the four case study regions are then presented 
and evaluated in this chapter (Chapter 2). Documents and further, relevant 
information about the regions’ European policies and programmes is by and large 
available on regional governments’ respective websites. Additional documents were 
provided by the regional governments on the occasion of the fieldwork visits, 
including annual plans, annual reviews, brochures on specific projects and 
programmes. The regional governments of the selected case study regions were 
asked to supply organisational charts of the teams, services, directorates and/or 
departments managing the regions’ European affairs. The documents in their 
totality helped to better understand, among others, the contexts and scope of the 
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European programmes offered by the respective regions, the areas prioritised, and 
resources mobilised for lobbying and staffing. They also helped prepare for the 
semi-structured interviews with regional political elites and civil servants in charge 
of European affairs. These documents were critically evaluated, and the essential 
points are presented in the chapter. The four case study regions’ scope of European 
policies and programmes were then compared to illuminate und illustrate their 
similarities and differences.  
 
 
Methodology for regional political elites semi-structured interviews 
(Chapter 5) 
In order to understand the underlying reasons behind both the scope and 
objectives of the four case study regions’ European policies and programmes, semi-
structured interviews were conducted with political decision-makers of those 
regions’ European politics divisions. This occurred following exhaustive analyses of 
the preliminary documents of each region’s European policies and programmes. The 
expectation was that the interviewees’ accounts could substantiate the documents’ 
analysis, but that they would also allow for additional and deeper analytical insights 
and explanations. The semi-structured interviews were the chosen methodology to 
optimally address a range of topics central to the thesis’s research and hypotheses. 
The interviewees made frequent use of the interviews’ flexible structure by freely 
discussing issues they considered to be of high importance and, at times, great 
sensitivity; these exchanges complemented the questions outlined in the 
preparatory notes for the interview questions and topics selected.  
 
Interviewee recruitment and logistics 
The interviewees recruited to represent the political elites were the Directors of the 
European divisions of the regional governments. Insofar, the number of political 
elites interviewed is fewer than the number of civil servants interviewed, as there 
are fewer policy decision-makers than implementing civil servants. In the case of 
Brandenburg, the top regional decision-maker for European affairs is the Minister 
for European Affairs and. His deputy, nominally in charge of European affairs, was 
the next most senior decision-maker in line. The deputy Minister in charge of 
European affairs not only participated in the semi-structured three-hour interview 
to discuss the regions’ European policies and programmes, he also provided a range 
of examples of his regions’ European engagement. The three-hour-interview was 
broken into two sessions: one session took place in the morning and one in the 
afternoon; both were conducted in the political elite’s office in German. The 
interview was audio-recorded.  
 
 57 
 
The Brandenburg political administrative elite also selected the administrative level 
civil servants of the regions’ European affairs team to participate in the interviews. 
According to the personnel chart, these selected interviewees represent each 
functional area of the regions’ European affairs. The engagement of the political 
elite can be characterised as having been very pro-active, interested in and 
supportive of the project and its objectives.   
 
In Wallonia, the region’s top European decision-maker is the Minister President, 
although the division in charge of managing and executing matters of European 
affairs is run by a small number of general directors in charge of EU legal 
integration, European territorial cooperation and European bilateral partnerships. 
The directors of each of these three divisions were selected for the interviews to 
provide in depth accounts of how decisions are made and implemented. The 
Minister President was not available for the interview. The assistant to the director 
of the European territorial cooperation division was mandated to assist in the 
identification and selection of the administrative civil servants interviews. The 
interview with the director of EU affairs lasted nearly 60 minutes; the interview with 
the director of bilateral partnerships nearly 40 minutes; and the interview with the 
director of European territorial cooperation 15 minutes. The interviews with the 
political elites managing the EU legal integration and the European bilateral 
partnerships divisions lasted longer than the interview with the general director of 
the European bilateral partnerships division because of limited personnel capacity in 
each of the divisions. The European bilateral partnerships general director, for 
instance, is the only person working on European partnerships, while the general 
director of the EU legal integration division manages a team of two administrative 
civil servants (one of whom was also interviewed for the administrative case) and 
the general director of the EU territorial cooperation division manages a team of six 
administrative civil servants; all of whom were also interviewed for the 
administrative case.  
 
The political elite managing European territorial cooperation in Wallonia was very 
pressed for time during the week of the interviews; the interview therefore was 
comparatively short. However, the political elite apologetically volunteered to make 
himself available for further questions should they arise. All three interviews took 
place in the respective political elites’ offices. The interviews were conducted in the 
region’s official language, French, and all were audio-recorded. 
 
In the South West of England, the civil servant managing the European policy 
within the RDA was integral in identifying and selecting the political elite for the 
case study interviews; he was also instrumental in attaining the consent from the 
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administrative case to participate in the interviews. Once the civil servant had 
discussed the case study with the political elite, the political elite agreed to the 
planned interviews and also to assist in attaining the other civil servants’ consent. 
This was no small feat because of their very sceptical reaction to the invitation to 
participate in the interviews.  
 
The interview with the political elite lasted just short of 30 minutes. The civil 
servant who had expressed interest to participate in the case study had suggested 
to interview the former political elite, who had been reassigned to a different 
position within the RDA. The former political elite was quite willing to discuss in 
particular the evolution and prospects of the region’s European engagement. The 
interview with the former political elite lasted nearly 30 minutes. The interview with 
the current political elite was conducted in one of the RDA’s conference rooms 
(where all of the interviews took place); the interview with the former political elite 
took place in his office. Both interviews were conducted in the region’s official 
language, English, and were audio-recorded. 
 
In Nord – Pas de Calais, the general director for European cooperation played a 
significant role in the region’s agreement to be one of the four case studies and in 
identifying and selecting the interviewees of both the political elite and the 
administrative levels. The top decision-maker on European affairs for the region, 
the director, assigned the deputy director to participate in the interview. 
Hierarchically, the director makes and signs off on the top policy decisions, with the 
deputy director, who also acts as the general director for European projects, in 
charge of managing the European team. The third political elite, is the general 
director for European cooperation. Thus, two of three political elites participated in 
the interviews. The interview with the deputy director lasted 20 minutes; the 
interview with the general director for European cooperation last 45 minutes. It was 
conducted in two sessions; the first session lasted 30 minutes, and it was 
conducted at the beginning of the case study, while the second session lasted 15 
minutes at the end of the case study. Both interviews took place in the respective 
political elites’ offices. The interviews were conducted in the region’s official 
language, French, and were audio-recorded. 
 
Table 2.3 below shows the political elites from the four case study regions who 
participated in the semi-structured interviews; it also includes information about 
their approximate professional European experience, of working in that role or in 
the European division, as well as the interview duration. 
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Table 2.3 Interviewees – The political elites  
Number Region Position / Role Experience in 
this role / 
division 
Interview 
Duration 
9 
Nord – Pas 
de Calais 
Deputy Director and 
General Director for 
European Projects 
10-15 years 20 minutes 
10 
Nord – pas 
de Calais 
General Director for 
European Cooperation 
15-20 years 
45 minutes 
(30+15) 
11 
South West 
of England 
Director of European 
Programmes 
20-25 years 30 minutes 
12 
South West 
of England 
Former Head of Policy 
incl. European Policy 
15-20 years 25 minutes 
13 Brandenburg 
Deputy Director of 
European affairs and 
General Director of EU 
policy and legal 
coordination, European 
Ministerial Conference 
and European 
Communications 
20-25 years 3 hours 
14 Wallonia 
General Director for 
European Territorial 
Cooperation 
20-25 years 15 minutes 
15 Wallonia 
General Director for EU 
legal integration 
15-20 years 56 minutes 
16 Wallonia 
General Director for 
European Bilateral 
Partnerships 
20-25 years 38 minutes 
 
 
Semi-structured interview topics, questions and analysis 
The topics addressed in the interviews for all case study regions included a 
discussion of the European policy and programmes decision-making process; 
organisational changes within the regional government’s European teams; the 
evolution of policy priorities and objectives as well as the strategies considered in 
preparation of the next EU funding period from 2014 onwards.  
 
All of the political elites interviewed have had between 10 and 25 years of 
experience working in the European domain of regional politics and government. 
Their accounts of the regions’ European policies and programmes development over 
time are therefore very valuable. They all have gained relevant and original 
insiders’ experiences and perspectives and thus offer great potential and promise to 
the thesis’s documents’ analysis and a discussion of their perceptions of the 
underlying objectives of the European engagement of the region – past, present 
and future. The interview questions reflected these considerations and they were 
consequently focused on the themes and topics listed above. They were also 
framed in such a way as to invite further discussion and to entice the political elites 
to speak freely about them. In this way, the political elites had the space to discuss 
 60 
 
and divulge, if they so decided, information and insights they felt comfortable 
sharing and considered worthy of mentioning.  
 
The political elites were very happy to discuss the scope and objectives of their 
region’s European engagement. Typically two types of follow-up questions to a 
topic of discussion were asked. The first was aimed at seeking current or past policy 
or programme examples to illustrate their point on matters of scope and / or 
objectives. The second follow-up question was typically more critical, asking about 
difficulties and challenges related to their regions’ European engagement and how 
these might be overcome.  
 
The strategic goals of the interviews were four fold. The first was to make political 
elites feel comfortable by allowing them choose the location of the interview and to 
express themselves freely in their mother tongue. The second goal was to allow 
them time to discuss the topics they wanted to promote and perceived as 
important. Their perceptions and interpretations, in turn, provided valuable insider 
knowledge and explanations to the documents’ analysis. The third goal was to 
follow up with specific questions about relevant examples, which are not always 
included in regions’ documents or made available to the case study. And the fourth 
goal was to ensure that all of the information tied directly into the research 
question – even if the political elites had gone off topic in the first part of the 
interviews.  
 
In the case of the general director for European cooperation in Wallonia, where the 
political elite had let it be known that he would not have more than 15 minutes for 
the interview, the discussion commenced with a question on the core objectives 
and was followed with a question on the difficulties and challenges of their 
European engagement. The interview concluded with a question about the 
anticipated objective of the next phase of the region’s European policy of the 
region. The interviews with the  
administrative civil servants of the European cooperation team served the primary 
purpose of filling in the gaps and providing more details on a fuller range of policy 
and programmes examples. This was possible because of the civil servants’ 
extensive 5 to 25 years of experience in the field.  
 
All of the interviews were audio-recorded. Key points were written down swiftly 
during the interview and expanded on after completion of the interview and before 
going into the next interview. This allowed for the verification of a point or concept 
and also made it possible to obtain a range of perceptions. A list of key points was 
developed throughout the interview period. After completion of the case study 
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interviews, the audio-recordings were partially transcribed, highlighting the most 
salient points made. Salient points were those which provided original or 
substantiating information and were, in addition, suitable to complement the 
documents’ analysis by either verifying  or falsifying research findings discussed in 
Chapter 1, or which verified or falsified statements made by other political elites 
and / or administrative civil servants. Based on this, a comparative analysis of the 
four case study regions was then undertaken. 
 
 
Methodology for regional civil servants semi-structured interviews 
(Chapter 6) 
Similar to the semi-structured interviews with the political elites, the sixth chapter 
seeks to identify and define perceptions of civil servants working in regional 
European politics.  
 
Interviewee recruitment and logistics 
The regional political elites of all four case study regions had in principle given 
permission to conduct semi-structured interviews with all civil servants 
implementing European policies and programmes, but the degree of their 
agreement and support varied. In Nord – Pas de Calais; Brandenburg and Wallonia, 
political elites took the initiative to secure the administrative civil servants’ 
participation in interviews. In contrast, in the South West of England it was an 
administrative civil servant who had taken the initiative to gain first the support of 
the political elite and then, in a combined effort, also the support of the 
administrative civil servants. For all civil servants, however, it was essential to have 
secured the political elites’ consent to their participation in the interviews before 
agreeing to discuss their work and perceptions on the region’s European 
engagement.  
 
Working locales and surroundings also differed considerably. In the South West of 
England, administrative civil servants work in an open plan office space. Interviews 
therefore were conducted in the division’s conference room. In Nord – Pas de 
Calais, two administrative civil servants are assigned to share one office. When the 
interviews were conducted, one civil servant routinely volunteered to work in a 
different office or the common room to ensure privacy and confidentiality during the 
interviews. In Wallonia, most administrative civil servants had their own offices. 
Only one civil servant had to share an office, but the colleague was not at the office 
on the day of the interview. In Brandenburg, the administrative civil servants had 
their own offices and the interviews were conducted there. As with the political 
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elites, all interviews were conducted in the region’s official language so that the 
interviewees could be as comfortable as possible, speaking in their mother tongue.  
 
In a number of cases, civil servants spoke so freely that they immediately after the 
interview asked for certain information and details to not be used, which was 
respected and omitted from notes and transcriptions. As with the political elites’ 
interviews, nearly all administrative civil servants interviews were audio-recorded, 
except on one occasion when a civil servant did not feel comfortable with an audio-
recording being made of the conversation. Brief notes on the key points or concepts 
were made during the interview and developed after its completion. Partial 
transcriptions of all of the salient points were made once the case study had been 
completed. The salient points were identified and treated as already indicated 
above. 
 
Table 2.4 below provides information on the administrative civil servants 
interviewed in the four case study regions. 
 
 
Table 2.4 Interviewees – The civil servants  
Number Region Position / role 
Experience 
in this role / 
division 
Interview 
Duration 
17 
Nord – Pas 
de Calais 
European Cooperation, 
Project Capitalisation 
Officer  
4-5 years 
35 
minutes 
18 
Nord – Pas 
de Calais 
European Cooperation, 
Training Officer 
2-3 years 
30 
minutes 
19 
Nord – Pas 
de Calais 
European Cooperation, 
Youth Mobility Officer 
10-12 years 
36 
minutes 
20 
Nord – Pas 
de Calais 
European Cooperation, 
Strategy Centre Officer 
10 years 
25 
minutes 
21 
Nord – Pas 
de Calais 
European Cooperation,  
Finance and Legal Officer 
8-10 years 
15 
minutes 
22 
Nord – Pas 
de Calais 
European Cooperation, 
Bilateral Partnerships 
Poland and Germany 
Officer 
8-10 years 
45 
minutes 
23 
Nord – Pas 
de Calais 
INTERREG IV A 
Programmes Officer 
8-10 years 
30 
minutes 
24 
Nord – Pas 
de Calais 
INTERREG IV A 
Programmes Officer 
5-6 years 
20 
minutes 
25 
Nord – Pas 
de Calais 
INTERREG Programmes 
Manager 
8-10 years 
20 
minutes 
26 
Nord – Pas 
de Calais 
INTERREG  IV B and C 
Programmes National 
Authority 
12-15 years 
15 
minutes 
27 
Nord – Pas 
de Calais 
 
Structural Funds Assistant 8 years 
15 
minutes 
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28 
Nord – Pas 
de Calais 
Head of Projects 
Development 
8-10 years 
35 
minutes 
29 
Nord – Pas 
de Calais 
Projects Development 
Officer 
5 years 
15 
minutes 
30 
South West 
of England 
Policy Manager, Europe 5-8 years 
60 
minutes 
31 
South West 
of England 
Policy Manager, 
Transnational Development 
5 years 
50 
minutes 
32 
South West 
of England 
Diversity & Equality 
Manager 
4-5 years 
15 
minutes 
33 
South West 
of England 
Head of Convergence 15 years 
25 
minutes 
34 
South West 
of England 
European Programmes 
Business Manager 
4-5 years 
15 
minutes 
35 
South West 
of England 
Innovation & Enterprise 
Convergence Manager 
8-10 years 
30 
minutes 
36 
South West 
of England 
Head of Competitiveness 12-15 years 
45 
minutes 
37 
South West 
of England 
Coordinator RDA – ESF 
(GOS) 
5 years 
15 
minutes 
38 
South West 
of England 
European Investment 
Manager 
5 years 
10 
minutes 
39 
South West 
of England 
RDPE Delivery Manager 5 years 
15 
minutes 
40 Brandenburg Head of INTERREG  10 years 
20 
minutes 
41 Brandenburg Communications Manager 10-12 years 
30 
minutes 
42 Brandenburg 
Head of International 
Partnerships 
15 years 
35 
minutes 
43 Brandenburg 
International Partnerships 
Officer 
5-8 years 
40 
minutes 
44 Brandenburg 
European and External 
Markets  
8 years 
10 
minutes 
45 Brandenburg International Partnerships 3-5 years 
10 
minutes 
46 Brandenburg 
EU Structural Funds  
(Objectives 1 + 2) 
8-10 years 
25 
minutes 
47 Brandenburg 
Technology and Innovation 
(European cooperation) 
5 years 
35 
minutes 
48 Brandenburg 
Objective 3: INTERREG 
 
10-15 years 
30 
minutes 
49 Brandenburg 
Objective 3: INTERREG 
 
8 years 
30 
minutes 
50 Brandenburg 
Objective 3: INTERREG 
 
5 years 
30 
minutes 
51 Wallonia 
European Integration, 
Head of Legal Intergation  
8-10 years 
25 
minutes 
52 Wallonia 
European Integration, 
Environment, Transport 
and Energy legislation 
 
5 years 
15 
minutes 
53 Wallonia 
European Territorial 
Cooperation, Manager of 
Finances 
8-10 years 
20 
minutes 
54 Wallonia 
European Territorial 
Cooperation, Finances  
5-8 years 
15 
minutes 
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55 Wallonia 
European Territorial 
Cooperation, INTERREG 
IVA and IVB Contact 
Officer  
10-12 years 
30 
minutes 
56 Wallonia 
European Territorial 
Cooperation, Head of 
INTERREG IV A (Cross-
Border) and IVB (Europe 
North-West)  
8-10 years 
45 
minutes 
57 Wallonia 
European Territorial 
Cooperation, Head of 
INTERREG IVC , 
INTERACT, and URBACT 
15 years 
35 
minutes 
58 Wallonia 
European Territorial 
Cooperation, Head of 
INTERREG IVA ‘Grande 
Region’  
2-5 years 
15 
minutes 
 
The interviews with the civil servants in general lasted between forty-five and sixty 
minutes; two interviews, which revealed that civil servants’ job responsibilities had 
virtually no European components, were completed in less than ten minutes. Two 
civil servants who were not able to meet for the interview worked in capacities very 
similar to those of other interviewees; the likelihood therefore that the information 
and insights offered by these two civil servants would have offered dramatically 
new or different perspectives is negligible.  
 
Interview questions  
As with the political elites’ interviews, the administrative civil servants were first 
asked to share relevant information and explanations on certain themes and topics 
of importance to the research. They were then asked specific follow-up questions. 
This enabled the civil servants to speak freely and expansively about their accounts 
and perceptions of policy changes and set objectives. This method ensured that the 
information shared was relevant in answering the research question. The 
interviewees were also asked general questions about their specific roles and how 
they have changed over time; and then were asked about the scope of their 
respective region’s European policies and programmes and how these have 
changed over time. They were asked about the challenges they faced in 
implementing the policies that had been decided on by the political elites, and what 
they believe would improve their region’s European engagement and their personal 
contributions. Follow-up questions often focused on regional characteristics and 
features and their impact on their regions’ European engagement, scope and 
objectives.  
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Whilst some civil servants raised and discussed European identity as an objective 
on their own initiative, others needed to be prompted by way of further follow-up 
questions.  
 
The questions were not dealt with in a strict order to allow - and in fact invite - the 
civil servants to digress on certain points and relay their perception of what to them 
is most important. The flexibility of the semi-structured interviews as opposed to 
structured interviews or questionnaires encouraged the civil servants to candidly 
speak about what they believed to be important. The open questions also 
encouraged civil servants to discuss their work in their own words, allowing for 
nuances in the rhetoric of their objectives, priorities, critiques and suggestions. And 
the follow-up questions made it possible to ensure that when a discussion went off 
topic, interviewees could be brought back to the focus of the research question 
through controlled yet inquisitive questions. The interviews were conducted in the 
official languages spoken in the regions to ensure that all civil servants expressed 
themselves accurately, and that they used terms and phrases with which they were 
most comfortable and familiar. 
 
 
Methodology for the case on whether European regional networks enhance 
European engagement and European identity-building (Chapter 7)  
A document analysis and review of political science research on European regional 
networks was conducted and then complemented by a case study on a European 
regional network. The method was chosen to theoretically and empirically establish 
whether such networks can help regions overcome their challenges in participating 
in European policies and programmes.  
 
Network selection criteria  
A network was identified in which three of four selected regional case studies 
presented in this thesis actively participated. The chosen network was one of the 
first European regional networks to be established by a number of regions. At its 
inception, it received and was dependent on EU funding; it has further evolved over 
time and has become self-sustainable today through charged membership fees. The 
network chosen is a particularly suitable in the context of this thesis as it appears 
to have successfully addressed over an extended period of time the multiple and 
different needs of its varied membership and thus could be perceived as a 
successful network. The fact that the regions’ membership pays the required fees to 
get access to the network’s outputs and actively participates in its events is a 
testament to its usefulness. By presenting this network and conducting semi-
structured interviews with its membership (including the three case study regions’ 
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representatives) this particular network complements the research conducted 
within the context of this thesis and further helps to develop its analysis. 
 
However, does this network truly help the membership overcome its challenges so 
they can engage more with their European counterparts; and does it cultivate a 
European identity?  
 
To illuminate and assess the usefulness of the network in facilitating regions’ 
European engagement, a document analysis on the network has been performed. 
Documents were uploaded from the network’s website; the most relevant 
documents however were only made available during the one-week long visit to the 
network’s headquarters. The network allowed me to read documents about its 
evolution, agreements between the board and the membership made, and 
strategies decided on and executed by the membership board and the membership. 
Further documents on matters relating to communication and campaign plans, 
membership lists, and annual reports were also made available for the thesis’s 
evaluation and analysis of the network. The most salient parts of these documents 
were highlighted and critically evaluated, then summarised in the seventh chapter. 
These parts contribute to answering the thesis research question by further 
elaborating on the scope of regions’ European engagement, the objectives of their 
European engagement, and the methods regions may choose and employ to boost 
their European engagement.  
 
 
Following the documents’ analysis, twelve randomly-selected semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with network members in order to add their perceptions 
of the network whether they believe the network enhances European engagement 
and builds a European identity. Table 2.5 below describes the interviewees 
stemming from a range of regions. 
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Table 2.5 Interviewees – the regional network case 
No. 
EU 
Member 
since 
Network 
Member 
since 
Function 
within ERRIN 
Country 
Gov’t 
system 
Geographic 
location 
Language 
59* 
 
- 2006 - 2007 Former Director - - -  
60 1995 ERRIN 1+2 
Management 
Board 
Sweden Unitary Isolated 
Non EU working 
language 
61 1957 ERRIN 1+2 
Management 
Board 
Italy Unitary Isolated 
Non EU working 
language 
62 1957 
ERRIN 
1 partly + 2 
Working Group Italy Unitary Isolated 
Non EU working 
language 
63 1957 
ERRIN 
1 partly + 2 
Management 
Board 
Belgium Federal EU Border 
Non EU working 
language 
64 1957 
ERRIN 
1 partly + 2 
Working 
Groups 
France Unitary Isolated 
EU working 
language 
65 1973 
ERRIN 
1 partly + 2 
Working 
Groups 
UK Unitary Isolated 
EU working 
language 
66 
 
1957 
 
ERRIN 1+2 
Working 
Groups 
France Unitary Isolated 
EU working 
language 
67 1973 ERRIN 1+2 
Management 
Board 
UK Unitary Isolated 
EU working 
language 
68 
 
2004 ERRIN 2 Working Group Cyprus Unitary Isolated 
Non EU working 
language 
69 1957 ERRIN 1+2 
Management 
Board 
Italy Unitary EU Border 
Non EU working 
language 
70 1957 
ERRIN 
1 partly + 2 
Management 
Board 
France Unitary Isolated 
EU working 
language 
71 1995 ERRIN 1+2 
Management 
Board 
France Unitary Isolated 
EU working 
language 
 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted in members’ Brussels offices and 
lasted from 30 minutes to one hour. The interviews were performed in English, the 
network’s and memberships’ de facto working language. In view of the limited time 
available for the interviews at the network’s regional offices, and to ensure optimal 
use of the time granted, no audio-recordings were made. Instead, the time 
available was used to produce a comfortable interview atmosphere and motivate 
interviewees’ to offer frank responses and unfiltered perceptions. Therefore, merely 
notes were taken during the interview; they were then expanded upon immediately 
after the interviews to ensure an accurate and thorough account of the 
interviewee’s responses and commentaries. As English was not the mother tongue 
of most of those interviewed, partial transcripts containing and reflecting the most 
important points made, were sent to respective interviewees for their review, 
approval and further comments. All of the transcripts were approved before the 
comparative analysis was performed.  
 
As with the previous semi-structured interviews, they provided the interviewees 
with sufficient flexibility to discuss points they believe to be particularly relevant 
and important; avoiding the often restraining impact of set questionnaires. They 
also provide interviewees with opportunities to further explain and expand on 
specific cases, thus providing more detailed information and insights into the 
variations amongst the regions studied. Stage-setting general questions were asked 
to all twelve interviewees. They focused on how long their respective regions had 
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been a member of the network; how their participation has changed over time; 
which services of the network they find particularly useful and why; whether their 
regional characteristics and features challenge or facilitate their European 
engagement; whether they believe the network boosts their European engagement, 
and if it does, how does it do so; and also whether and how the network builds a 
European identity. In addition to these twelve semi-structured interviews with 
network members, one semi-structured interview was conducted with the former 
director of the network. Whilst the newly appointed network director was in the 
process of settling in at the time of the interviews, the former director agreed to 
provide her accounts on the establishment of the network, its evolution, and its 
objectives. This interview lasted over an hour; it was also semi-structured in order 
to garner as much information from the interviewee as possible, including particular 
accounts, memories and insights. The interviewee discussed the history of the 
network; the network board’s modus operandi and the way decisions are prepared 
and reached the network’s objectives and which services are of particular 
importance to the director, the board, and the membership; the perceived 
strengths and weaknesses of the network; its value-added to the membership; and 
whether the networks helps regions overcome their challenges to engage in 
European policies and programmes. The former director also was asked to share 
perceptions on how the network builds a European identity through its decisions 
and services. 
 
Because this network evaluation is the first of its kind, the documents’ analysis and 
semi-structured interviews’ methodologies were selected to conduct an in-depth 
study of this first case. The interview questions and findings closely align 
themselves with the interviews of the four case study regions in the previous two 
chapters and thereby enhance the value of their analysis, particularly when they 
contribute to answering the thesis research question – with a focus on the scope, 
challenges and benefits of European engagement.  
 
 
 
Concluding remarks on the methodology of this thesis 
The different strands of research complement each other and offer interesting and 
robust insights of the EU regions’ European policies and programmes. By combining 
the descriptive quantitative analysis of the 97 regions, the regions’ characteristics 
and features are clarified. The documents analysis presents assesses the EU’s 
Regional Policy to which all 97 regions of the Union have access and are invited 
participate, as well as the scope of the European policies and programmes of four 
selected case study regions. The documents’ analysis is complemented by the 
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findings of the semi-structured interviews conducted in all four case study regions 
with their respective political elites and civil servants in charge of managing their 
regions’ European policies and programmes. They provide insights on their 
perceptions of the evolution, scope, objectives, and future strategies of their 
region’s European engagement, as well as the role European identity plays within 
the confines of these policies and programmes. Furthermore, members of a 
European regional network provide additional accounts on the scope of regions’ 
European engagement and how the network promotes the regions’ capacities to 
engage in European affairs and in European identity-building. Together, these 
strands of research offer triangulation. These research methodologies make it 
possible to introduce the study of the variation in scope and objectives of regions’ 
European policies and programmes. The case studies allow to research in depth the 
European engagement of four comparative regions with a focus on their respective 
evolution, scope and objectives. The methodologies also provide a platform to pose 
questions in semi-structured interviews on the perceptions of the regions’ political 
elites and civil servants on the role of European identity in their work. The 
operationalisation of mixed methodologies with a focus on qualitative research 
methods reliably complement each other and provide a more robust and rigorous 
understanding – and appreciation - of regions’ European governance and politics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 70 
 
 
Chapter 3 
Regional characteristics affecting the scope and objectives of European 
Policy 
 
The first chapter has introduced and explored relatively recent developments on 
regions’ role in European and EU affairs. It has also discussed an apparent lack of 
systematic research on the EU regions and the opportunities and constraints of 
their respective European policies and programmes. In fact, very little evidence-
based information and insight exists about regions’ European policies and 
programmes and the scope and objectives of their European engagement. Theory 
opines that there is variation amongst regions’ European engagement. Reasons 
advanced to explain this variation have drawn primarily on regional characteristics 
and features. These characteristics have not, however, yet been empirically studied 
and validated as factors affecting the scope and objectives of regions’ European 
engagement and identity-building.  
 
This chapter takes the theoretically based claims of political scientists to the next 
level: the level of evidence based empirical data and analysis. It presents the full 
gamut of regional characteristics and features identified in political science 
scholarship with potentially impacting the scope of regions’ European policies and 
programmes, as well as the cultivation of a European identity. And newly gained 
insights will provide a clearer understanding of the ratio of regions facing specific 
challenges in engaging in European affairs. This chapter will then pinpoint the 
regions participating in the different categories of EU funded Cohesion Policy 
objectives. This in turn will explain and further clarify the extent regions experience 
‘their’ European engagement.  
 
Whilst Objectives 1 and 2 of the EU’s Cohesion Policy are merely implemented 
within the respective NUTS 1 region, Objective 3 offers a range of programmes in 
which regions must collaborate across at least small parts of Europe. As, to date, 
no database exists that captures the scope and objectives of EU regions’ European 
policies and programmes, this preliminary assessment will provide a first indication 
of regions’ European engagement with respect to EU funded programmes. Further 
information on the full gamut of the regions respective European policies and 
programmes will be presented in the case studies in the subsequent chapters. This 
chapter will close with a discussion of the spread of levels of European identity 
across the EU over time, based on data collected at the national level. as it is not 
yet available at the regional level. 
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This chapter will not only present original data and newly gained insights about 
representative characteristics and features potentially influencing the scope and 
objectives of 97 regions’ European engagement. On the back of this new knowledge 
base acquired this chapter will also prepare the grounds for the case studies and 
further assessment of the impact of these regional characteristics. The case studies 
will, in turn, provide the critical backbone to answer with greater certainty the 
research question on the scope and objectives of regions’ European policies and the 
role of European identity in their European engagement.  
 
 
Overview of the regional characteristics which are suggested to influence 
the scope and objectives of regions’ European policies 
Six regional characteristics were identified, theoretically but not empirically, in the 
first chapter as having an impact on the scope and identity-building objectives of 
regions’ European policies. These include the political elites’ personal inclinations in 
favour of a European identity; a government system providing regions with 
sufficient political authority to engage in European politics; whether a region is 
situated on a border to a European neighbour; whether a region participates in a 
European regional network; how long a region and its country have been part of 
the EU and engaged in European integration politics; and whether a region’s 
language and heritage is shared by other European regions and thereby brings 
them closer socially and politically.  
 
The first characteristic on the political elites perceptions on European identity goes 
back to the discussion of political elites feeling more European than citizens and the 
anticipation that political elites shape policies based on their own interests – thus in 
this case, Europhiles including identity-building dimensions to their respective 
region’s European policy. There is a great need to collect and evaluate data on 
regional political elites’ European inclinations to better understand whether indeed 
there is causation between interests and policy design at the emerging regional 
level of European politics. This will be assessed in the policy analysis of Chapter 4, 
as well as the analysis of semi-structured interviews with regional political elites 
and civil servants, in Chapters 5 and 6 respectively. But first, this chapter will 
continue to grapple with the other regional characteristics which are expected to 
have an impact on the scope and objectives of regions’ European policy – for which 
there is data available.  
 
The second regional characteristic indicates that the type of government system 
impacts the levels of political authority delegated to regional governments to, in 
turn, develop their own European policies and programmes, instead of 
 72 
 
implementing those decided on more centrally. Furthermore, the scope of regions’ 
European engagement also influences whether the objectives pursued are of a 
primarily economical nature or whether, indeed, regions’ European policies and 
programmes also intend to cultivate and reinforce a European identity.  
 
The third characteristic is the region’s geographic border location in terms of 
proximity to another European region. Data available manifests which proportion of 
regions is physically located on a direct land border to another European region and 
which regions must overcome the challenge of geographic separation or even 
isolation from potential European engagements. Furthermore, regions with borders 
to European neighbours may more organically develop a European identity through 
daily or frequent interactions and the reality of proximity and the perception of 
commonly shared values.  
 
The fourth characteristic builds on the constraints of geographic separation, 
isolation and impediments associated with particular government systems on the 
one hand, and the mitigating effects of European regional networks potentially 
supporting access to those regions constrained to more fully engage in European 
politics and develop a European identity on the other hand. European regional 
networks are expected to not only enhance regions’ European engagement, they 
are also suspected to cultivate European identity amongst their membership. Thus, 
gaining an evidence-based number on how many regions participate in European 
regional networks would be necessary to estimate networks’ potential impact on the 
scope and objectives of regions’ European engagement.  
 
The fifth characteristic draws on the extent of time regions have been members of 
the EU and postulates membership duration to have an impact on the levels of 
European identity perceived among and within regions. Though it is known how 
long each region and their respective countries have been EU Member States, 
European identity data has not yet been broken down to the regional level. 
Therefore, duration of membership’s impact on regions’ levels of European identity 
cannot be measured. However, on the base of available national data, an indication 
measure will be presented as it shows that a longer duration of EU membership 
indeed produces higher levels of perceived European identity. Furthermore, what 
membership duration really looks into is how much people engage with other 
Europeans over time. Another way to study this is to assess the extent of European 
engagement within regions’ European policies. Though data on regions’ European 
policies is not widely available and within the scope of this thesis not possible to 
collect; preliminary data on the extent of European engagement within the EU’s 
Cohesion Policy is available. Though this data, once more, is only available at the 
 73 
 
national level, it shows an indication of which countries within the EU 
predominantly, within the Cohesion Policy, engage with other Europeans and which 
countries do not - and in turn, what their respective levels of European identity are. 
 
The sixth regional characteristic looks into whether European regions share a 
common language or heritage and what this impact may be on the scope and level 
of European identity. Whilst all languages in the EU are official EU languages, 
English and French - the two languages most commonly learned in school and 
spoken - are de facto acknowledged as the European or the EU working languages. 
Regions whose official language is one of the official European working languages 
can engage with greater ease with their European counterparts. However, regions 
which have a language distinct from the European working languages must 
overcome their linguistic constraints by investing resources (both material and non-
material) into language capacity building measures to ensure that they will be able 
to operate on par with their native English and French-speaking colleagues. Due to 
the complexity of this ‘heritage attribute’ identified in the literature, its potential 
impact will be assessed in the interviews with political elites and regional civil 
servants, presented in the subsequent chapters.  
 
As there isn’t sufficient data available on the scope of all regions’ European policies 
and whether European identity features in them, it is not possible to quantify and 
measure the impact of these regional characteristics on their scope. Also, the data 
on European identity levels across Europe have not been broken down to the 
regional level, hence it is not possible to measure whether these regional 
characteristics have an impact on the levels of European identity in the respective 
regions. Discovering the proportions of regions across the EU with characteristics 
which either boost or challenge their European engagement is nevertheless a useful 
study. It helps political scientists understand why some regions may have a 
European policy with a broader scope, or why they may naturally have higher levels 
of European identity and thus potentially more identity-building dimensions within 
their European policy. This study thereby takes the theoretical identification of 
influential regional characteristics a step further. It shows the proportional 
distribution of them across Europe and prepares the grounds for when political 
elites and civil servants discuss their perceived impact of these characteristics on 
both European engagement and identity-building.  
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The representativeness of regional characteristics and features potentially 
impacting the scope and objectives of regions’ European policies 
 
National government systems affecting regions’ European policies 
EU Member States’ approach to and engagement in the ‘European project’ 
oftentimes reflect their quite distinct national government systems. This routinely 
evokes varying reactions in the regions, both in terms of the way the policies and 
politics of the EU are interpreted and, subsequently, how they influence and impact 
their responses. There is also great variation in terms of capacities and resources 
among the regional governments. Scholarly literature has identified several 
categories for levels of political authority delegated to regions. It has shed light on 
the complexity and idiosyncrasies of the continent’s different government systems 
and, moreover, the multitude of regional governance and how it works. It follows 
that it is extremely difficult to know ‘who is in charge’ and whom to contact when 
collaboration on specific issues is being contemplated. And whilst the levels of 
authority in the regions are everything but self-evident, what is clear is that the 
most pronounced dividing line that accounts for variation lies between the federal 
and unitary government systems. The ‘fault line’ between these two government 
systems will therefore be evaluated in this thesis. In order to understand which 
government systems are the most typical as well as their distribution across the 
EU, the list of EU’s government systems (Table 3.1) and pie chart (Figure 3.1) 
indicate the number and percentage of government systems across EU regions.  
 
Table 3.1: Government systems and border status in European Regions 
Country Gov’t System Region Border Status 
Austria Federal 
East Austria Border 
South Austria Border 
West Austria Border 
Belgium Federal 
Brussels capital Region No Border 
Flemish Region Border 
Walloon Region Border 
Bulgaria Unitary 
Severna I Iztochna Border 
Yugozapadna I Yuzhna Tsentralna Border 
Cyprus Unitary Cyprus No Border 
Czech 
Republic 
Unitary Czech Republic Border 
Germany 
Federal 
Baden-Wuerttemberg Border 
Bavaria Border 
Berlin No Border 
Brandenburg Border 
 Bremen No Border 
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Country Gov’t System Region Border Status 
Hamburg No Border 
Hessen No Border 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Border 
 
Lower Saxony Border 
North-Rhine-Westphalia Border 
Rhineland-Palatinate Border 
Saarland Border 
Saxony Border 
Saxony-Anhalt No Border 
Schleswig-Holstein Border 
Thuringia No Border 
Denmark Unitary Denmark Border 
Estonia Unitary Estonia Border 
Spain Unitary 
North West Border 
North east Border 
Community of Madrid No Border 
Centre Border 
East Border 
South Border 
Canary Islands No Border 
Finland Unitary 
Mainland Finland No Border 
Aland No Border 
France Unitary 
Ile-de-France No Border 
Parisian Basin No Border 
(France) (Unitary) 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais Border 
East Border 
West No Border 
South West Border 
Centre East Border 
Mediterranean Border 
Overseas Departments No Border 
Greece Unitary 
Voreia Ellada No Border 
Kentriki Ellada No Border 
Attica No Border 
Nisia Aigaiou Kriti No Border 
Hungary Unitary 
Central Hungary (Kozep 
Magyarorszag) 
No Border 
Transdanubia (Dunantual) Border 
Great Plain and North (Alfold es 
Eszak) 
Border 
Ireland Federal Ireland Border 
Italy Unitary 
North West Border 
North East Border 
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Country Gov’t System Region Border Status 
Centre Border 
South Border 
Islands No Border 
Lithuania Unitary Lithuania Border 
Luxem-bourg Unitary Luxembourg Border 
Latvia Unitary Latvia Border 
Malta Unitary Malta No Border 
Nether-lands Unitary 
North Netherlands Border 
East Netherlands Border 
West Netherlands No Border 
South Netherlands Border 
Poland Unitary 
Central (Centralny) No Border 
Poludniowy Border 
Wschodni Border 
Polnocno-Zachodni Border 
Poludniowo-Zachodni Border 
Polnocny Border 
Portugal Unitary Mainland Portugal Border 
(Portugal) Unitary 
Azores No Border 
 
Madeira 
No Border 
Romania Unitary 
Macroregion  One Border 
Macroregion 
Two 
Border 
Macroregion Three No Border 
Macroregion Four No Border 
Sweden Unitary 
East Sweden No Border 
South Sweden No Border 
North Sweden No Border 
Slovenia Unitary Slovenia Border 
Slovakia Unitary Slovakia Border 
United 
Kingdom 
Unitary North East England No Border 
United 
Kingdom 
Unitary 
North West England No Border 
Yorkshire and the Humber No Border 
East Midlands No Border 
West Midlands No Border 
East of England No Border 
Greater London No Border 
South East England No Border 
South West England No Border 
Wales No Border 
Scotland No Border 
Northern Ireland No Border 
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Figure 3.1: Government systems in European Regions 
 
[Figure 3.1 depicts the number and percentage of federal and unitary regions, respectively. 
Source: EU Member States’ government websites, last accessed June 2012.] 
 
 
From Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 it becomes apparent that the Unitary system of 
government is the most common government system in the EU, with 76%. It is also 
the system of choice of the new EU Member states, which have only recently 
developed their democratic, multi-party governments. Few regions, only 24%, have 
Federal governments, in which regions have been granted substantially more policy 
design and implementation autonomy from the central state than regions in Unitary 
government systems. Each of these categories of government systems influences and 
impacts the extent to which a region can initiate and participate in European politics 
independently from their national government. It can therefore be anticipated that only 
24% of EU regions have sufficient political authority to engage in European politics and 
determine the objectives of that European policy – whether it is of a purely economic 
nature or also includes European identity-building. The remaining great majority of the 
EU regions, 76% of them, are dependant on their central governments changing 
positions on the extent of regionalisation and decentralisation of the European policy. 
And, according to Hooghe, Marks & Schakel (2010), regions in such unitary states 
have less political authority to engage in European politics than regions in federal 
states. For these 76%, government system is a significant regional characteristic in 
influencing the scope and objectives of their European policy.  
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Regional geographic location affecting their European policies 
A further regional characteristic which may influence the extent of regions’ European 
engagement is that of its geographic location. The scholarly literature has posited that 
a region located on a (foreign) European border would have more contact with its 
neighbours, thus engage more in European politics and potentially also grow a 
European identity. It is in the context of this presumption that this thesis will look 
further into regions which share a border with another European member state’s 
region, as well as regions which are not geographically located on a border. How many 
regions share a border with another EU member state’s region and how many regions 
are geographically isolated from other European regions?  
 
A small majority of the 97 EU regions are physically located at the heart of the EU, 
sharing their borders with European neighbours, whilst other regions are 
geographically separated or even isolated from having direct European neighbours. The 
citizens of the 54% of regions which have border location, therefore, have, direct, daily 
contact and interactions with other Europeans and may need to inter-regionally 
cooperate on policy areas such as transport in order to get to and from work. Fourty-
six percent of the regions, however, are located on the outskirts of Europe and may 
therefore feel more distant to the EU and ‘Europeanness’. In terms of population, 59% 
of the EU population lives in a region sharing a border with another EU region whilst 
41% of Europeans live geographically isolated from an EU neighbour.  
 
If regional values for European identity were available, their respective depth and 
breadth could be compared with the designated category of geographic location to 
better understand whether natural cooperation based on sharing a border with another 
European region facilitates the emergence of European identity. Knowing that 54% of 
regions are either entirely or partially on a border to another EU region makes the 
cross-border cooperation initiative within the Cohesion Policy’s Territorial Cooperation 
Programme very relevant. However, this also means that 46% of the EU regions which 
are not located on a border cannot participate in cross-border cooperation projects 
within the EU Cohesion Policy’s territorial cooperation programme – and therefore are 
geographically constrained in the extent of their European engagement. The regions’ 
geographic location thus influences their scope of European engagement in two ways: 
it either fosters opportunities of funded cross-border European cooperation projects, or 
it frustrates regions’ ability to benefit from such European opportunities. 
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European regional network affecting regions’ European policies 
The scholarly literature has suggested that European regional networks can narrow 
both the access and participation gaps widened by national government systems. In 
the absence of empirical evidence on both the scope and impact of these networks, an 
email survey was conducted within the scope of this thesis research to fill persisting 
data gaps. Forty six out of 97 EU regions replied to the survey, and 100% of them 
stated that their regions participate in European regional networks. It also found that 
the number of networks regions participate in varies in part because their existence is 
either unknown to or under-utilised by regional civil servants. How networks aim to 
provide ubiquitous and easy access to all regions, particularly to those constrained by 
their unfavourable regional characteristics will be evaluated in Chapter 7. 
 
 
Duration of EU Membership affecting regions’ European policies 
The EU has an evolving membership history. When considering European integration, 
the duration of membership plays an important role. The founding members of the 
European Economic Community were Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in 1958. European enlargements occurred in 1973, 
1981, 1986, 1995, 2004, and 2007. The most significant enlargement was in 2004, 
when ten predominantly Eastern European countries joined the EU and grew its 
membership from fifteen to twenty five. The enlargement however was not only 
significant because of its sheer magnitude in number. It was also, and perhaps even 
more importantly, significant because of the wave of democratisation and development 
it unleashed in Eastern Europe and its new member states’ orientation toward the 
West. When viewed from a cultural, historical, political and economic perspective, the 
twelve new Eastern European countries joining the EU in 2004 and 2007 brought with 
them very different experiences, orientations, values, and levels of development, thus 
enriching and complementing but also complicating affairs of the more cohesive 
Werteunion formerly established by the Western EU member states. It is against this 
historical backdrop that EU member states are often put into two categories: the EU-
15 Member States (from 1957 to 2003) and the new EU Member States (the members 
which joined in 2004 and 2007, respectively).  
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In addition to the differing experiences, orientations, values and levels of development 
experienced by the EU-15 Member States and the new EU Member States, a divide in 
extent of European engagement within the EU funded Cohesion Policy ensued. In most 
cases, regions of the EU-15 Member States had already received infrastructure 
development funds from the EU within the Objective 1 of the Cohesion Policy, and, by 
2007, were predominantly participating in Objectives 2 and 3, European-wide 
cooperation programmes. Thus, EU-15 Member States, which had already benefited 
from a longer period of European integration, also are expected to engage more with 
other Europeans within the Cohesion Policy than the regions, which are newer to the 
EU. If extent of engagement has an impact on the extent of European identity felt and 
thereby also the extent of identity-building included in European policy design, then it 
should be expected that EU-15 Member States have much higher levels of European 
identity than newer EU Member States; and that European identity features more 
prominently in the Eu-15 Member State’s European policies than those of the newer EU 
Member States. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 below show which type of funding was allocated to 
the 97 EU regions in both funding periods, 2000-2006 and 2007-2014. It shows that 
there is a clear transition from EU-15 Member States in 2007 who participate much 
more in European-wide programmes, whereas the newer EU Member States receive 
funding to be spent within their region for infrastructure development, before 
accessing the European-wide cooperation programmes.   
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Figure 3.2: EU Regional Policy Funding 2000-2006  
 
[Figure 3.2 depicts blue regions, which received Competitiveness and Employment funding and 
red regions, which received Convergence funding, including European-wide oppoprtunities of 
cooperation. Source: European Commission, 2008.] 
 
Figure 3.3: EU Regional Policy Funding 2007-2013  
 
[Figure 3.3 depicts blue regions, which received Competitiveness and Employment funding and 
red regions, which received Convergence funding, including European-wide oppoprtunities of 
cooperation. Source: European Commission, 2011.] 
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Figures 3.2 and 3.3 indicate a clear transition of many Western European regions from 
participating in the Cohesion Policy’s infrastructure development objectives to 
European-wide cooperation opportunities within Objectives 2 and 3. Therefore, it can 
be expected that regions engaging more with other Europeans, in this case 
predominantly EU-15 Member States’ regions, would also have higher levels of 
European identity and feature identity-building objectives within their European 
policies. This analysis will be taken up in the section on European identity, later in this 
chapter.  
 
 
Language affecting regions’ European policies 
How close people feel to Europe is firmly rooted in language and the ability to speak, 
understand, participate and thereby integrate. Although the EU publishes all official 
documents in every one of its 23 official EU languages, the most common working 
languages in Brussels are English and French; thus the largest share of pertinent 
information about both interregional and intraregional cooperation circulates in those 
two languages only. For people not proficient in either English or French, their nature-
based geographic isolation is further compounded by their de facto linguistic isolation.  
 
The majority of EU regions (73%) and their populations (72%) do not have English or 
French as their natural official language and therefore the minority of regions and EU 
population (27% and 28%, respectively) is naturally integrated linguistically and can 
communicate and process information with ease. Adding to this, the regions which are 
already geographically located at the core of the EU, such as France and Belgium, also 
speak the Union’s most commonly spoken languages, whilst the regions located on the 
margins of Europe, such as Cyprus and Greece, not only have to overcome geographic 
challenges but also linguistic ones to engage more naturally and easily in European 
affairs. Both these factors may have an impact on the extent to which regions 
participate in European-wide cooperation programmes and engage with other 
Europeans, and in turn, the extent to which they feel European and want to build a 
European identity through their European policy. For 73% of EU regions, language 
could significantly challenge their European engagement and identity-building 
opportunities. 
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Levels of European Identity (1990 to 2010)  
Having identified and assessed a number of EU regions’ characteristics with a likely 
impact on the scope and objectives of their European engagement, it is significant to 
know ‘how European’ their citizens actually feel. The question was asked as part of the 
Eurobarometer survey commissioned by the EU. The Eurobarometer data is based on 
national values; it does not allow for a specific evaluation of the regions’ levels of 
European identity. Across the EU, the average levels of European identity have 
increased from 1990 to 2010 by 16.5%, from just shy of 48% to above 64%. The 
actual levels of European identity by EU member state, however, differ amongst EU 
member states. This is also the case when splitting the 27 EU Member States into two 
groups: the EU-15, which have been integrating for a considerably long time; and the 
newer EU member states, which joined in 2004 and 2007, respectively. Figure 3.4 
shows these comparative average levels of European identity. 
 
Figure 3.4: Levels of European identity according to EU membership duration 
Levels of European identity according to duration of membership
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
70.0
80.0
European identity
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European identity
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European identity
2010 yes
EU-15 average
New Eu average
Linear (EU-15
average)
 
[Figure 3.4 shows whether populations from before 2004 EU enlargement Members States have 
higher or lower levels of European identity than populations from states which joined the EU in 
or after 2004. Source: Eurostat European identity survey results in 1990, 2006 and 2010; and 
categorised EU membership duration before and after 2004 enlargements.] 
 
Figure 3.11 shows that levels of European identity are, overall, rising; however, the 
newer EU Member States have slightly lower levels of European identity than the more 
integrated EU-15 member states. The average of the EU-15 member states show that 
in 1990, 47.4% stated to ‘feel European’; in 2006 this percentage rose to 58.5%; 
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whilst in 2010, 66.2% ‘felt European’. In comparison, the new EU member states’ 
average in 2006 was 60.5%; it rose to 62% in 2010.  
 
Assessing to which extent regional characteristics influence the levels of European 
identity would enhance our understanding of their correlation. However, the data on 
European identity is only available at the national level and therefore inferences of 
regional characteristics cannot be made on regional levels of European identity. 
However, it is possible to glean an indication from the national values. The levels of 
European identity in federal versus unitary states. Countries of federal government 
systems had higher levels of European identity than countries of unitary government 
systems (federal = 72% and unitary = 68%) in 2010; and countries where an EU 
working language is the official national language had higher levels of European 
identity than countries with non-EU working languages (same language = 67.8%; 
other language = 63.3%). However, more data on European identity as well as 
European engagement at the regional level must be collected in order to make more 
meaningful and reliable evaluations and provide more evidence-based explanations. A 
deeper analysis of this, based on qualitative research of the four case study regions 
and the European regional network, will be presented in the following chapters of this 
thesis.  
 
 
Conclusions on regional characteristics’ potential influence 
This chapter has provided a basis for understanding the potential impact of regional 
characteristics on their respective European policies and the role of European identity 
both within their regions and policies.  
 
The regions, by nature and choice, exhibit varied degrees of institutionalisation at the 
levels of national and regional governments and EU institutions, respectively - which 
can either encourage or limit their engagement in European politics as independent 
actors and policy designers. Only 24% of the regions operate inside federally organised 
states which have historically granted significant autonomy to regions in the design 
and implementation of their own European policies. This leaves a significant 76% of EU 
regions with potentially no or very limited political authority to include European 
identity-building objectives in their policies.  
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The daily need to be active in European politics, relations and cooperation is also 
influenced by regions’ geographic location. Fifty-four percent of regions in the EU share 
a border with another EU region; making the need to cooperate on, at the very least, 
policy areas affecting mutual cross-border concerns a conditio sine qua non. But this 
also means that many European citizens, 41% of the total population, who live in 
regions which do not have an intrinsic need to cooperate with their European 
counterparts, and therefore, perhaps, do not participate in the ‘European project’ as 
actively as those who are located on a border. Furthermore, for the 46% of regions not 
located on a European border, the lack of European encounters and interactions on a 
daily basis may also inhibit their natural European identity building. European policies 
for those regions can be expected to look quite different from the border-located 
regions in terms of their European cooperation and integration features.  
 
Also the duration of EU membership influences and constitutes an important regional 
characteristic because of its impact on the regions’ cohesive integration. Indeed, it has 
been shown that EU Member states with a longer membership duration than the states 
which joined more recently in the two European enlargement waves have higher levels 
of European identity compared to the newer EU members. As was shown, regions in 
the EU-15 Member States also participate in more European-wide cooperation 
programmes funded by the EU than regions in the newer Member States. The extent of 
European engagement may also play a significant role in shaping the levels of 
European identity, which, due to Cohesion Policy criteria, goes hand in hand with 
regional GDP and, in this case also, EU membership duration. 
 
Language also matters. The language barrier for those who do not speak the two de 
facto EU working languages, English or French, can also be a significant challenge to 
engaging in European programmes and projects. It can also act as an impediment to 
feeling European if the official regional language is not one of the more commonly 
spoken languages in Europe. With 72% of the EU population not speaking the most 
commonly spoken languages, English and French, a significant language challenge may 
make it more difficult for those Europeans to engage with other Europeans and build a 
European identity. 
  
Taking into consideration these and other impeding regional characteristics, European 
regional networks have been established to bring regions together, level the playing 
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field, and facilitate European cooperation amongst the regions. The survey results 
presented showed that 100% of respondents participate in a European regional 
network; the response rate, however, was only 47% of EU regions. A more 
contextualized and detailed account of the ability of European regional networks to 
foster regions’ European engagement and identity-building will be presented in Chapter 
7.  
 
In absence of a broadly-based dataset on the comparative scope of regions’ European 
engagement, the facts and figures collected illustrate that particularly regions which 
have only recently joined the EU tend to apply for and receive considerable 
convergence funding. It can therefore be assumed with some degree of certainty that 
these regions at this point of their EU membership focus their European engagement 
primarily on acquiring and managing these funds for internal infrastructure 
development needs, putting on a ‘low burner’ for the time being initiatives to engage in 
inter-European-wide programmes and projects. However, it can also be expected that 
these regions will engage more with their European counterparts once their regional 
GDP strengthens; and in turn, European identity-building will play a more important 
role in their European policies. Yet, more research needs to be conducted on this once 
the newer Member States’ regions have integrated economically. 
 
The findings here provided also set the stage for the presentation and discussion of 
valuable qualitative insights gained from regional political elites and civil servants 
managing their respective regions’ European politics and engagement. Four case 
studies, each one covering one EU region, will be presented. They will identify and 
analyse regional characteristics, variations and similarities, and how they impact and 
influence both the depth and breadth of those regions’ European engagement. The 
table below (Table 3.2) shows in more detail the case study regions selected in 
accordance with their characteristics. This research will provide new insights and a 
better understanding of the European engagement of EU regions and what role 
European identity plays in their design and formulation. As regions become 
increasingly institutionalised into the EU and thus play a more important role on the 
European stage, it is imperative to better understand their objectives and motives as 
well as modus operandi, and to draw, in the process, both the necessary theoretical 
and empirical political science - and public policy – conclusions. 
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Table 3.2: Presentation of Regional Case Study Selection  
 
Region 
Region’s 
Economy 
GDP in PPS 
/ inhabitant 
(of old EU 
MS) 
Type of 
EU 
Regional 
Policy 
Funding 
1=conv. 
2=comp. 
3=coop. 
Duration 
of EU 
Member-
ship 
(year 
joined EU) 
% citizens 
feeling 
European 
(national 
levels) 
National 
Governm
ent 
System 
 
Geographic 
Location 
on a 
border? 
 
EU Working 
Language or 
other? 
 
 
Wallonia 
 
20,700 
 
2+3 
 
1957 
(Founding 
Member) 
 
1990:53 
2006:60 
2010:76 
Average:63 
Federal Border 
EU working 
language 
 
Nord – 
Pas de 
Calais 
 
22,000 
 
2+3 
 
1957 
(Founding 
Member) 
 
1990:58 
2006:55 
2010:57 
Average:56 
Unitary Border 
EU working 
language 
 
Brandenb
urg 
 
20,500 
 
1+3 
 
1990 
(German 
Reunificati
on) 
 
1990:41 
2006:58 
2010:73 
Average:57 
Federal 
Border 
(since 1990) 
Other 
language 
 
South 
West of 
England 
 
26,600 
 
1+2+3 
 
1972 
 
1990:28 
2006:32 
2010:41 
Average:33 
 
Unitary No border 
EU working 
language 
[Sources: Regional economy, population and European identity data from Eurostat. Type of EU 
regional policy funding: European Commission’s Directorate General for Regional Policy website 
on each region’s operational programme 2007-2013. EU Membership duration: EU Website: 
Members. National government system: country’s website. Region’s official language: region’s 
government / RDA website. Geographic location: Google Maps.] 
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Chapter 4 
Comparative Regions’ European Policies  
A comparative policy analysis and assessment of the role of European identity 
 
The evolutionary process of European integration has seen states work increasingly 
closely together in the pursuit of common objectives and interests. Cooperation in the 
European Union (EU) has indeed spread to the same number of policy areas as 
Member States, thus greatly expanding its scope of political cooperation. A vast body 
of research has analysed both the process of European integration and the impact of 
the Europeanisation of national policies and programmes. The insights gained produced 
a better understanding of rising socioeconomic disparities amongst the regions in the 
enlarged EU. In recognition of this stark reality on European Union soil, the European 
Commission responded by developing the Regional Policy aimed at boosting and 
pumping much needed support into the regions and, so its expectation, fostering in the 
process socioeconomic cohesion and a heightened sense of unity throughout the EU.  
 
The Europeanisation of Regional Policy has had a positive impact on the regions’ 
integration into the European institutions. It has enabled them to more systematically 
represent and present their interests and, though to a varied extent, participate in the 
Regional Policy’s decision-making process. Furthermore, regional governments have 
been developing their own European portfolios. They are becoming increasingly 
vociferous and visible participants in the shaping and making of European affairs and 
operate quite independently from either EU institutions or their respective national 
governments. Particularly in preparation of the new 2014 EU budget, regions, which 
anticipate to no longer ‘make the cut’ for the most significant EU regional funding 
objectives, are increasing their European interregional cooperation activities by tapping 
into EU funding in support of regions’ European engagement; efforts designed to 
be(come) sustainable European actors without receiving EU funding. Regional 
governments are thus transitioning from being, primarily, EU funding recipients for 
regional development projects to European cooperation-seeking actors; they are 
asserting and exercising more authority at the European level by broadening their 
competencies and capacities and taking more pro-active steps in the European sphere. 
In the process, some regions are gaining access to the European sphere for the first 
time.  
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In general, regions across the EU are reaching out further than ever before, 
participating in European politics in concert with supranational and national actors. 
Indeed, all 97 EU regions have designated European teams; many regional 
governments have departments who are mandated to design, implement and manage 
their regions’ own, distinct European portfolio. In some regions teams merely manage 
EU allocated funding to the regions for internal infrastructure development. In other 
regions European teams or departments manage bilateral partnerships with their 
European counterparts and provide European educational and training programmes to 
raise awareness of European opportunities and even European identity; while others 
help start European projects linking citizens of their region with citizens of other 
European regions for entrepreneurial collaboration or social integration purposes. 
There are numerous ways in which regions engage in European affairs. But what 
exactly is the scope of regions’ European engagement and what are their objectives? 
Do they purely seek regional economic development or also a form of social integration 
and European identity-building? How broad are the variations across the 97 regions’ 
European engagement?  
 
The Introduction chapter cited research findings relating to regional governments’ 
differing degree of exercising political authority and breadth and depth in shaping 
European politics. It also identified research gaps in the comparative European 
governments field: whilst the objectives and scope of European policies and 
programmes of the EU Member States have been accorded centre stage attention, the 
fact is that, to date, the academic community as well as policy and political decision 
makers know very little about what the regions’ respective European objectives, 
policies and programmes are. Are they restricted to stimulating and strengthening 
economic development within the confines of their regions, or do the regions’ European 
policies and programmes also include social policy dimensions, such as fostering, for 
instance, a European identity?   
 
This chapter addresses this particular research gap by placing and focusing its 
analytical instruments onto four European regional case studies. The case studies will 
highlight the increase of European engagement at the regional government level. They 
will also provide an evidence-based understanding of the state of regions’ European 
policies and programmes, as well as the distinct objectives, scopes and variations that 
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occur amongst the four selected regions. These four case study regions include 
France’s Nord - Pas de Calais; the South West of England; Germany’s Brandenburg; 
and Belgium’s Wallonia.  
 
The regions’ self-designed and implemented European policies will be assessed 
alongside their participation in EU-designed and implemented policies and 
programmes. Based on this document analysis, the scope of European engagement of 
four regions will be documented and presented. Furthermore, findings from semi-
structured interviews with European Commission delegates overseeing these four case 
study regions within the context of the EU Regional Policy’s Operational Programme 
will be provided to strengthen the understanding of developments in the EU Regional 
Policy and their effect on the regions’ respective European policies’ and programmes’ 
designs. This chapter will conclude with a preliminary assessment of whether European 
identity plays a paramount role in the regions’ European policies and programmes, or 
whether it is tantamount to the objectives’ focus on economic development and 
integration. The findings will offer a first explanation of the scope and objectives of 
regions’ European engagement, thereby producing evidence-based answers to the 
thesis’ research question. This chapter’s initial findings will also set the stage for the 
subsequent chapters addressing and analysing the perceptions of regional political 
elites and civil servants shaping and managing the regions’ European engagement.  
 
 
First indications of variation amongst regions’ European engagement 
Regions, which had not already been granted political authority to participate in the 
debate, policy-making and implementation of policies reaching beyond regional 
geographic and administrative boundaries, were delegated new political authority to 
participate in a range of European interregional policies and programmes offered 
through the EU’s Regional Policy. The programme affecting all regions, initially, was 
the Convergence programme. Its main objective was to tackle the socioeconomic 
disparities across the EU’s membership. However, the programme’s available resources 
did not keep up with a vastly expanding EU membership. With limited resources at its 
disposal to distribute amongst the regions of the EU Member States, critical choices 
had to be made, putting great pressure on the programme. In the current funding 
period the European Commission’s Directorate General for Regional Policy (DG Regio) 
manages the EU’s Regional Policy under the umbrella of three core Cohesion policy 
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objectives: Objective 1 is to distribute convergence funding to those regions with a 
regional GDP below the 75% EU regional average; the regions with a GDP above the 
75% EU average receive Objective 2 funding for competitiveness and employment. All 
regions receive funding from either the Cohesion’s Policy Objective 1 or Objective 2 as 
long as they have the regional political authority and capacity to manage these funds. 
Although both Objectives 1 and 2 have economic development as their core aims, 
Objective 2 also provides regional actors from the public and private sector with the 
opportunity to connect with their European counterparts in exchange of best-practice 
collaboration. This enhances their European engagement with other Europeans and can 
boost European identity-building. Because of this, the regions of Objective 2 as 
opposed to the regions of Objective 1 may have a higher chance of developing a 
European identity through their management of EU Cohesion Policy funding and 
participation in its programmes. All regions can, under Objective 3, develop European 
territorial cooperation projects, apply for funding, and, if granted, implement them in 
cooperation with other European regions. The extent of European engagement in these 
projects is by far the most influential in building a European-identity, when compared 
to Objectives 2 and certainly 1. However, it is also more challenging to participate in 
Objective 3 than in Objectives 1 or 2. Firstly, for regions receiving Objective 1 funding, 
connections across Europe may not yet have been established and thus it would be 
considerably more difficult for those regions to identify European partners and set up a 
European-wide project under Objective 3. Secondly, under the rules and regulations of 
this objective, regions are required to invest their own resources upfront into both the 
planning and application stages without guarantee of receiving any funds for project 
proposals submitted. The precarious financial resources in most regions have prompted 
many not to invest in this potential funding opportunity. The Cohesion Policy’s 
qualification limitations and prerequisite regional investment provisions de facto 
contributed to a variation in the scope of EU-funded programmes available to the EU’s 
97 regions – and a variation in regions’ opportunities to build a European identity 
through their participation in Cohesion Policy programmes. The variation in regions’ 
European engagement, however, continues to increase. In addition to the programmes 
designed and co-funded by the EU, the 97 regions are at liberty to design and 
implement their own European policies – though this option is exercised to dissimilar 
degrees.  
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Although to date there is no available data on the variation in scope of the 97 regions’ 
European policies and programmes, Hooghe; Marks & Schakel (2010) have developed 
a political authority index of European regions, which is based on the scope and depth 
of all policies within the respective regions’ portfolios. Table 4.1 outlines the political 
authority index of the four case study regions presented in this thesis: 
 
Table 4.1: Political Authority Index for the four case study regions 
Region Policy Depth Policy Scope Timeframe 
Brandenburg, GER 3 3 1950-2006 
Nord - Pas de Calais, FRA 2 2 1986-2006 
South West of England, UK 2 1 1999-2006 
Wallonia, BEL 3 3 1989-2006 
[Source: Hooghe; Marks & Schakel, 2010. This table outlines four European regions’ 
political authority index based on policy depth (1 lowest – 3 highest) and policy scope (1 
lowest – 3 highest). It also provides a timeframe to the administrative existence of the 
respective region.] 
 
Table 4.1 shows that there is variation amongst the regions’ respective political 
authority as related to their entire policy portfolio. It indicates that the regions’ political 
authority with regard to their European policies and programmes portfolio will also 
show variation. However, empirical evidence on the regions’ scope and objectives for 
their European policy and programme portfolio still needs to be presented in support of 
this claim – and will be done so in this chapter. This chapter will further investigate the 
variation in regions’ European policy, as manifested by the four regional case studies 
Nord – Pas de Calais; the South West of England; Brandenburg; and Wallonia. It will 
also assess the role of European identity within the regions’ respective European 
policies. 
 
 
Regions’ European policies: four case studies 
The European policies of the four case study regions Nord-Pas de Calais; the South 
West of England; Brandenburg; and Wallonia will be the focus of this section. More 
specifically, the comparative extent of European engagement and identity-building of 
these four sub-national government actors will be presented and analysed. Regions’ 
European policy includes the programmes funded by the EU Cohesion Policy as well as 
the regions’ own European policies and programmes. The objectives of their European 
engagement will be addressed and explained in order to determine whether European 
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initiatives are primarily driven by commercial considerations and forces, such as 
economic convergence and socioeconomic cohesion; or whether objectives extend to 
achieving long lasting European political relations, collaboration, a sense of unity, and 
a European identity.  
 
Nord-Pas de Calais 
The French region Nord-Pas de Calais is both actively engaged in the pursuit of 
European Union regional policy objectives and in the sign and implementation of its 
own European initiatives. Regarding EU-based funding, the region is allocated and can 
draw on €2.3 billion in competitiveness and employment funds under Objective 2 for 
the period 2007-2013 (Source: European Commission Directorate General for Regional 
Policy Operational Programme for Nord-Pas de Calais region 2007-2013). With a 
population of just over 4 million, the competitiveness and employment funding 
allocated to the region amounts to €575 per person for the seven year funding period. 
The region has recently undergone a phase of extensive development, due to high 
unemployment rates, low levels of research and development and growing 
urbanisation. The region’s programme focus therefore now is on creating and 
supporting a competitive and innovative business environment to stimulate sustainable 
economic growth and create, in the process, new and well-paying jobs. EU funds are 
therefore targeted to support and accelerate developments in the areas of training and 
research, cultural regeneration and fostering a new image, as well as promoting 
regional solidarity. 
 
In addition to Objective 2-funded activities, which are European funds to be spent 
within the regions, Nord-Pas de Calais also actively engages in three EU-facilitated 
European cross-border cooperation programmes and one transnational cooperation 
programme. The first cross-border cooperation program is entitled: ‘France-Wallonie-
Vlaanderen’ and deals with border-related issues between France and Belgium. It is 
supported by a total budget of €248 million (Source: European Commission Directorate 
for Regional Policy Nord-Pas de Calais Operational Programme 2007-2013). The 
second cross-border cooperation programme is ‘Deux Mers’, and it addresses maritime 
cooperation issues between Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and the UK. It can draw 
on a total budget of €295 million (Source: European Commission Directorate for 
Regional Policy Nord-Pas de Calais Operational Programme 2007-2013). Nord-Pas de 
Calais’s third cross-border cooperation programme is the ‘France (Channel) England’ 
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programme. It deals with strictly bilateral maritime border cooperation questions 
between France and England and has a total budget of €329 million (Source: European 
Commission Directorate for Regional Policy Nord-Pas de Calais Operational Programme 
2007-2013). Furthermore, the transnational cooperation programme of ‘North West 
Europe’ aims to address territorial issues through the exchange of best-practice in 
regional networks. The networks are home to approximately 180 million people, and 
the total budget for this programme zone is €696 million (Source: European 
Commission Directorate for Regional Policy Nord-Pas de Calais Operational Programme 
2007-2013). The region’s EU funded European policy has shown to include both 
economic development and, through network participation, European identity-building 
opportunities.  
 
Beyond the EU Regional Policy funding for Objectives 2 and 3, the region Nord-Pas de 
Calais is very active in European politics. Its regional government (‘Conseil Régional’), 
which is the leading governmental institution dealing with European affairs, developed 
the Institute for European Territorial Cooperation. The institute conceives and 
implements educational events on issues about Europe, broadly defined, for students, 
academics, civil servants and the general public. Events cover seminars on Europe and 
European opportunities for regional politicians and civil servants; training events on 
European cooperation projects and the role of regions in Europe. The institute also 
promotes student exchanges across Europe (Source: Booklet on the European Institute 
for Territorial Cooperation. Published by the Conseil Regional of Nord-Pas de Calais in 
October 2011). In addition, the regional government develops bilateral and multilateral 
relations with other European regions and provides assistance designed to develop and 
promote European interregional cooperation projects (Source: Nord-Pas de Calais 
website on Europe). In initiating and supporting the extent children, students, public 
and private sector constituents engage with other Europeans, Nord – Pas de Calais’ 
own European policy incorporates the potential to develop a European identity, in 
addition to possibly enticing economic development through its interregional 
cooperation projects.  
 
The European engagement of the region Nord-Pas de Calais thus extends from EU 
Regional Policy funding for Objective 2 on competitiveness and education to Objective 
3 on transnational cooperation and includes a range of self-designed and implemented 
European initiatives to develop training programmes and research projects as well as 
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raise awareness and appreciation of European opportunities to help stimulate 
sustainable economic growth and employment. It has allocated five civil servants to 
work on Objective 2, between twelve to sixteen on Objective 3 and fourteen on self-
designed initiatives including the Institute for bilateral relations and the development 
of cooperation projects (Source: Internal Document on Nord – Pas de Calais European 
Directorate Staff provided during Interviews in May 2010). Furthermore, the region is 
represented by one civil servant in Brussels. These staff numbers also show that the 
region invests significant resources into developing European social integration and the 
potential to building a European identity through its more socially minded and 
European-wide engaging programmes. These broad objectives of the region’s 
European policy come as a surprise when reflecting on the government system led 
anticipation of Keating (1999). According to his initial research on political authority 
delegated to regional governments, regional governments within unitary states are 
expected to have less authority than regions within federal government systems. 
Considering that Nord-Pas de Calais’ government system is highly centralised, it has 
not only allowed the implementation of a number of substantial initiatives led, amongst 
others, by its Institute for European Territorial Cooperation. It has also encouraged the 
Institute’s active engagement in developing European social integration and, through 
this, European identity-building, and ensured its appropriate funding and staffing. The 
Institute was established in 2008 and has grown from two to six full time staff 
members. In addition, the region’s own initiatives in the European-wide bilateral arena 
and its cooperation project development support efforts have grown to include eight 
full time staff members. The region is expanding its European social integration and 
identity-building objectives within its European policy.   
 
South West of England 
The South West of England European Policy and Programmes team is predominantly 
tasked with managing EU regional policy funds. As Cornwall’s GDP is below 75% of the 
EU average GDP, it is eligible to receive convergence funding under the Regional 
Policy’s Objective 1. This Objective does not include any scope for interacting with 
other Europeans, and through this interaction fostering a European identity. The rest of 
the region received Competitiveness and Education funding under Objective 2 (Source: 
European Commission Directorate General for Regional Policy South West of England 
Operational Programme 2007-2013). Due to this locational division of funding, there is 
also a division in location of teams. The team assigned to address Objective 1 is 
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managed in Cornwall, while the team in charge of Objective 2 is managed in the 
Regional Development Agency (RDA) in Exeter. It is also in Exeter, where the team 
dealing with Objective 3 of the EU Regional Policy funds is located. Team staff 
allocations, however, are quite uneven. The team assigned to pursue Objective 3 
consists of only two agents, while the teams delegated to address Objectives 1 and 2 
have eight to ten agents each ‘on the job’ (Source: Internal Document on South West 
of England RDA European Policy and Programmes Team Staff provided during 
Interviews in April 2010). Objective 3 is the programme with the most opportunity to 
interact with other Europeans and through this engagement foster social integration 
and European identity-building. As this Objective is not staffed as systematically as the 
management of EU funding within the region under Objectives 1 and 2, it can be 
anticipated that the region does not set as a significant objective to build a European 
identity through its work. Furthermore, the South West of England’s RDA has joined 
forces with Universities and businesses from the region to share a regional Brussels 
representation office. There are between 4 and 5 member of staff in the Brussels 
office. 
 
In the UK, there are no institutionalised regional governments. Decisions on European 
policy are the domain of the central government; regional governments, as presented 
in the other case studies in this thesis, do not exist. Consequently, there is only very 
limited authority at the regional level for European politics in the country. And the 
extent and focus of European affairs dealt with at the regional level in the UK revolves 
very much around EU Regional Policy objectives – and especially those which manage 
EU funding within the region but not those which would foster European interaction, 
engagement and identity-building. It does not reach beyond the set objectives of 
developing the regional economy.  
 
During the 2007 – 2013 EU budget period, Cornwall and the Iles of Scilly expect to 
receive convergence funding amounting to £565 million, whilst the rest of the region 
receives competitiveness and employment funding amounting to £345 million (Source: 
European Commission Directorate General for Regional Policy South West of England 
Operational Programme 2007-2013). The total EU Regional Policy funding for 
Objectives 1 and 2 allocated to the South West of England amounted to £910 million. 
With a population of just below 5.2 million, the allocated funding for Objectives 1 and 2 
is just short of £176 per person for the seven year period. The projects’ primary aims 
 97 
 
 
 
for Objectives 1 and 2 include support for both economic regeneration and economic 
growth, increasing the level of productivity, and halting and reversing prevailing 
socioeconomic inequalities within the region (and in Europe, as parts of the South West 
of England are below 75% of the average EU GDP; a GDP percentage quite uncommon 
for Western Europe). 
 
In addition to the allocated funds of Objective 1 and 2, the South West of England’s 
European policy states that it is a partner in two cross-border cooperation programmes 
as well as two transnational cooperation programmes. These are part of the Objective 
3 of the Cohesion Policy – the programme which can foster a European identity 
through enhanced European interactions and engagements. It is part of the ‘Deux 
Mers’ cross-border cooperation programme between the UK, France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands (together with Nord-Pas de Calais), with a total budget of €295 million; 
and is also part of the ‘France (Channel) England’ cross-border cooperation programme 
(again, together with Nord-Pas de Calais) between the UK and France with a total 
budget of €328 million (Source: European Commission Directorate General for 
Regional Policy South West of England Operational Programme 2007-2013). The two 
transnational cooperation programmes in which the region participates are the ‘North 
West Europe’ programme (again, together with Nord-Pas de Calais) and the ‘Atlantic 
Coast’ programme, together with the Atlantic coastal areas of France, the UK, Ireland, 
Spain, and Portugal. Its total budget is €159 million (Source: European Commission 
Directorate General for Regional Policy South West of England Operational Programme 
2007-2013). 
 
Whilst there are approximately the same number of team members working on 
Objective 1 and Objective 2, only one team member has been delegated to manage 
Objective 3 and nobody has been exclusively assigned to oversee European initiatives 
beyond the scope of EU funding (Source: European Commission Directorate General 
for Regional Policy South West of England Operational Programme 2007-2013). This 
lies in stark contrast to the staffing numbers of Nord – Pas de Calais, who have eight 
civil servants working on interregional cooperation opportunities and six civil servants 
working on programmes which have the potential to include elements of social 
integration and European identity-building. The interviews conducted with the RDA’s 
European Policy and Programmes team will shed some light on why European 
territorial cooperation and European initiatives beyond EU funding do not play a more 
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important role for the region of the South West of England – especially those which 
have the potential to construct a European identity in addition to fostering economic 
development.  
 
Brandenburg  
Germany has a federal government system, granting its regions, the Bundesländer, 
considerable latitude in exercising political authority in the European policy area, 
amongst others. It is against this background that the Brandenburg regional 
government (‘Ministry of Trade, Industry and European Affairs’) derives both its 
mandate and authority over not only the management of EU-funded programmes 
within the framework of Objectives 1 and 3, but also develops a host of additional 
European initiatives, such as identifying and launching broadly-based bilateral relations 
with other European regions and countries. Within its policy scope, there is a strong 
possibility of Brandenburg cultivating a European identity.   
 
Brandenburg is geographically located in the former German Democratic Republic 
(‘East Germany’). It has thus only become a constitutive part of the EU after the 
reunification of Germany in 1990. Economic convergence by way of putting in place the 
basic pillars for a stronger, more stable regional economy with well-paying jobs in an 
increasingly competitive business environment have been top priorities for the region. 
In addition the region also intends to strengthen its SME innovation capabilities, 
develop its research and development capacity, and turn Brandenburg into a premier 
address for businesses (Source: European Commission Directorate General for 
Regional Policy Brandenburg Operational Programme 2007-2013). 
 
More than twenty years after having formally joined the EU as a ‘Bundesland’ of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Brandenburg still receives convergence funds under 
Objective 1, amounting to €2 billion. With a population of just over 2.5 million, the per 
capita convergence funding amounts to just about of €787 per person for the 2007 – 
2013 budget period. 
 
Brandenburg has chosen to participate in two cross-border cooperation programmes 
and two transnational cooperation programmes. The two cross-border cooperation 
programmes are ‘Lubuskie-Brandenburg’, a Polish-German cooperation programme 
supported with €146 million; and ‘Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg and 
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Zachodniopomorskie’, another Polish-German cooperation programme funded with 
€156 million (Source: European Commission Directorate General for Regional Policy 
Brandenburg Operational Programme 2007-2013). Brandenburg’s two transnational 
cooperation programmes are expected to provide the region with best practice 
experiences on territorial issues. Of particular relevance and interest for Brandenburg 
are the ‘Baltic Sea’ programme, which supports regions in Germany, Denmark, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Finland, and Sweden with €293 million; and the 
‘Central Europe’ programme, which has €298 million allocated for regions in the Czech 
Republic, Italy, Hungary, Austria, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, and Germany (Source: 
European Commission Directorate General for Regional Policy Brandenburg Operational 
Programme 2007-2013). By engaging with the membership of these cross-border and 
transnational cooperation programmes, there is a likelihood that, though increased 
interactions, Brandenburg may be fostering a European identity. 
 
In addition to EU Regional Policy funding, Brandenburg has also developed pro-active 
relations with other governments in European regions and countries, additional 
European interactions which may contribute to European identity-building. In view of 
substantial cooperation funding with Polish regions, Brandenburg’s regional ‘Ministry of 
Trade, Industry and European Affairs’ has been able to develop very close ties to their 
Polish colleagues. Being able to draw on sufficient staff support, both in terms of 
quantity and quality, has greatly contributed to building those ties. Whilst the French 
Nord-Pas de Calais region has only one regional government official managing its 
European bilateral relations, and the South West of England region has none, 
Brandenburg has been able to commit eight full time civil servants managing the 
federal region’s bilateral relations (Source: Internal Document on Wallonia European 
Directorate Staff as provided during Interviews in May 2010). Additionally, a branch of 
Brandenburg’s Ministry has a liaison office in Brussels, staffed with eleven 
professionals, to cover the region’s European programmes sur place (Source: Internal 
Document on Wallonia European Directorate Staff as provided during Interviews in May 
2010). In contrast to the French and UK case studies, Brandenburg has thus sufficient 
manpower in place to comply with, among others, EU framework rules and regulations; 
such as coordinating and translating EU laws into regional laws. The regional Ministry 
assigned six civil servants to dispose of these types of obligations (Source: Internal 
Document on Wallonia European Directorate Staff as provided during Interviews in May 
2010). 
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Whilst the three regions’ teams dealing with Objectives 1 and 2 are of very similar 
size, the teams dealing with additional regional European capacities run higher in staff 
numbers. Brandenburg’s team sets itself apart from the British non-institutionalised 
RDA (Regional Development Agency) team; it is also better equipped than an 
otherwise very active French regional government in drawing in needed manpower. 
The French and British regions’ more constrained access to professional human 
resources, however, is primarily a reflection of both their more limited European 
mandate and authority as well as ready access to resources provided by a decidedly 
more centralised government system eager to preserve their European prerogatives. 
This particularly holds in the case of the British region. However, it must be noted that 
the French region does have ample opportunity to foster social integration and 
European identity-building through its European policy.  
 
Wallonia 
The Walloon region, like Brandenburg, operates within a federal government system. 
And like the German region, it enjoys substantial regional political and legal authority. 
In the recent 550 days absence of a functioning a national Belgian government, 
Wallonia, together with its Belgian counterparts Flanders and Bruxelles-Capitale, has 
become one of the most autonomous regions in the EU.  
 
Similar to Brandenburg, Wallonia has an extensive regional government staffed with 
experienced civil servants. And like the South West of England’s Cornwall, Wallonia’s 
Hainaut receives EU convergence funding, while the majority of the region receives 
competitiveness and education funding. Wallonia receives EU-funding for programmes 
covered by Objective 1 in the amount of €1.1 billion; and €720 million to address EU-
relevant challenges as defined in Objective 2. The region also draws in money set aside 
for initiatives under Objective 3. Wallonia is actively involved in four cross-border 
cooperation programmes and one transnational cooperation programme (Source: 
European Commission Directorate General for Regional Policy Wallonia Operational 
Programme 2007-2013). With a population of just over 5.5 million, the region receives 
€322 per citizen in EU funding for Objectives 1 and 2 for the 2007 – 2013 budget 
period. On the basis of this funding, the region aims to improve its competitiveness by 
restoring and enhancing both its urban and rural areas. But in view of Hainaut’s 
convergence objective, Wallonia must also tackle its persistent economic inequalities 
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(Source: European Commission Directorate General for Regional Policy Wallonia 
Operational Programme 2007-2013). By participating in both Objectives 2 and 
particularly 3, Wallonia has the opportunity to develop European identity alongside its 
economic growth. As was explained previously, it is through participation in Objective 
3 that regions can interact to the largest extent with other Europeans (within the EU 
funded programmes) – and develop a European identity by way of these interactions. 
As will be explained below, Wallonia participates very actively in Objective 3 
programmes, and thus creates ample opportunity to participate in European identity-
building. 
 
Wallonia is part of numerous cross-border cooperation programmes. Firstly, it is 
involved in the ‘Deux Mers’ (together with Nord-Pas de Calais and the South West of 
England) programme with total programme funding for the Belgian regions, the 
Netherlands, France, and the UK in the range of €295 (Source: European Commission 
Directorate General for Regional Policy Wallonia Operational Programme 2007-2013). 
Secondly, the region is engaged in the ‘France-Wallonie-Vlaanderen’ cross-border 
cooperation programme, a Franco-Belgian programme with total funding of €248 
million (Source: European Commission Directorate General for Regional Policy Wallonia 
Operational Programme 2007-2013). It is, thirdly, participating in the €145 million 
‘Euregio Maas-Rhein’ programme with designated regions in Belgium, Germany and 
the Netherlands (Source: European Commission Directorate General for Regional Policy 
Wallonia Operational Programme 2007-2013). And fourthly, Wallonia is associated with 
the ‘Grande Région’ programme covering regions in Belgium, Germany, France and 
Luxembourg; the amount allocated for this cross-border cooperation programme is 
€212 million (Source: European Commission Directorate General for Regional Policy 
Wallonia Operational Programme 2007-2013). Furthermore, Wallonia is part of the 
‘Nord-West Europe’ Transnational cooperation programme. Regions of the UK 
(including the South West of England), Ireland, France (including Nord-Pas de Calais), 
Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Luxembourg are part of this programme with 
an allocated programme budget of €696 million (Source: European Commission 
Directorate General for Regional Policy Wallonia Operational Programme 2007-2013). 
Through this long list of European cooperation programmes Walloon public and private 
sector constituents can participate in, Walloons are at a strong advantage to interact 
with other Europeans and through this interaction foster a European identity. 
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Furthermore, benefitting from its geographic location, which puts the region alongside 
several European borders, Wallonia is in a very favourable position to conduct its 
cross-border cooperation projects. This natural comparative advantage is 
complemented by the country’s federal government system. It not only allows for 
maximum European outreach in times of recurrent national political stalemates – with 
the most recent one lasting through much of 2010 and 2011 -, it inter alia encourages 
the Walloon European Ministry to build  an extensive European portfolio, reaching far 
beyond EU-funded objectives. And while the region’s government headquarters in 
Namur are generously staffed to systematically pursue regional European interests, 
core staff remains in Brussels in a collaborative ’umbrella agency’ jointly managed by 
Wallonia and Bruxelles Capitale, the two francophone Belgian regions. Wallonie 
Bruxelles International (WBI), the European affairs branch of the regional government, 
is charged with maintaining European and international bilateral relations; managing 
EU funds and promoting European cooperation; and representing the region to the EU 
institutions, including the Committee of the Regions and the Assembly of European 
Regions. It is also responsible for translating EU legislation into Belgian and Walloon 
laws (Source: WBI Europe organisational introduction on website).  
 
These and additional responsibilities are routinely handled by two representatives of 
the region attached to EU institutions; four civil servants in the European legal 
department; twelve civil servants managing bilateral relations with other European 
regions, countries and international partnerships; nine civil servants overseeing EU-
funded Objective 3 cooperation programmes; and several civil servants working in 
different regional offices of the ministry, managing EU-funded Objective 1 and 2 
programmes (Source: Internal Document on Wallonia European Directorate Staff as 
provided during Interviews in May 2010). The region is thus well staffed to cultivate a 
European identity through its European cooperation work, if it sets this as an objective. 
Taken together, the Walloon European Ministry and WBI constitute a large regional 
governmental body. It has well developed links abroad and a smoothly running, large 
European programmes apparatus which effectively supports the region’s ability to 
significantly extent its political authority on all European matters of relevance to 
Wallonia. And the Walloon region compares favourably to the other three regions 
presented in this thesis, as it enjoys substantial political authority and the means 
necessary to engage in European affairs, both within the scope of EU-funded 
programmes and beyond.  
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All four regions presented here manifest variations in national government systems, 
which influence and impact the extent of regional authority to engage in European 
politics. The English region with its centralised national government and a de facto 
non-institutionalised regional development agency does not provide the indispensable 
European capacities and authority to optimize the acquisition and management of EU-
funded objectives. And while the French regional government is institutionalised, it 
routinely faces a highly centralised national government’s opposition when its outreach 
is interpreted as a move to bring about the devolution of power. The region has, 
however, been able to acquire more European political authority, ranging from EU-
funded objectives to bilateral relations, development of further cooperation projects, as 
well establishing a European Institute dedicated to raise awareness among civil 
servants, academics, students and citizens about the EU and European opportunities.  
 
The German region, operating within a federal, highly de-centralised national 
government system, enjoys extensive political authority on matters relating to the 
European sphere. As the region is still in a process of socio-economic convergence 
following the reunification of Germany and membership accorded the former East 
German region(s) to the EU in 1990, it is not yet developed on par with the Belgian 
region; notwithstanding the fact that it also manages its regional European affairs in a 
highly de-centralised federal government system. Existing academic research suggests 
that a region’s national government system is a core influence in the development of 
regional capacity and effective engagement in European politics. Yet, the policy 
analysis has shown that the French region, Nord – Pas de Calais, has significant 
staffing resources to boost the region’s participation in European cooperation projects, 
which can foster both economic development and European identity-building through 
the enhanced interactions of the participants. Thus, the claim cannot yet be made 
whether government system has a strong enough impact on both scope and objectives 
of a region’s European policy. Field research in the four regional governments and 
semi-structured interviews conducted with political elites and civil servants pointed at 
additional factors influencing the scope of a region’s political authority and its European 
engagement. The following section will discuss the findings. 
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Commonalities amongst the four regions’ European engagement  
The one commonality shared by all four regions’ European engagement is their pursuit 
and receipt of European funds within the confines of the EU’s Cohesion Policy. Whether 
they receive convergence or competitiveness and employment funding depends on 
their respective regional GDP as compared to the average EU regional GDP. During the 
2007-2013 period, Brandenburg receives convergence funding, the South West of 
England and Wallonia obtain convergence as well as competitiveness and employment 
funding, and Nord-Pas de Calais secures competitiveness and employment funding. 
There is thus some variation in the commonality of receiving EU funds from the 
Cohesion Policy. Table 2 shows the variation in funding allocation. 
  
Beyond funding for Objectives 1 and 2 of the Cohesion Policy, the regions may also 
receive funding for participation in territorial cooperation programmes. This funding is 
allocated to the programme, not directly to the participating region. Therefore, based 
on the information available, it is not possible to gauge the total amount of funding 
regions receive for participation in territorial cooperation programmes. Drawing on the 
earlier outline of the four case study regions’ participation in the Cohesion Policy, Table 
4.2 shows the number and scope of the territorial cooperation programmes each 
respective region participates in. 
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Table 4.2: Cohesion Policy Funding per region 
Region 
Objective 
1 
 
Objective 
2 
 
Total 
O1 + O2 
Funding 
p.Pers. 
Objective 3 
Cross-border and 
Transnational 
Cooperation 
Programmes 
Nord- Pas de 
Calais 
 
€2,3 billion 
 
€575 
‘France-Wallonie-
Vlaanderen’ 
€248 million 
‘Deux Mers’ 
€295 million 
‘France (Channel) 
England’ 
€329 million 
‘North West Europe’ 
€696 million 
South West of 
England 
€565 
million 
€345 
million 
€176 
‘Deux Mers’ 
€295 million 
‘France (Channel) 
England’ 
€329 million 
‘North West Europe’ 
€696 million 
‘Atlantic Coast’ 
€159 million 
Brandenburg €2 billion  €787 
‘Lubiskie-Brandenburg’ 
€146 million 
‘Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern, 
Brandenburg and 
Zachodniopoporskie’ 
€156 million 
‘Baltic Sea’ 
€293 million 
‘Central Europe’ 
€298 million 
Wallonia €1,1 billion 
€720 
million 
€322 
‘Deux Mers’ 
€295 million 
‘France-Wallonie-
Vlaanderen’ 
€248 million 
‘Euregio Maas-Rhein’ 
€145 million 
‘Grade Region’ 
€212 million 
‘North West Europe’ 
€696 million 
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Table 4.2 documents that the amount of funding received by the regions through the 
Cohesion Policy varies considerably; whilst Brandenburg is allocated €787 per person 
over the seven year period from 2007-2013, the South West of England is allocated a 
comparatively small amount of €176 per person for the same period. In view of this 
variation, it could be expected that the Brandenburg region is staffed with more civil 
servants to manage the initiatives within the confines of Objective 1 than the South 
West of England region for Objectives 1 and 2. However, the South West of England 
Regional Development Agency mainly deals with managing European funding, whereas 
the Brandenburg region’s civil servants have developed a broader scope of European 
engagement and have a comparatively small staff managing the copious European 
funds of Objective 1. This gives credence to two assumptions: firstly, that the German 
federal government system gives Brandenburg more political authority to develop and 
engage in a European policy beyond managing the EU funded programmes than the 
British government system gives the South West of England; and secondly, that for 
some regions managing EU funding has been set as a prioritised objective, whilst for 
other regions it has been used as a mechanism to develop the European scope of their 
regional political engagement.  
 
The objectives for the Cohesion Fund’s programmes are set by the European 
Commission. In the passages below, it will be clarified to which extent these objectives 
undertake economic development and European identity-building. The Regional Policy, 
now called Cohesion Policy, has, generally, undergone a transformation from being a 
purely regional development fund to a fund fostering development on the one hand 
and better collaboration between the European regions on the other hand. The initial 
baby steps of the Regional Policy were taken in 1957, with the decision to implement a 
European Social Fund. In 1972 the Heads of State institutionalised the Regional Policy, 
and in 1975 implemented the European Regional Development Fund with a budget of 
€1,300 million for a period of three years. In 1986, alongside the Single European Act 
and the creation of a single market, the Cohesion Policy was implemented in order to 
more effectively address the need for convergence and cohesion across the EU. The 
funding mechanism of the Cohesion Policy were called Structural Funds and amounted 
to €65 billion for the period of 1989 to 1993. However, it was only in 1990 that the 
interregional component was added to the scope of the Cohesion Policy, and it has 
evolved ever since. In its second period, from 1994 to 1999, the budget reached ECU 
3,519 million. In its third period, covering the years from 2000 to 2006, the budget 
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was set at €4,875 million. And finally, in its fourth and present period, from 2007 to 
2013, the budget for interregional initiatives has not only grown to €8.72 billion; 
Objective 3 was added to the Cohesion Policy, now including cross-border cooperation, 
transnational cooperation, and inter-regional cooperation. By fostering better 
collaboration amongst Europeans, a shared identity can emerge as a bi-product of the 
increased interactions and interconnectedness. And this is precisely the area the 
European Commission intends to further develop in the next budgets.  
 
Referring to the exponential growth of interregional initiatives within the Cohesion 
Policy, a top Policy Development decision-maker within DG REGIO’s Regional Policy 
Directory C explained that interregional engagement throughout Europe will play an 
increasingly important role in future Cohesion Policy strategies and plans (Source: 
Interviewee number 1). At the moment, the interviewee is working on the preparation 
of the next Cohesion Policy, running from 2014 onwards. Whilst discussions on the 
budgetary allocations to interregional initiatives will be held throughout 2012 and 
much of 2013, the top Policy Development decision-maker interviewed said she 
expects a clear funding transition from convergence to competitiveness and 
employment and, finally, to interregional cooperation (Interviewee number 1) She 
added, that the focus would shift from spatial areas to sectors – making it essential for 
regions to develop sufficient capacities to work with other regions, as they will not only 
need to better cooperate with their closest neighbours and develop and implement 
collaborative project ideas with their counterparts located in areas throughout the 
expanded EU. Regions will thus need to develop and manage their European 
engagement more independently from the EU than has been the case in the current 
funding period. And as EU funding is oftentimes dependant on proof of European 
project experience, EU regions must boost the scope of their European engagement 
from managing allocated funds to be spent within the region to participating in pan-
European projects to ensure continued procurement and participation in EU-funded 
projects in the future. The next funding periods will thus place a key objective 
European cooperation; a programme which develops both EU regions’ economies and 
fosters a European identity due to the increased interactions amongst European 
participants. 
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Transitioning development funds allocated to regions for specific objectives to funds 
given to regions for cooperation projects in specific spatial areas and sectors will 
become the new modus operandi and funding basis of the EU Cohesion Policy. Whilst 
all four regions receive either convergence funding or competitiveness and 
employment funding (or, as in the case of the South West of England and Wallonia, 
both types of funding), they show significant variation in the scope of their European 
engagement beyond managing the EU funds allocated to their region. As was noted 
earlier, some regions have their own dedicated civil servants managing bilateral 
partnerships with other European civil servants, or organising European exchange 
programmes for social integration, or supporting the start-up of European 
entrepreneurial or political cooperation projects. But not all regions. This variation in 
scope and objectives is paramount, as regions are meant to position themselves for a 
future in which interregional cooperation will be the central objective of the EU’s 
Regional Policy. Which of the four case study regions are in a good position through 
their European-wide engagement, and which may already be fostering a European 
identity?  
 
Variation amongst the four case study regions’ European engagement  
The most profound variation in the regions’ scope and objectives of European 
engagement lies in the policies which they themselves design. Secondary to that is 
their engagement in the EU’s Cohesion Policy. The first variation assessment of the 
four case study regions’ scope of European policy can be seen in Table 4.3 below.  
 
Table 4.3: European engagement of the case study regions  
 South West of 
England 
Nord – Pas 
de Calais 
Brandenburg Wallonia 
Bilateral partnerships 
 
    
Cooperation projects and 
support 
    
Brussels Regional 
representation office 
    
Regional Cooperation 
Networks 
    
European Affairs Ministry 
(with own policy) 
    
Represents itself to the EU 
institutions and Council of 
Ministers 
    
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As Table 4.3 documents, there is significant variation across the four regional case 
studies in terms of the scope of their self-designed European policies reaching beyond 
EU-funded programme participation. The South West of England region has placed its 
focus on managing European funds allocated for Objectives 1, 2 and 3, respectively. 
Both the region’s regional Brussels office and its participation in regional cooperation 
networks are initiatives with the aim of identifying cooperation partnerships. This is in 
keeping with the extent of political authority provided to the artificial region, created 
for managing the EU funding. However, it also shows that the region has not 
developed on this scope since its creation in 1999. The other three regions have 
integrated into their European portfolio bilateral partnerships across the EU. 
Partnerships are typically formed between and among other regions and countries. The 
objectives of fostering new and consolidating existing relationships with potential 
cooperation partners will be discussed in detail in the following chapter. Particularly for 
a region as geographically isolated as the South West of England, the honing and 
growing of close partnerships with European neighbours is more difficult; and whilst 
having a set of bilateral partnerships would be very beneficial for developing 
interregional cooperation opportunities, the region has yet to establish any. Of the 
remaining three regions, Wallonia, with its highly developed decentralised government 
system, has put in place the most elaborate bilateral partnerships. Both Brandenburg 
and Nord-Pas de Calais, though the later to a lesser degree, have developed a number 
of strategic bilateral partnerships; primarily with neighbouring regions dealing with 
similar economic regeneration needs and challenges. 
 
All four regions have implemented European cooperation projects and initiatives. Of 
the four regions, the French Nord- Pas de Calais region has, together with 
Brandenburg, the broadest set of objectives of all four regions’ cooperation 
programmes, ranging from regularly organised social integration and cooperation 
programmes for particular social groups within the region, to producing a manual for 
potential cooperation participants and running seminars and workshops, igniting the 
interest and involvement of its constituents in EU-funded activities. Their cooperation 
programmes are thus on the one hand targeted toward EU-funded opportunities and 
on the other hand reaching for social integration and perhaps even identity-building. 
Whether this heightened interest of the region is in response to anticipated changes in 
the next EU-funding period, as mentioned above, remains to be seen.  
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Of the case study regions, the Nord – Pas de Calais and also Brandenburg regional 
governments have developed and adopted a multi-pronged strategy, pursuing a host 
of cooperation initiatives across the full gamut of EU-funded objectives. Brandenburg 
also generates cooperation opportunities with the objective to raise public awareness 
and engagement in all stages of development and implementation of EU projects and 
programmes. The region has identified target audiences, including school children, 
students, university researchers, entrepreneurs, and organises a steady flow of 
specialised and focused ‘reaching out’ events to drive home the message of European 
opportunities, benefits and identity. But Brandenburg’s strategy clearly goes beyond 
awareness raising and motivating people and entrepreneurs alike to strengthen the 
region’s economic base and prospects; it also uses its political mandate and authority 
to communicate to the region that it is as important to also make Europe a social 
project - and making the people the centrepiece of this project.  
 
The same motivation and drive is markedly absent in the South West of England. While 
the region designated staff to manage and develop cooperation projects, it has, for 
political reasons, not been able to dedicate more than one (!) full time staff to develop 
a broadly-based, effective cooperation strategy with the objective of creating EU-
funded opportunities for the region. How the region will develop its cooperation 
capacities in preparation of the 2014 budget is unclear.  
 
The Walloon cooperation projects, in contrast, have enjoyed the benefit of professional 
support throughout the regional government. Its projects are very much focused on 
the opportunities provided by the INTERREG programme – thus staying close to EU 
Cohesion Policy opportunities instead of developing a broader range of cooperation 
themes and objectives, like Nord – Pas de Calais and Brandenburg. Wallonia is clearly 
in charge of driving and managing cooperation opportunities; it only steps aside if 
cooperation communication events need to be coordinated through the bilateral 
partnerships division. Given the pre-eminence of INTERREG makes it clear that 
Wallonia’s cooperation objectives are primarily driven by and linked to making the 
most of available EU-funding opportunities. It also further highlights the variation 
amongst the four regions’ cooperation policies and programmes. It is nothing less than 
substantial and significant.  
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All four regions have assigned representation offices in Brussels – although Wallonia’s 
main headquarters for European engagement (Wallonia Bruxelles International) is 
located in Brussels. Though their sizes vary (Nord – Pas de Calais: 1; South West of 
England: 4-5; Brandenburg: 11; Wallonia approx. 14), all representation offices are 
mandated to give voice and visibility to their regional interest when engaging the 
representative of the European institutions, provide links between regional actors and 
the European institutions, diffuse information from the European institutions to the 
region, and network with other regional representation offices and regional actors in 
order to establish and nurture closer ties with potential cooperation partners. Whether 
the regional Brussels offices are meant to build a European identity through their work 
is not stated in any terms, however it can be anticipated that, being European 
connection hubs, their amount of European-wide interconnectedness and engagement 
could cultivate a shared identity.  
 
The prominence of the four regional Brussels offices varies. The offices of the South 
West of England, Brandenburg and Wallonia are quite visible in terms of their proximity 
to the relevant EU institutions (with exception of the WBI office which is located in the 
very large, and thus less centrally located headquarters building of the region). The 
three regions’ offices are spacious with the capacity to hold medium to large-size 
meetings and events. They also have sizable professional and support staff and 
maintain their own, and generally informative websites. The Brussels office of Nord – 
Pas de Calais, in somewhat of a contrast, has not yet set up its own website; it 
manages part of its outreach by posting monthly information updates and relevant 
documents on the region’s website. Its office is not in close proximity to the DG Regio 
buildings; it is also small in size and only has a few professional staff members on 
hand. Proximity and visibility of the regional offices thus varies greatly: whilst the 
offices of the South West of England, Brandenburg and Wallonia are only a ‘stone’s 
throw away’ from the key EU institutions with regional responsibilities and is supported 
by a good to excellent office infrastructure and human resources, the office of the Nord 
– Pas de Calais operates at the margins, both in terms of its closeness to the relevant 
EU buildings and institutions and the capacity of its ability to support its professional 
and support staff. This is surprising in view of the scope of European policies and 
programmes initiated by the region’s home office.  
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Similarly, all four regions participate in European regional cooperation networks. The 
objectives and ambitions behind their participation in such networks will be discussed 
in the next chapter and the perceptions of regional cooperation network members will 
be presented in Chapters 5, 6 and by extension Chapter 7. European regional 
cooperation networks have the principal objective of linking potential regional 
cooperation partners and disseminating relevant information in the most timely and 
cost-efficient manner to enhance cooperation opportunities amongst its membership. It 
can also serve as an instrument for building a European identity through the European-
wide collaboration it facilitates. The objectives of the regions participating in European 
regional networks are listed as tools to identify and connect with cooperation project 
participants. However, whether identity-building also plays a role in their network 
participation will be studied in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
 
Brandenburg and Wallonia are both integral parts of their countries’ de-centralised 
government systems, and therefore, unlike Nord – Pas de Calais and the South West of 
England, have the political, legal and regional authority and capacity to maintain a 
ministry devoted to European affairs. Belgian’s constitution and political tradition has 
supported the evolution of a government system that gives the country’s regions a 
greater degree of independence than, for example, the German ‘Bundesländer’. 
Wallonia has therefore the ability to exercise more authority and capacity than 
Brandenburg in designing and implementing its own European positions. It also is able 
to represent its interests directly to the EU in Brussels by way of its permanent 
regional representatives. Brandenburg is, of course, also equipped to represent its 
views and interests to the Brussels-based European institutions; however it is obliged 
to get clearance first through the Bundesrat, Germany’s second legislative chamber 
representing all sixteen ‘Bundesländer’, before speaking on behalf of German regions – 
not just its own. And whilst both Brandenburg and Wallonia are sufficiently staffed to 
manage both their European Affairs Ministry and directly represent themselves at the 
European institutions, the Belgian region can draw on more directly allocated 
permanent staff for individual assignments and thus appears to be better positioned to 
make optimal use of its official European branch both in Brussels and within its 
regional government system. 
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There is significant variation in the scope of the four regions’ European engagement; 
particularly within their self-designed policies and programmes. Whether the causes of 
this variation are the differing levels of political authority, an argument for which a 
strong claim has been made by Hooghe; Marks & Schakel (2010), or the other regional 
characteristics discussed in Chapters 1 and 3 (including political elites’ interests; 
geographic location; network participation; and shared heritage and language), will be 
raised and clarified by both the perceptions of regional decision-makers on and 
implementers of regions’ European policies and programmes in the next two chapters. 
However, based on the policy analysis in this chapter, it has become clear that the 
Political Authority Index proposed by Hooghe; Marks & Schakel (2010) is not sufficient 
in explaining the variation in scope of regions’ European policies. Whilst German and 
Belgian regions would be expected to have equal policy scope (as they both received 
the same, maximum rank in the index) it has been shown that the two case study 
regions indeed to do not share the same scope. Wallonia enjoys more independence 
from the central state in its representation to the European Union, and Brandenburg 
has developed a wider scope of social engagement in its European policy and 
programmes. However, the Political Authority Index (Hooghe; Marks & Schakel, 2010) 
does accurately reflect the comparative scope of the French and English regional case 
studies: Nord- Pas de Calais would be expected to have a wider policy scope than the 
South West of England, and this was shown to be true. A further assessment of 
explanations on the variation of regions’ scope in European policies and programmes 
will be presented in the following two chapters. First, however, it will be assessed 
whether the four regions’ European policies and programmes claim to cultivate a 
European identity. 
 
 
Preliminary assessment of the role of European identity within the regions’ 
European policies and programmes 
Whilst the term ‘European identity’ does not appear in any of the current European 
policy documentation of the four case study regions, and thereby no official claim is 
being made by either of the regions on intending to cultivate a European identity 
through their European work, the analysis of their respective policy scope allows for a 
preliminary assessment of whether certain policy aspects build a European identity as 
an explicit, intentional objective; as a bi-product; or not at all. The South West of 
England’s European portfolio is strictly limited to EU funded programmes which 
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typically involve infrastructure and competitiveness development within the region 
itself. However, as the region is able to participate in cross-border and transnational 
cooperation, in theory this exchange and interaction could build a European identity as 
a bi-product. The three other regional case studies have shown that they too 
participate in cross-border and transnational cooperation programmes through the EU’s 
Cohesion Policy Objective 3. In contrast to the South West of England’s European 
portfolio, these three case study regions also design and implement their own 
European policies and programmes which, though quite distinct, display a number of 
features and attributes capable of constructing a European identity. The Nord-Pas de 
Calais and Brandenburg regions in particular offer programmes which would quite 
naturally cultivate a European identity – by intent. The Nord-Pas de Calais’ European 
youth exchange programme and Brandenburg’s European awareness campaign and 
cultural exchange programme provide opportunities for citizens to experience Europe, 
engage with other Europeans, and, through interactions and personal experiences, 
potentially identify similarities and a common identity. Whether the programmes are 
indeed intended to achieve this will be raised with and clarified by the political 
decision-makers of the two regions in the following chapter. Also Wallonia’s bilateral 
partnerships including cultural exchanges for musicians could potentially foster a 
European identity, however this programme does not include the extent of personal 
interaction with other Europeans when compared to, for instance, the programmes 
offered by Brandenburg and Nord- Pas de Calais. Therefore Wallonia’s European policy 
may foster a European identity more as a bi-product than as an intended objective. 
The preferences and intentions of the four case studies’ political elites must be critically 
explored and evaluated through, amongst others, insider accounts of regional political 
decision-makers and policy and programme implementers. Their accounts and 
reflections will be presented in the following two chapters. 
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Chapter 5 
Is European policy European? The political case 
 
Chapter four has started to assess whether European identity-building plays a role in 
the four case study regions’ European policies – as they are formulated. It has found 
that, somewhat surprisingly, the region Nord – Pas de Calais has developed quite a 
broad scope of objectives within its European policy, through which it can foster a 
European identity – although it does not explicitly say so. The opportunities include 
bilateral partnerships; interregional cooperation; raising awareness of European 
opportunities; and engaging constituents with social exchanges throughout Europe to 
share best practice and experiences. Particularly the latter programme fosters a 
significant opportunity to build a European identity. Also Wallonia may foster a 
European identity through its bilateral partnerships and participation in interregional 
cooperation programmes and European regional networks. Brandenburg, too, has the 
opportunity to build a European identity through its policy scope. Particularly through 
its interregional cooperation programmes, bilateral partnerships, European regional 
network participation, and an impressively represented and connected Brussels office, 
the region places as core objectives the awareness-building of European benefits and 
citizenship in schools and communities throughout the region, and connects 
constituents with other Europeans.  
 
To learn whether building a European identity indeed plays a role in the regions’ 
European policy objectives, this research speaks directly to civil servants and political 
elites of the four case study regions. This chapter will assess whether the political 
elites intend to cultivate a European identity through the policies they design and 
decide on, and the next chapter will evaluate the perceptions of the civil servants on 
the role of European identity within the work they implement. The two chapters will, 
taken together, answer the question whether civil servants, who engage more with 
Europeans on a daily basis, feel more European than the political elites and want to 
build a European identity through their work; or whether indeed political elites feel 
more inclined to consider European identity as part of their policy. This question stems 
from opposing views within the literature and the research presented in this and the 
next chapter will provide an evidence-based answer. Thirdly, this chapter, as the next, 
will determine to which degree political elites and civil servants have experienced 
regional characteristics to either challenge or support the European engagement and 
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identity-building of the respective regions. Before assessing the role of European 
identity within regions’ European policies, as confirmed by the political elites, it must 
be explained which level of political authority the respective regions’ political elites hold 
in order to develop their European policies – and determine whether European identity 
ought to feature in their policy or not.  
 
The political elites affirmed that their respective system of government and the extent 
of decentralisation have a substantial impact on their regions’ European objectives and 
scope – and thus their role and ability to influence and manage their regions’ European 
engagement. The political elite in charge of the South West of England’s European 
Policy and Programmes within the Regional Development Agency explained that in the 
absence of political authority to develop a wider range of European policies and 
programmes “[his] primary purpose is to ensure that convergence and competitiveness 
programmes in the regions are running well” (Interviewee 11). His authority is thus 
limited to overseeing and managing administrative duties. His counterpart in Nord – 
Pas de Calais, on the other hand, enjoyed considerable political leverage in the 
management of his European engagement. The breadth and depth of their activities 
greatly benefitted from French decentralisation in the 1980s and the initiatives taken 
by two leading regional politicians, Mr. Michel Lamblin and Mr. Michel Delbarre. Both 
Lamblin and Delbarre used their authority to set up the Institute for European 
Cooperation within the Conseil Régional. The power the institution projected not only 
enhanced the standing of the political elite’s role within the European Directorate of 
Nord – Pas de Calais, it also was decisive in broadening their scope of action and range 
of responsibilities on matters relevant to the regions’ multiple European interests. 
 
Brandenburg, like Nord – Pas de Calais but to a much larger extent, enjoys the 
benefits that heightened levels of decentralisation offer. Constitutionally set within a 
federal government system, Brandenburg wields substantial political authority to 
effectively pursue its European interests. Yet, its political elite’s standing differs 
significantly from that of either the Nord- Pas de Calais or the South West of England 
regions. In addition to overseeing EU funding within the region, Brandenburg’s 
“Minister will also be working on the transmission of European affairs within the region, 
including developing an enthusiasm within the region to open up to European as well 
as international affairs” (Interviewee 13). The Minister thus performs the dual role of 
political decision maker and chief diplomat on behalf of his region.  
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Wallonia has also benefitted from decentralisation reforms. The region’s political elites 
now have the political authority to manage interregional cooperation (mainly EU 
funded projects under Objective 3): the transposition of EU laws into regional 
legislation and pursuance of bilateral relations and partnerships with other regions and 
countries. The scope is similar to that of Brandenburg, although Wallonia draws on a 
greater range of constitutionally granted political and legal authority. And whilst both 
exert considerable power when it comes to their respective European engagement, 
their focus differs. Walloon’s political elite does not have a European identity dimension 
build into their portfolio. Brandenburg’s, on the other hand, is explicitly mandated to 
strengthen European awareness and identity.  
 
The political authority granted to regional political elites thus already provides essential 
background information to the extent to which political elites can decide whether 
European identity ought to play a role in their European policy or not. Whilst for the 
political elites of the South West of England this appears to be a highly contested and 
limited objective, it will be significant to learn what their perceptions of European 
identity are. Furthermore, the continental European political elites’ impressions on 
whether European identity should and does play a role within their European policies 
will be assessed in the next chapter section. 
 
 
 
Does European identity feature amongst the objectives of the regions’ 
European policies? Perspectives from the political elites  
Political elites don’t operate in a political vacuum. They are part and parcel of political, 
organisational and institutional structures. And they are, in the end, held accountable 
for what they do and what policy is implemented by their European directorate. They 
manage their directorates’ European engagement: the approaches chosen to secure EU 
funded projects; the strategies applied to enhance interregional cooperation; the 
policies designed to build bilateral partnerships and interregional networks; the 
commitments made to have a Brussels presence; the investments required to augment 
the quality of their overall European communications; and, particularly relevant to 
Brandenburg and Wallonia, the ways and means designated to ensure the 
transposition of EU laws. Whether they believe European identity should feature in 
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these components of their European policy matters, for they shape regions’ policies 
and engagement. This section will assess the four regions’ political elites’ views on the 
scope of their policies’ objectives: are they striving for economic development only, or 
also for social integration by way of weaving elements of European identity-building 
into the fabric of their European policy.     
 
 
Political elites’ perceptions on the region’s participation in EU funded 
programmes – and whether European identity features in this engagement 
In Chapter 4, the South West of England’s European engagement was described as 
being confined to EU funded Cohesion policy Objectives 1 and 2. This constraint has 
the practical effect of making the region ineligible to develop its own European policies 
and programmes and unfit to participate in Objective 3’s interregional cooperation 
programmes. The region’s political elite considers the limited participation in EU funded 
programmes and European politics to be a structural constraint imposed by political 
interests of the national government. Though there is a myriad of opportunities for 
interregional cooperation between the South West of England and other European 
actors, the political elite has determined that to optimally pursue the region’s European 
interests “[they] don’t step out into other areas like the arts and culture, fisheries and 
agriculture; areas where a lot of people feel that they might have a close connection 
[with other Europeans]. [This is] because these are areas for which London has the 
legitimacy and authority to lead on it” (Interviewee 11). Including these potential 
areas of collaboration into the region’s European engagement mix could have 
considerable impact on building a European identity over time, particularly in light of 
its physically conditioned isolation from the European continent’s landmass. This 
approach and attitude clearly reflects the political elite’s appreciation of operating in a 
highly centralised government system where political interests at the level of national 
government are tightly controlled, and the process of regionalisation reversed. The 
scope of the region’s European engagement within EU funded programmes is thus de 
facto limited to the promotion of economic development within the region, based on 
funding allocated by the EU. Whatever political ambitions the region may harbour in 
the area of championing interregional cooperation programmes or cultivating a 
European identity through EU-funded collaboration opportunities; the prevailing 
distribution of power and authority renders them beyond their reach. 
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By comparison, Nord – Pas de Calais, Wallonia and Brandenburg enjoy greater 
operational latitude. All three regions’ political elites expressed to have been given the 
authority to manage their regions’ allocated funding as well as the freedom to explore 
additional cooperation and funding opportunities. According to the political elite in the 
Nord – Pas de Calais region, the broadening of its scope of activity and, specifically, 
the advancement of the territorial cooperation desideratum of the EU, was a political 
objective of its European Directorate with extension to the political elites of the 
regional government (Interviewee 10). The region’s timely systematic outreach has 
been beneficial in that it not only successfully managed the territorial cooperation 
programme; it also established a sound reputation for its effective leadership in this 
domain. The region’s engagement has thus been in large measures the result of a 
strategic approach championed by the European Directorate’s political elite; reinforced 
by the articulated political interests of key regional decision-makers; and institutionally 
supported by far-reaching regionalisation reforms. The objectives of the regional 
political elites who had determined the importance of Europe to the region and the 
region’s close participation with European integration and EU opportunities, was based 
on their personal interest in Europe. This interest was then translated into developing a 
broad European policy, within the scope of EU funded programmes and also beyond it. 
The political elite explains that identity-building is part of European programmes, as 
identity is naturally cultivated through repeated interactions which are fostered by 
Objective 3 of the EU funded programmes (Interviewee 11). In contrast to the South 
West of England, Nord-Pas de Calais participates in the EU funded programmes which 
are said to cultivate a European identity – and has the government system and 
political elites’ interests to do so. At this stage it is also important to note that the 
political elites do not refute the economic benefits of participating in EU funded 
programmes. Thus it can be concluded that the French region in all likelihood 
participates in EU funded programmes for both economic and identity-building 
objectives.  
 
The political elites of Brandenburg and Wallonia expressed their strategic objectives for 
developing and participating in territorial cooperation opportunities (Objective 3) in 
quite similar terms to the political elites of Nord – Pas de Calais. They also, like Nord – 
Pas de Calais, benefitted economically from direct EU-funding for the policies and 
programmes covered by Objectives 1 and 2. Brandenburg’s political elite attributes the 
region’s statistically more prosperous status due to the EU enlargements; as a 
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consequence it cannot expect to receive as much funding from the EU for Objectives 1 
and 2 in future (Interviewee 13). The remaining funding opportunities are thus limited 
to participation in territorial cooperation programmes under Objective 3. The region is 
strategically bolstering its capacities to engage itself more in interregional cooperation, 
primarily through bilateral partnerships. The cooperation projects Brandenburg 
develops under Objective 3, however, are not merely ones of economic development 
interests, they also include projects which foster social integration and in turn identity-
building as a bi-product. These projects are primarily in cross-border regions, thus 
geographic proximity and shared interests and enhanced connectedness also play a 
large role in identifying cooperation projects, getting them started and sustaining 
them.  
 
In comparison to Brandenburg’s political elite, Wallonia’s decision-maker does not go 
into as much detail on the objectives of the Objective 3 projects. The EU funded 
opportunities are said to substantially contribute to the economic development of the 
region. And instead of discussing identity-building as being a bi-product of cooperation, 
the Walloon political elite explains that it is helpful to the region, that they are centrally 
located in Europe, indeed at the heart of Europe, feel European, and therefore engage 
with other Europeans naturally (Interviewee number 14). Therefore, already having 
cultivated a European identity helps the regional practitioners to engage in EU funded 
opportunities - and European-wide cooperation opportunities at large. Nevertheless, 
the strategic objective of the region’s participation in EU funded programmes, 
according to the political elite, is to entice economic benefits for the region.   
 
 
Political elites’ perceptions on the role of European identity in the region’s 
interregional cooperation 
European interregional cooperation is one of the core strategic European engagement 
objectives of three of the four case study regions; namely Nord – Pas de Calais; 
Wallonia and Brandenburg. The scope and objectives of the four case study regions’ 
European interregional cooperation follow two distinct, but often interconnected, 
tracks: regions either participate in EU-funded territorial cooperation programmes or 
they engage in both EU-funded opportunities as well as non-EU-funded and self-
initiated cooperation opportunities. In some cases, regions set up their own (funded) 
programmes which help identify and develop cooperation project ideas and which, if 
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successful, will be funded by the EU. This section evaluates whether the political elites 
consider interregional cooperation to be an opportunity to promote economic and 
European identity development, or merely the former. Their assessments and 
perceptions are based on their respective region’s participation in non-EU funded 
interregional cooperation programmes.  
 
The South West of England is presently not pursuing interregional cooperation 
projects; the decision to forego such projects reflects the region’s lack of political 
authority to engage with other EU regions in that context. Nord – Pas de Calais, on the 
other hand, has no such political constraints. According to its political elites, the region 
manages a wide scope of interregional cooperation programmes – partly with the 
objective of further strengthening its involvement in EU-funded territorial cooperation 
programmes. “The idea to establish the ‘centre de formation’ [training centre] within 
the Institute for European Cooperation was to demonstrate the region’s willingness to 
engage with Europe and create a place in the region for Europe; it was also to show 
that we have the know-how based on our experience in managing European regional 
funds and cooperation projects funded by the EU. We of course want to capitalise on 
this experience to enhance the potential project benefits for the participants as they 
start up cooperation projects and apply for EU-funding” (Interviewee 9). Whilst the 
French region has a bouquet of programmes covering a variety of European 
cooperation initiatives, including training and youth exchange programmes, it can be 
assessed as having social integration and European identity-building as a significant 
objective. However, its present and principal objective has been to strictly refocus on 
participating in EU-funded programmes - since the two regional political elites, who 
had set up the Institute for European Cooperation, were no longer in office and thus 
the scope has been scaled down (Interviewee 10). With the European-wide social 
interaction programmes being scaled down, it does not mean that identity-building 
objectives are being cut out of the region’s interregional cooperation programmes. 
Indeed, identity-building can still develop from private and public sector programmes 
funded by the EU. As the political elite describes: “I expect you would find the link 
between European regional cooperation and European identity mainly with the project 
participants, less so with the citizens at large why may be positively affected by 
improvements caused by the programme. Those involved in the running of cooperation 
programmes realise what a project produced by European wide interactions and 
synergy can achieve – and as they have shared this experience of working together on 
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a common project and objective, they foster a European identity” (Interviewee 9). 
Further to this, the second political elite explains: “Project participants may have 
gained an enhanced European mind-set through the collaboration process, as when 
Europeans work together, they can develop a sense of European citizenship and 
identity” (Interviewee 10). The two political elites thereby show to both hold 
perceptions of identity-building opportunities within their interregional cooperation 
programmes. However, neither of the political elites expresses a priority objective 
between economic or identity development through their work. Though both appear to 
be aware of identity-building opportunities within the policies, they also share an 
awareness of regional political elites being wary of publicising objectives which go 
beyond the nature economic development to citizens who, at large, ware not 
Europhile. This will be further discussed in the communications section of this chapter, 
however it is important to note that European identity, for regional political reasons, 
would not be explicitly announced as an objective within a policy.  
 
Wallonia’s primary motive for its systematic pursuance of EU-funded interregional 
cooperation opportunities within the context of the territorial cooperation programmes 
under the Union’s Cohesion Policy is largely driven by identified economic benefit of 
receiving EU co-funding on projects the region would otherwise seek to develop and 
also finance by itself. Indeed, before the EU started funding interregional cooperation, 
Wallonia was already engaging with other Europeans. The political elite describes the 
region as having a European mind-set: “Wallonia is quite pro-European. Belgium is a 
founding country of the European Union, Belgium is at the heart of Europe, Brussels is 
the capital of the EU, so we perceive Europe in a positive way” (Interviewee 15). He 
further explains that, due to this European mind-set, both public and private sectors 
quite naturally cooperate with particularly geographically close European neighbours – 
in cross-border cooperation projects. Indeed, given Wallonia’s geographical setting 
with several borders engulfing the region, the extent and quality of cross-border 
cooperation is critically important and makes it imperative to tackle, for instance, 
issues such as cooperation in transportation and the smooth flow of goods and 
services. “The region and even the country is quite small and therefore it is not 
imaginable to live in withdrawal from our immediate surroundings. Cooperation is very 
important to us, and we have, consequently, been involved in cooperation projects 
since the start of the European Community” (Interviewee 14). The projects are also 
developed out of a European problematic which needs to be solved. “Our cross-border 
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cooperation initiatives were identified because of their local relevance. They include 
research, environment, culture, and, more specifically, communication, transport, 
exchange of cross-border labour, security and policing” (Interviewee 14). The projects 
bring Europeans closer together and support social integration as well as economic 
integration. Importantly, these projects were also set up before there was the 
opportunity to economically benefit from them by receiving EU funding. The region can 
therefore be assessed as perceiving a shared identity with their geographic neighbours 
and having an interest in working together. This shows that there is a starting level of 
European identity in the region before cooperation commences, and it can be expected 
to grow with further European interactions and engagement. However, the political 
elite does not talk much about whether he believes European identity should feature as 
an objective in his European policy. He speaks about European identity as though it 
were a constant characteristic throughout the region. Indeed, the level of European 
identity in Belgium is quite high, at 76% in 2010 (Eurobarometer, 2010). Yet if it 
continues to grow, it is more likely to be a bi-product of the engagement fostering 
policies than due to particular identity-cultivating policy objectives developed by the 
regional government. 
 
The objectives of the German region Brandenburg’s interregional cooperation are more 
varied than those of both Wallonia and Nord – Pas de Calais. Though the region also 
highly values and seeks EU-funded cross-border cooperation opportunities with its 
Polish neighbours, for example, it also develops a range of non EU-funded European 
engagement events to allow citizens to experience Europe and build a European 
identity. The political elite speaks about the European identity-building objective within 
his policy much more explicitly and enthusiastically than any of the previous case 
studies’ political elites. Like Wallonia, Brandenburg actively initiates cross-border 
cooperation programmes in order to deal with challenges it shares with its immediate 
neighbours; such as providing bilingual education facilities near borders to support the 
movement of labour between Poland and Brandenburg. The political elite is painfully 
aware of existing shortcomings in this arena: “[The region has] one civil servant 
dealing with relations to Poland as well as other Central and Eastern European 
countries, including Romania. There are two civil servants from the Brandenburg 
region who are based in Poland, and one is based in Romania, in order to further 
strengthen the cooperation ties” (Interviewee 13). The political elite explained that, as 
these are new EU members, it is important to get to know each other and build a 
 124 
 
 
 
relationship, so that practices of cooperation may follow suit. He thereby identified 
identity-building as being a key component in this cooperation policy objective.  
 
However, all ambitious plans to expedite and optimise cross-border cooperation will fall 
short if language-related and a host of other very practical cross-border problems 
cannot be mitigated. Despite these challenges, the region’s political elite is pro-actively 
developing its interregional cooperation engagement and is advancing it beyond the 
scope of exclusively EU-funded projects. The Political elite’s decision to place civil 
servants at the region’s expense in countries with which it is building closer ties is very 
ambitious and a deliberate demonstration of its willingness to start-up broad and 
mutually beneficial cross-border exchanges. Under the direction the region’s political 
elite, acting in full compliance with the political authority granted by constitution and 
budgets allocated by its parliament, Brandenburg also organises European-oriented, 
but non-EU-funded cultural events, such as music group exchanges for citizens. These 
have the sole objective of European social integration and identity-building and the 
political elite is very proud in talking about them as he believes them to be very 
important for the region, for Europe, and out of principle. The attitude of 
Brandenburg’s political elite appears not only more Europhile and keen to promote 
European identity through his policy than the political elites of Wallonia and Nord – Pas 
de Calais. It also sharply contrasts the opportunity of the South West of England region 
to develop policies embracing social integration throughout Europe and thereby 
cultivate a European identity. 
 
 
Political elites’ perceptions on the role of European identity within their 
region’s bilateral partnerships 
The political elites representing the four regions’ European interests show considerable 
variation in the set objectives; a case in point is the development and pursuit of 
bilateral partnerships. The political elite of the South West of England no longer had 
the authority and capacity to create and cultivate bilateral partnerships with their 
European counterparts; political constraints and the re-prioritisation with a focus on 
managing EU funds allocated to the region effectively put on hold any kind of 
meaningful bilateral outreach initiatives (Interviewee 12). The region once more 
misses a European-identity building opportunity by foregoing bilateral partnership 
development, which would foster European interactions and the cultivation of shared 
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interests and identity. This stands in stark contrast to the attitudes and approach 
adopted by the other case study regions with regard to the maintenance of bilateral 
partnerships with other European regions and countries – yet their reasons vary. The 
objective underpinning the Nord – Pas de Calais’ bilateral partnerships is to support the 
region’s participation in territorial cooperation programmes funded by the EU’s 
Cohesion Policy (Interviewee 10). The primary objective thus is not primarily identity-
building as contact-building and fostering enhanced engagement – which in turn can 
cultivate a European identity. And whilst Wallonia’s embrace of interregional 
cooperation programmes has been one of its most enduring and pronounced features – 
an attribute it shares with Nord – Pas de Calais, the region’s higher levels of political 
authority also led to a wider scope of engaging in a range of bilateral partnerships. The 
motives for these partnerships are a broadly based and varied, as is the breadth and 
depth of the region’s political mandate and mission. The region’s priority has 
historically been on strengthening its ties within the global French-speaking 
community. More recently, Wallonia’s focus has been on economic rejuvenation, with 
particular attention being paid on bilateral cooperation in selective domains of life 
sciences: logistics; agriculture and food security; nanotechnologies, aeronautics and 
space; as well as environmental sustainability. Where opportunities for the exchange 
of expertise and collaboration present themselves, bilateral partnerships are 
established (Interviewee 16). However, European identity-building does not stand at 
the forefront of Wallonia’s bilateral partnerships. The political elite also mentions two 
regional characteristics which have affected its bilateral partnerships. Whilst the 
political elite is conscious of the key role heritage has played and continues to play in 
establishing bilateral partnerships, present day regional needs and priorities as 
identified by its top political decision makers have shifted, and so has the nature and 
context of the region’s bilateral partnerships. He also explains that as the levels of 
Wallonia’s political authority increased, so did the region’s capacity to develop bilateral 
partnerships.  
 
Brandenburg has experienced similar developments in both its level of political 
authority and concomitant scope of objectives. Whilst, on the one hand, its 
partnerships garnered expected interregional cooperation opportunities, they triggered 
a range of positive spin-off effects which political elites in the region characterised as 
“more far-reaching; engagements which go beyond cross-border cooperation clearly 
providing additional opportunities for governmental and sectoral collaboration” 
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(Interviewee 13). To develop and consolidate their bilateral relations and, in their 
wake, collaborative initiatives, the region has seconded two civil servants to operate 
out of Poland and Romania. The dedicated resources manifest Brandenburg’s keen 
interest to open itself toward Europe and actively engage with its European 
counterparts. The political elite explains this further: “European identity should be 
sought and facilitated because the region has become part of an enlarged Germany 
with deep roots in the Europeanisation of the European continent and the European 
Union; it should therefore be open to Europe and feel as part of Europe” (Interviewee 
13). The European outreach strategy, or bilateral partnerships, thus aims to foster a 
European identity. Furthermore, the bilateral partnerships’ orientation toward Eastern 
Europe is strategic; it is based on geographic and political considerations, a shared 
heritage and similar economic needs.  
 
 
Political elites’ perception on the role of European identity in their region’s 
participation in European regional networks 
All four case study regions participate in European regional networks – however the 
South West of England region participates in networks indirectly. There, it is the 
region’s Brussels office (which it shares with a public and private sector partnership) 
which participates in networks to learn of and disseminate relevant information 
campaigns (Interviewee 11). The political elite identified ‘relevant information’ being 
best practice expertise on how to manage the EU funding allocated to the region most 
effectively. The region used to participate more actively in interregional cooperation 
fostering networks as well, however, this objective was downsized. The political elites 
of the South West of England do not speak more about network participation, they 
suggest taking up this subject with the European policy team.  
 
The continental political elites address one common overriding objective: to identify 
potential cooperation partners amongst the membership of a specific network and thus 
strengthen their regions’ interregional cooperation ambition. Nord – Pas de Calais is 
empowered to participate actively on the European scene. The region not only obliges 
its regional Brussels office representative to participate in the networks’ sur place, it is 
also actively engaged in the production and dissemination of information and 
knowledge sharing on policy areas relevant to the region (Interviewee 9). In doing so, 
civil servants dealing with transportation policy exchange best practice with relevant 
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European counterparts. This collegial sharing of ideas and advice can bring regions 
throughout Europe closer together, based on their shared interest, and in turn, 
cultivate a European identity. The region however does not invest the kind of resources 
Brandenburg and Wallonia have committed over the years to further optimise the 
potential of the European regional networks.  
 
Both Wallonia’s and Brandenburg’s political elites and civil servants participate in a 
range of networks which either operate under the umbrella of the territorial 
cooperation programme or non EU-funded networks. Their common feature is to 
facilitate interregional cooperation amongst participating network members. This 
objective, too, can cultivate a European identity through developing common interests 
and increasing regions’ European-wide interactions and engagement.  
 
An additional incentive is to closely work with and through European regional networks 
in order to lobby for continued EU allocations for phasing-out convergence funding. 
The region thus finds regions of similar economic situations and interests, builds a 
common identity based on that interest, and they join forces to influence the EU’s 
Regional policy. Brandenburg had successfully led a network of thirteen regions with 
similar interests; they all secured ‘phasing out’ convergence funding for the funding 
period of 2007 – 2013 and have continued to cultivate a close relationship. Most of 
them will be joining forces once more during the budget discussions for the 2014+ 
period. Thus, it appears, a European identity has been cultivated and sustained in this 
network.  
 
 
Political elites’ perceptions on their region’s Brussels offices – do they 
cultivate a European identity? 
In addition to regions’ commonly shared vision of the value of pooling their efforts by 
jointly participating in European regional networks, they also determined that 
operating Brussels offices would further enhance their effectiveness. According to the 
expectations of the political elites, the common objective of regions’ Brussels offices is 
to more pointedly represent their particular interests at the relevant EU bodies and 
provide an effective information and feedback loop to their respective regions. The 
Brussels-based regional representatives are also expected to liaise with their European 
counterparts in order to shape and maintain strategic contacts and provide hubs for 
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information and knowledge sharing. Engaging regularly with other European region’s 
representatives as well as European bureaucrats, regional representatives working in 
the Brussels offices can be expected to develop a European identity through their 
interactions. Brussels provides a breeding ground for European identity as those 
working there are joined by their European interests and work together regularly. 
However, the political elites of Wallonia and Nord – Pas de Calais do not identify 
European identity-building as being an objective of their Brussels offices. Though, as 
seeking interregional cooperation opportunities is their key objective, and collaboration 
in time can cultivate European identity, Brussels offices can develop identity as a bi-
product of their work. Brandenburg’s political elite, however, acknowledges the 
opportunity of developing a European identity by working in a Brussels office and 
through the work of the Brussels office (Interviewee 13). Having been the Director of 
the region’s Brussels office, he described the civil servants working in the office as 
being very engaged with a number of other regional representations and EU 
institutions. European cultural events also frequently are hosted in the Brussels office, 
to foster closer European partnerships and collaboration. This, in turn, fosters 
European identity.  
 
 
Political elites on their region’s European communications and whether 
European identity-building features amongst them 
Unlike the commonalities jointly developed and operationalised in the networked-based 
Brussels offices, the management of the regions’ European communications follows 
different pathways. In fact, only Brandenburg has a designated communications team 
in place to produce and disseminate its European messages to the constituents at large 
– thus raising European awareness and aiming to cultivate a European mind-set and 
identity. 
 
The political elite of the South West of England, conscious of the importance of 
strategic communications, regretted the absence of a dedicated communications team 
in the region’s European directorate. Its communications and outreach efforts are 
limited to maintaining and updating the region’s website. Beyond that, additional 
information is generated by an off-site website (the ‘Convergence Cornwall’) operated 
out of Cornwall. In all, the political elite appeared to be comfortable with this 
arrangement. It felt that the focus of the South West of England’s EU-oriented 
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engagement involved the procurement and management of both Objective 1 and 2 
funding within the Cohesion Policy; areas which, in their eyes, do not necessitate 
active citizen involvement. It is, however, conceivable, that this would be a straight 
forward opportunity to cultivate a European identity in the region, communicating 
about the development and improvement fostered by European programmes. Yet, the 
political elites, in the course of the interviews, did not appear overly concerned about 
the lack of a dedicated communications strategy and team within its European 
directorate. This lack of concern, as Chapter 6 will show, was not shared by the 
region’s civil servants. They, in fact, saw the benefits in communicating to their 
constituency and stakeholders on European opportunities, and they criticised the 
national government for not allowing the region to conduct and implement a pro-active 
European communications and outreach strategy.  
 
The South West of England’s political elites’ minimalist communication approach and 
its view that the various media and communication platforms don’t hold much promise 
in shaping and influencing the region’s ‘European fortunes’ was in effect shared by the 
political elite of Nord – Pas de Calais. They differed, however, in their perception and 
critical perspective of their government’s imposed strict limitations in all 
communication matters. The political elite in Nord- Pas de Calais would like to be able 
to communicate more widely on European opportunities and improvements to the 
region as she said this would potentially combat some Eurosceptics in the region, 
cultivate a European identity, and support the directorate’s European work 
(Interviewee 10). Nonetheless, the political elite in the end appeared resigned to the 
recognition of the political realities on the ground; that the political decision about 
communications was made at the top of the regional government, and that it was 
unable to overcome the limitation of its political authority to develop a broad range of 
communication activities. In shedding additional light on the latter point, the political 
elite stated: “We communicate fairly little with the citizens about the European 
programmes because it is not supported politically, unfortunately. […] We also see in 
the political debates which take place just before European elections that neither the 
media nor the newspapers talk about Europe. They discuss national problems, and 
they blame Europe for them. Our regional government is elected of course, and our 
politicians are worried about discussing European topics, as it might cost them their 
election. The programmes which were presented during the elections two months ago 
did not mention Europe once – although the regional government is very much 
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engaged and the region capitalises on European opportunities within the region. 
Speaking of Europe during elections is a political problem, which is a great pity” 
(Interviewee 9). It is against this background that the scope of communication on the 
European engagement of the region has been strategically limited to the operation of a 
website and the occasional release of project success stories - when no elections are 
on the calendar. The region’s lack of communication to citizens stands in stark contrast 
to its active outreach programmes, including its European youth exchange programme, 
training sessions for European interregional cooperation opportunities, and the 
effective management of the INTERREG programmes within the Cohesion Policy’s 
Objective 3. In view of the economic benefits these European projects bring to the 
region, the lack of political support within the higher ranks of the regional government 
for a pro-active communications strategy is surprising. 
 
The Walloon region’s European directorate does not have its own communications 
service; each functionary is responsible for providing information to citizens through 
the multiple media outlets: the region’s website, articles placed in newspapers, and by 
way of disseminating information to various local services. These efforts are 
complemented, according to the region’s political elite, by a multitude of information 
and awareness raising campaigns: “During the Belgian Presidency of the EU [in 2010], 
approximately 400 social European encounter events were held. And in addition to the 
official political agenda, WBI [Wallonia Bruxelles Intérnational] organised 70 events. 
But, when it is not the Belgian presidency, there are pretty much daily events held, 
which relay relevant information about Europe and current initiatives. These events are 
held at universities, research centres, villages, and government offices, amongst 
others” (Interviewee 15). Thus, the region works, in a slightly fragmented way, to 
raise awareness on European opportunities, benefits and improvements within the 
region, which has a strong potential for fostering Europhile attitudes and cultivating a 
European identity. 
 
Brandenburg’s political elite’s perception on its European communications shows 
slightly more prioritisation than Wallonia’s political elite, however in comparison to the 
political elites of the French and British regions, Brandenburg’s European 
communications are at the other extreme end of the spectrum. It has put in place its 
own communications team which very actively manages its website, publishes articles 
and advertisements in regional newspapers, distributes leaflets and routinely organises 
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a host of communications and outreach events – particularly during election times with 
the full support of the region’s political elite. Indeed, the political elite fully endorses 
Brandenburg’s European communications despite residual Euroscepticism amongst its 
citizens. As a member of the political elite from the European directorate explains, the 
Communications team, the region’s Minister and the political elite work together 
closely to effectively communicate the scope and intent of the region’s European 
engagement. The region’s political elite has shown to be very concerned about 
cultivating a European mind-set and identity throughout the region by engaging 
citizens and raising awareness on opportunities and benefits. However, the 
communications team does not only work in this single direction. Instead, “the 
Communications team also tries to gauge the citizens’ perception of European affairs. 
Of course a Minister can be very active in European politics but it is essential to know 
what the citizens think of Europe. This is also very important to me, as, in addition to 
my work here in the Ministry [of economics and European affairs], I am in my personal 
time the chairman of the association ‘European Union of the Region Brandenburg’, 
which tries to frame the topic of Europe in a positive light throughout the region” 
(Interviewee 13). The objective behind learning what citizens think about Europe helps 
the Communications team and political elite to coordinate an appropriate response to 
citizens’ worries, concerns and doubts about Europe. The political elite reiterates the 
importance of needing to understand the concerns before being able to overcome 
them, foster a European identity, and fully integrate into Europe. Publicising the 
European opportunities and benefits is thus a top objective and significant part of the 
strategy pursued by the political elite and the Communications team in the region – 
and they aim to foster a European identity through their work.  
 
In addition, the ministry complements the region’s communications strategy by 
organising events about European topics relevant to the region; promoting a “Europe 
Week” each May, addressing an important EU theme tackled by both the Union and the 
region each year (in 2009, the theme was eliminating poverty throughout Europe); 
and awarding prizes to citizens who contributed significantly in promoting social 
integration in Europe. Developing these associations between the region and Europe, 
and raising awareness on them at the citizen level can be expected to and is aimed at 
fostering a European mind-set and identity. The directorate also organises events in 
schools and helps to establish European schools throughout the region to more 
systematically introduce European themes in history and social studies classes and 
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enhance school’s ability to offer more foreign language classes. According to the 
political elite, the objective of these supporting interventions is to “bring Europe closer 
to the citizen because for many the EU is perceived merely as ‘those people in 
Brussels, what do they do again?’; and we are trying to show that Europe is also very 
much present within the region and trying to foster support for Europe in the minds 
and hearts of particularly the young people. However, we are not trying to glorify 
Europe. We are trying to inform citizens and get them to participate in exchanges and 
events so that they can experience up-close and personal, instead of studying Europe 
from afar, and build their own opinion about the European project” (Interviewee 13). 
To Brandenburg’s political elite, the communication strategy is part and parcel of its 
overall objective to inform citizens about Europe and European opportunities available 
to them to participate in: “It is my aim to enable every student of Brandenburg to go 
to another European city for a couple of weeks, so they can see for themselves what 
the similarities and differences are across Europe. We also offer internships to up to 
four students for approximately two months, so that they can learn more about the 
ministry and our initiatives, and better understand the many opportunities to the 
region” (Interviewee 13). And while the scope of Brandenburg’s communication on the 
region’s engagement is broad, its objectives remain very strategic and focused on 
promoting and capitalising on European benefits to the region and promoting the 
cultivation of a European identity throughout the region. The political elite exudes a 
very enthusiastic demeanour when discussing the scope of the region’s 
communications strategies and activities.  
 
Although Brandenburg and Wallonia can be seen in contrast to Nord – Pas de Calais 
and the South West of England because they have European communications 
strategies; they have shown to be of a different nature and objective. Wallonia raises 
awareness of the European opportunities to engage citizens more and inform them of 
the benefits to the region from European programmes. Brandenburg’s political elite is 
very keen to cultivate a European identity in the region and makes extensive use of a 
broad range of communications strategies to bring this objective to life. The 
enthusiasm the political elite has for making citizens aware that they are part of 
Europe and should experience Europe with a positive instead of sceptical mind-set, is 
contagious.  
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Political elites on their region’s EU legal integration – does it foster a 
European identity? 
The process of transposing EU laws into regional legislation is, due to the prevailing 
government systems and their resultant respective regional legal authority and 
capacity, relevant only to Wallonia and Brandenburg. To the political elites of both 
regions these unique regional political characteristics have great importance; they 
greatly influence what they consider their regions’  ‘heightened scope of European 
engagement’ when compared to many other European regions. The Belgian political 
elite in charge of EU legal integration made it a point to express and explain the 
challenges of transposing very complex laws into the Walloon legislation (Interviewee 
15). To ensure that the region’s larger EU agenda does not fall victim to these 
challenges, a dedicated team in Wallonia coordinates these processes within WBI 
(Wallonia Bruxelles Intérnational) and the relevant ministries. Working on the 
transposition of EU laws into regional laws not only provides a European nature to the 
regional law, it also, to those realising the change, provides a heightened appreciation 
of European integration and Europeans being increasingly the same. Legal integration, 
thus, fosters awareness of social integration and European identity cultivating over 
time. In Brandenburg, the political elite has been tasked with managing and 
coordinating the complexity of transposing European laws. Whilst the political elite 
carries out these responsibilities and deems them to be important, he does not 
attribute as much interest in discussing the region’s legal integration work compared to 
the other domains of European engagement, including the region’s bilateral 
partnerships, interregional cooperation, and in particular its European communications 
approach and strategy (Interviewee 13).  
 
 
Political elites’ perceptions on the anticipated objectives of the regions’ 
European engagement from 2014 onwards 
A common priority of regions’ European policy has been to manage EU funding and, 
those who have the political authority and capacity to do so, develop and participate in 
interregional cooperation programmes. The dominant benefits of both were identified 
as being economic development of the region. However, European identity-building 
also featured as part of the objectives within interregional cooperation programmes, 
particularly across all of Brandenburg’s programmes; as a status-quo in Wallonia’s 
programmes; and as a previous objective but recently cut in Nord – Pas de Calais.  
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Thinking forward, the political elites offered their perceptions on the regions’ priorities 
from 2014 onwards, when the next Cohesion Policy will be launched and, potentially, 
most Western European regions may no longer receive funding under Objectives 1 and 
perhaps also 2.  
 
Based on the analysis of the South West of England’s scope of European engagement, 
managing the Cohesion Policy funding under Objectives 1 and 2 has been a priority. 
Preparing for the time following the completion of the Cohesion Policy funding period 
2007-2013 is key according to the South West of England’s political elite: “Being quite 
realistic, there is an inevitability of a South and Eastward drift of the European money 
[…], so the South West of England would be extremely lucky to get funding in future. 
I’m very strongly supportive of transnational and territorial cooperation work, probably 
partly linked to thinking about what the reality is going to be like in the future. A lot of 
the funding will be dependent on having good partnerships, working with other parts of 
Europe” (Interviewee 11). There is a distinct sense of urgency amongst the political 
elite that the region must do more to develop its experience, networks and 
partnerships in interregional cooperation as this will, most likely, be the future of 
European funding the region would be able to access. However, being mindful that the 
region’s political authority has been established by the national government, with clear 
limits to the managing of funds allocated to the region, the South West of England is 
not prepared nor positioned for the years of 2014 and beyond. The conclusion of the 
region’s political elite is as straight-forward as it is urgent: “Regional contacts and 
partnerships help to position the region better for 2014 and onwards, when 
cooperation will be vital in seeking EU funding” (Interviewee 11). The political elite 
however attributes little importance to this assessment in view of the national 
government’s process of re-centralisation; this political decision appears to further 
diminish the region’s future allocations for strengthening its European capacities – as 
well as European identity-building possibilities.  
 
The other case study regions have been more pro-active in establishing and positioning 
their bilateral partnerships and engaging in interregional cooperation programmes, 
whether they are funded by the EU or initiatives developed internally. They also 
cultivate a European identity, be it a bi-product of their European engagement or an 
intentional core objective of the entire region’s European policy. Having gained the 
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political authority in 2001, the Nord – Pas de Calais region “has developed its 
capacities and experience as the managing authority for cooperation projects. It is in 
‘starting mode’ for the next period of programmes. The strategy decided by the 
regional elected politicians and advised by the European service is to develop three 
pillars: one pillar must reinforce the management of interregional cooperation projects; 
the second must strengthen the region’s European image through both institutional 
and bilateral relations with Germany and Poland, Kent, Wallonia, Flanders, and others, 
with the Institute for European Cooperation taking the lead; and the third pillar needs 
to raise potential regional cooperation actors’ awareness of European opportunities and 
provide them with guidance on how to start cooperation projects” (Interviewee 9). 
Though it is very possible that European identity-building will feature in these three 
pillars as a bi-product, it is not an explicit objective set for the region’s European policy 
in the next funding period.  
 
The Walloon political elite’s strategy for 2014 and beyond follows a similar pathway to 
that identified by the political elites of the French and British case study regions; it is 
also focused on interregional cooperation: “The EU member States, which need the 
funds most, should receive them. […] I expect there will be more competition for 
funding, which will ensure that the most useful projects will be selected. And 
furthermore, territorial cooperation should be pursued – with or without the financial 
assistance of the EU” (Interviewee 14). The political elite does not further elaborate 
what the objectives of this territorial cooperation ought to be – whether they aim to 
cultivate a European identity or whether this will occur as a bi-product, depending on 
the extent of Europeans’ engagement throughout the project.  
 
Brandenburg’s political elite is not only quite conscious of the need to establish a 
broadly-based cooperation model; he is very enthusiastic about interregional 
cooperation: “Although we are trying to influence the decision-making process for 
convergence and competitiveness and employment funding from 2014 onwards, we 
are also investigating how the work of the Directorate would change if Brandenburg 
were to no longer receive Objectives 1 and 2 funding. Certainly, cooperation is a very 
important aspect to be considered at this time” (Interviewee 13). These reflections 
relate to the region’s future European engagement based on EU funds. Beyond the EU 
funds, the region’s political elite continues to embrace the need for cooperation, 
particularly cross-border cooperation with its Polish neighbour, as both countries 
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continue to restore and revitalise their rural areas and deal, at the same time, with the 
challenges of an ageing population in this area. However, as a key priority, the political 
elite still identifies European communications and building a European mind-set and 
identity through all of the regions’ European policies and programmes. Cultivating 
European identity is a cornerstone of his personal interest, and he weaves this into the 
policy he develops and the work he completes. This shows that Brandenburg’s political 
elite’s personal interests have a very similar impact on the region’s European policy as 
Nord – Pas de Calais’ regional political elites had when one set broadened the scope of 
objectives in the 80s and 90s to fully engage in European opportunities and identity-
building, only to be overturned by a less Europhile political elite’s personal interests 
recently.  
 
 
Four dimensions to the role of European identity in regions’ European policy 
This chapter has revealed that the four case study regions’ political elites are 
interested in incorporating European identity-building objectives into their policies to a 
varied degree.  
 
In the Nord – Pas de Calais, the regional political elites were instrumental in 
broadening the scope of the region’s objectives – alongside the process of 
regionalisation which granted more political authority to the region to engage in 
European politics. However, with a new generation of political elites, a change in policy 
objectives followed suit. The programmes within the European policy which included 
identity-building objectives (bilateral partnerships and the social integration projects 
for regional youth) are in the process of being compressed, whilst more strategic and 
resource attention is being shifted toward the development and management of 
interregional cooperation programmes (which are partly funded by the EU). The 
regional political elite managing the European directorate’s Institute for European 
Cooperation regrets the decision made higher up in the region’s hierarchy. Thus, the 
role European identity plays in Nord – Pas de Calais’ European policy is changing from 
being highly significant to being potentially on the margins in future.  
 
Whilst the political elites in the South West of England show a vivid interest in 
developing programmes which would build European identity, they are disappointed by 
their lack of political authority to do so. In Wallonia, the political elite expresses 
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interest in European identity and fostering a European identity through the work of the 
European directorate. The political elite believes there is a widespread European 
identity throughout the region and this will naturally continue to thrive – without 
making it a policy priority. Whilst the political elite does not entertain a lengthy 
discussion of this objective, he, instead, focuses more on the objectives of continuing 
to develop and manage interregional cooperation for more economic purposes than 
social integration or identity-building.  
 
Of the four case studies’ political elites, the leader from Brandenburg appears to be the 
most interested in cultivating a European identity through the policies he designs. Of 
course, his political authority to do so also enables him to put on paper his preferences 
and interests in European identity-building.  Furthermore, compared to the other 
political elites, he is very outspoken about European identity being a key objective of 
his policy. He believes in the benefits of providing citizens the opportunity to 
experience Europe, engage in European activities, and build a European identity. To 
raise their awareness and cultivate European identity, the political elite has prioritised 
a well coordinated European communication strategy throughout the region, which also 
stands in contrast to the other case study regions’ procedures of raising awareness of 
citizens at large. Based on this personal belief, he integrates this objective into the 
European policy – and has the region’s top political elite’s support to do so.  
 
Based on the policies’ analysis as well as the explanations of political elites, European 
identity can indeed be intentionally fostered through regions’ European policies – if 
there is an interest to do so. European identity can also be cultivated through regular 
European interactions, as a bi-product. However, this correlation cannot yet be 
established through a quantitative analysis as there is a lack of European identity data 
at the regional level, as well as a lack of quantitative data on regions’ European 
policies. Nevertheless, the national levels of European identity are helpful in providing 
indications of how European people feel in the four case studies’ countries. As was 
explained before, the Belgian level is comparatively strong, with 76% of the population 
feeling European in 2010. This has increased quite steadily from 52% in 1990. If this 
value is seen as an indication of Walloon levels of European identity, it would be 
surprising to see such an increase, as the region does not pro-actively promote 
European identity-building through their European policy. A 24% increase would also 
be a significant bi-product of European cooperation’s effect on identity-building. Yet, as 
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the data is based on national and not regional values, this must be seen as an 
indication only of the Walloon levels and not a direct cause and effect relationship. 
From the four case study regions’ countries, Belgium has the highest levels of 
European identity. Germany is a close second and has experienced a significant rise in 
European identity levels, from 41% in 1990 (during Germany’s reunification phase) to 
73% in 2010. If this data were from Brandenburg only, it could be assumed that the 
substantial increase is attributable to pro-active European identity-building European 
policy. However, again, this must be seen as indicative values provided the data is not 
based on the Brandenburg region but instead on all of Germany’s sixteen 
Bundesländer. France has the third highest levels of European identity of the four case 
study regions’ countries  with a very stable 57% in both 1990 and 2010. If these levels 
were for Nord – Pas de Calais only, they would be surprising. The region previously 
had strong identity-building objectives within their European policy – and only recently 
side-lined those objectives in preference to economic development objectives. Thus, it 
should be assumed that the levels of European identity had increased in Nord – Pas de 
Calais alongside the identity-building policies, and that the levels would be decreasing 
in the next years, as the revised policies start to have an impact.  As the data is based 
on national values and not regional ones, this inference cannot be made. Finally, it is 
unsurprising that the UK has the lowest levels of European identity amongst the four 
case studies’ countries with only 28% in 1990 and 41% in 2010. The increase in those 
twenty years is quite substantial and it would be interesting to learn more about its 
causation. It certainly would be surprising if the region’s European policy, which does 
not feature European identity-building as a key objective, had caused this increase. 
However, to evaluate this properly, data at regional levels would be required. Although 
the data for all case studies is insufficient as it is at the national instead of regional 
level, it does provide some initial indications on the countries’ respective levels of 
European identity. The results of Belgium are not surprising, and the 2010 results for 
Germany are also high and not surprising. It is, however, surprising that France’s 
results are significantly lower than both Germany’s and Belgium’s provided the central 
role France has played in European integration and the strong identity-building 
dimension of its European policy; and it remains surprising that the UK’s values have 
increased quite substantially from 1990 to 2010, although, in general, British citizens 
are perceived to remain very Eurosceptic and the government maintains a significant 
distance from EU politics and particularly social integration opportunities.  
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Further to the link between political elites’ perceptions of the role of European identity 
within their European policies, the political elites also corroborated a number of 
regional characteristics affecting the scope and objectives of their European policy. 
From the South West of England, the regional characteristic identified as having the 
most significant impact on their European policy was the government system. Because 
of the highly centralised state, the regional government is very artificial, it is not 
institutionalised, and it does not hold the political authority to design a European policy 
or enhance the region’s European engagement beyond the management of EU 
allocated funding within the region. Also Nord – Pas de Calais mentioned the 
government system, but in combination with top regional political elites’ interests and 
their support for enhancing or scaling down the role of European identity throughout 
the European directorate’s policies and programmes. Furthermore, Nord – Pas de 
Calais’, Wallonia’s and Brandenburg’s regional political elites identified their geographic 
location near European borders as having an impact on the natural need and daily 
relevance of collaborating interregionally with their European neighbours and 
counterparts. Political elites from Wallonia and Brandenburg also explained that the 
border location fosters a European identity amongst the citizens experiencing the 
border and their European neighbours. Thus, from the six regional characteristics 
mentioned in the literature (government system; politicians’ interests; geographic 
location; European regional network participation; membership duration; and shared 
language and heritage), the political elites corroborate the following three regional 
characteristics as having an impact on the scope of their European policy and whether 
European identity would feature in it: government system; top regional politicians’ 
interests; and geographic European border location. It is expected, that these regional 
characteristics are the most relevant to the regional political elites, however that 
regional civil servants, who deal with the daily workings of European cooperation, may 
identify a different range of influential regional characteristics which hinder or boost 
their ability to communicate and coordinate work with their European counterparts – 
such as language, membership duration (or experience in European work) and network 
participation. This will be evaluated in the next chapter on civil servants’ perceptions.  
 
Reflecting back to the literature supporting the assumption that political elites feel 
more European than citizens and therefore civil servants may be less inclined to foster 
a European identity through their work, the political elite of Brandenburg’s case 
corroborates the findings from Spence (1998) that political elites, as top decision-
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makers of European policy, are, comparatively, very likely to feel European and 
potentially translate this into their work. However, the case studies and interviews 
have found that not all case studies’ political elites feel similarly European and act 
upon an interest in European identity-building when designing their European policy. 
Further to this, the question of policy implementers’ interests and influences remain to 
be assessed, as they too may affect the role of European identity in regions’ policy. 
More specifically, what role do civil servants play in the implementation of the 
European policy – and potentially further shaping the role of European identity through 
their work? Fligstein (2008) expects that those who engage more with Europeans will 
feel more European. Political elites’ working day is split between managing their 
European policy and dealing with regional and national political hierarchies and issues. 
Civil servants spend the entire day implementing their European policy and engaging 
with their European counterparts. Do they feel more European and have a stronger 
interest in cultivating a European identity within their respective European policy? 
According to Spence’s findings and Fligstein’s theory, a difference in perceptions on the 
role of European identity in European policy should be expected between political elites 
and civil servants. The next chapter will probe this expectation and provide further 
evidence on the civil servants’ (differing) perceptions.   
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Chapter 6   
Is European policy European? Perspectives from Regional Civil Servants  
 
The previous chapter has shown that the political elites from the four case study 
regions who are Europhile translate this interest into European identity-building within 
their European policies. Variation amongst the four case studies was significant, 
ranging from European identity featuring as a cornerstone objective within the 
different strands of Brandenburg’s European policy; to it being more of a bi-product 
than intended objective in Wallonia; and to it not even being considered in the South 
West of England. The political elites also discussed which regional characteristics affect 
the scope and objectives of both their European policy and identity-building practices. 
The literature proposes that civil servants, who engage to a larger extent with other 
Europeans on a daily basis, would be bigger Europe-enthusiasts and therefore want 
European identity to feature more prominently within their work – and may implement 
this dimension naturally. Whether, indeed, civil servants demonstrate this variation 
both from their political elites and from the determined objectives of the European 
policy will be assessed in this chapter. Based on the existing research findings, it is 
indeed expected that regional civil servants feel more European than their political 
elites and consider European identity-building whilst implementing the region’s 
European policy. Civil servants’ findings on whether European identity is cultivated as a 
bi-product of their work will also be evaluated in this chapter. The differences in 
perceptions between the civil servants and their political elites will be the focus of 
analysis. Secondary to this, this chapter will also reflect on the regional characteristics 
which the civil servants identify as affecting the scope and objectives of their region’s 
European policy and identity-building practices.   
 
 
Does European identity feature amongst the objectives of the regions’ 
European policies? Perspectives from the civil servants 
In this section, civil servants’ perceptions on the role of European identity within the 
scope of their European policy will be assessed. These include the region’s participation 
in EU funded programmes (Objectives 1 and 2); interregional cooperation (including 
EU funded Objective 3); bilateral partnerships; participation in European regional 
networks; European communications, European business connections; European legal 
integration; and anticipated objectives of the European policy from 2014 onwards. 
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The management of EU funding allocated to the region – a European identity-
building opportunity? Civil servants’ perspectives 
All four regions participate in either Objectives 1 or 2, or both, of the EU funded 
Cohesion Policy. The civil servants in the four case study regions acknowledge the 
benefits EU- funded programmes bring to the region – be they infrastructure 
development projects under Objective 1; strategic competitiveness and employment 
development initiatives under Objective 2; and in some cases, even European identity-
building opportunities within the two Objectives. Though civil servants were happy to 
discuss the correlation between Objective 3 projects (territorial cooperation) and 
European identity-building opportunities, they were more hesitant to make the 
connection between Objectives 1 and 2 fostering a European identity. Within the scope 
of Objective 1, a civil servant in the South West of England made it very clear that 
European identity-building was not part of her work: “We are all so very busy with our 
heads down and trying to drive the programmes forward [within our region] that we 
don’t have the time to step back and look at [European] opportunities within our 
regional implementation work” (Interviewee 33). However, a civil servant form the 
same region’s European Policy team explained that, in her opinion, there are 
opportunities to cultivate a European identity by connecting with other Europeans 
managing similar EU-funded programmes and sharing best-practice suggestions on 
their similar work (Interviewee 30). The mismatch in perceptions on whether European 
identity-building features in the management of EU funding work of the region can be 
attributed to different personal interests and backgrounds affecting the way in which 
civil servants perceive their work and execute it. Interviewee 30 has had more 
European experience than Interviewee 33 and therefore naturally identifies 
opportunities to improve her work by seeking advice from her colleagues – and 
importantly categorises her European regional counterparts as colleagues as much as 
colleagues sitting in her office in the South West fo England. However, Interviewee 33 
does not benefit from this wealth of experience and European-wide contacts to seek 
advice and best-practice suggestions for her work. And the political elites do not 
encourage their staff to manage EU funding with a European mind-set. In contrast to 
this, a civil servant form Brandenburg, who also manages Objective 1 EU funding 
within the region, engages with European networks and advice centres to gather 
suggestions on how to best manage the convergence funding. He explained that there 
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is information available on regions which have completed their conversion and which 
had similar situations to that of Brandenburg – their retrospective advice is, at times, 
very useful (Interviewee 40). Interviewee 40 and Interviewee 30 from the South West 
of England share not only their European mind-set and approach to managing EU 
funding within the region’s convergence / competitiveness programmes; they also both 
have a quite long-standing European experience: Interviewee 30 has 5-8 years’ 
working experience with other Europeans and Interviewee 40 has 10 years’ experience 
in his position and working with Europeans. Also, the civil servant in the Brandenburg 
region is working for the political elite who, in the previous chapter, was identified as 
being a very keen Europhile and who encourages his staff to engage in European 
opportunities themselves and seek European approaches to their work. In the example 
of Brandenburg and of the political elite and Interviewee 33 in the South West of 
England, the interests and mind-sets of the political elites affect not only the European 
policy of the region but also the mind-set and approach of the civil servants.  The EU’s 
convergence and competitiveness funding thus is identified by civil servants as 
focusing on economic development objectives within the region – yet the civil servants 
with European experience, mind-sets, and political elite support also seek opportunities 
to engage with their European colleagues in managing the Objectives 1 and 2 funding 
within their respective regions - and cultivate a European identity through their work.     
 
 
Civil servants’ perceptions on the role of European identity within their 
interregional cooperation 
The civil servants of all case study regions perceive the interregional cooperation 
objectives of their European policy to be of primary importance to their respective 
regions’ socio-economic development prospects. For civil servants’ work, territorial 
cooperation (within Objective 3 of the EU’s Cohesion Policy) can be very helpful in 
tackling and solving complex public policy issues within their regions by seeking best 
practice advice from a European-wide network of regional colleagues. For regions at 
large (both public and private sectors) interregional cooperation (including both 
Objective 3 and regions’ own interregional cooperation projects) can facilitate both 
social integration of those collaborating and boost innovation and economic 
development. As a civil servant from Nord – Pas de Calais pointed out: “In a good 
European [interregional cooperation] project, there is collaboration throughout and the 
end result could not have come to fruition without each participant’s contribution and 
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the synergy of each participant’s expertise” (Interviewee 29). A civil servant from 
Wallonia develops this further: “For cooperation to work well, it is important to see 
each other regularly. It is easier to find commonalities through contact and to foster a 
good working rapport – as well as a European identity” (Interviewee 56). Through the 
collaboration, a new product or service gets developed, which boosts economic 
development; but also the collaboration of like-minded, complementary people 
cultivates a shared, European identity. Particularly the interregional cooperation 
example of Nord – Pas de Calais’ youths who are categorised as being ‘troubled’, 
having left school and not integrated on the job market. They visit youths in similar 
situations in other European countries and learn what opportunities these youths have, 
what services are provided to them, and they exchange ideas on how they all can 
improve their situations and become better integrated in their own societies or perhaps 
other European ones. This exchange programme has a strong social context and 
delivers a European approach to solving a local social problem shared by other 
Europeans. The civil servant in charge of this programme explains that through the 
interactions and experiences, the youths feel more European and realise the 
opportunities they have beyond their home towns or even countries. The European 
identity cultivated through the programme, offers the youths a pro-active and positive 
mind-set and has the ability to help them progress in their lives. This all happens fairly 
quickly as the exchange only lasts one to two weeks and the support programme all 
together lasts approximately one month” (Interviewee 19). However, a different 
Interviewee from Nord – Pas de Calais cautions that it takes time for close and 
constructive collaboration to be fostered, and even longer for the collaborators to 
develop a European mind-set and European identity through their European 
engagement: “The link between cooperation and European identity is still a while off as 
it takes a long time to establish an identity through collaboration” Interviewee 28). 
Nevertheless, the statements made by civil servants in Nord – Pas de Calais reinforced 
the interests of their political elites’ predecessors, who were very Europhile and 
considered European identity-building in the policies and programmes they developed. 
The civil servants’ positions are not congruent, however, with the current region’s 
political elites, who are more Eurosceptic and plan to downsize the scope of the 
region’s European engagement – particularly the European identity-building dimension 
of the European policy.  
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In contrast to the discrepancy between the civil servants and political elites’ positions 
on European identity’s role within their European policy, both decision-makers and 
implementers in Brandenburg believe European identity-building plays a key role 
within their interregional cooperation. The civil servants agree with the political elite 
that the region’s European engagement fosters a European identity. This objective has 
been communicated to civil servants by the political elite and through his Europhile 
interests and personality, and the civil servants who work on the INTERREG team 
expressed their support to these sentiments and objectives in the course of their 
interviews. Two testimonials illustrate their feelings and perceptions about the region’s 
European engagement cultivating a European identity: “There are many INTERREG 
activities, however we realistically cannot reach every citizen – and many of them do 
believe that the EU is a big bureaucratic system that isn’t very useful. When people 
have concrete practical experiences, a point of reference, they perceive Europe in a 
positive way (Interviewee 48). An INTERREG colleague chimes in: “There is an 
example of a European school, in which the engagement of students with European 
languages, cultures and people has facilitated a European identity. Students 
graduating from this particular school in Poland typically work in European positions 
and feel European” (Interviewee 50). Both civil servants have given examples of the 
way in which their work facilitates a European identity, be it through a European school 
near the Brandenburg / Polish border, or providing European experiences to the 
constituents who ordinarily would not come into contact with European cultures or 
people in their daily lives. 
 
 
Civil servants’ perceptions on the role of European identity within their 
region’s bilateral partnerships 
Civil servants and political elites have stated that bilateral partnerships are essential in 
developing potential interregional cooperation partnerships. With interregional 
cooperation playing a key role in regions’ European policy strategies from 2014 
onwards, besides for the South West of England which lacks the political authority to 
engage in this domain, it must be assessed how bilateral partnerships help the 
European policy implementers to develop cooperation partnerships and also what role 
European identity-building plays within this objective. 
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Civil servants in the Nord – Pas de Calais emphasised the critical need for well-
functioning bilateral partnerships in order to support and strengthen interregional 
cooperation opportunities in specifically identified domains such as language training, 
improving transport opportunities, promoting culture through outreach initiatives, 
enhancing both the breadth and depth of youth and children mobility and exchanges, 
and other such activities for which the region has both a political mandate and the 
required human resources (Interviewee 22). The regions with which Nord – Pas de 
Calais has established bilateral partnerships are Silesia in Poland and North Rhine 
Westphalia in Germany. Cultural heritage, language, as well as geographic proximity 
and the perception of mutually benefitting from developing cooperation opportunities 
have been influential factors in selecting those partnerships. However, as the civil 
servant managing the bilateral partnerships clarified, whilst the region officially 
designates bilateral partnerships as a key objective in its strategy to support 
interregional cooperation the budget for partnerships is being put into question – an 
important point omitted by the political elite (Interviewee 22). The civil servant 
explains that, presently, “[t]here is a lack of political interest and support for bilateral 
partnerships. I had an intern for six months to help identify additional bilateral 
partnership links and opportunities, with the intention of hiring the intern full time 
depending on the development opportunities identified. Indeed, there were several 
solid opportunities which would have been beneficial for the region to pursue; however 
there was a lack of political will to follow up on them. I am trying to initiate as many of 
the opportunities as possible, however the budget therefore may shortly be put on 
hold” (Interviewee 22). The French civil servant explains the direct link between 
starting bilateral partnerships to develop interregional cooperation opportunities out of 
them. He also explains the political challenge in mastering this objective of the 
European policy, which is surprising because the political elites and civil servants all 
identify interregional cooperation as being the region’s European policy priority; and 
bilateral partnerships are a useful way to sustain cooperation project development. 
Furthermore, the civil servant discussed that partnerships were sought with regions 
which have similar backgrounds and interests to Nord – Pas de Calais. When bilateral 
partnerships are developed and people from the regions begin to interact more, a 
European identity can be reinforced through this enhanced engagement. “Indeed, it is 
this common mind-set and identity which boosts collaboration both within partnerships 
and cooperation projects” (Interviewee 22).   
 
 147 
 
 
 
In contrast to Nord – Pas de Calais’ exclusive bilateral partnerships’ objectives, those 
of Brandenburg and Wallonia are two-fold: on the one hand both regions want to 
facilitate European interregional cooperation, and on the other hand they expect to 
further strengthen their outreach opportunities and engagement throughout Europe 
beyond interregional cooperation opportunities (Interviewee 43, and Interviewee 57). 
The wider mandate and operational scope of both Brandenburg and Wallonia - when 
compared to Nord – Pas de Calais and the South West of England - is a direct 
consequence of their higher levels of political authority to be more active 
internationally, as well as due to their political elites’ interests in reaching out beyond 
the region and country to be part of a European (or even global) society. These 
objectives have at their core a European identity-building nature. The variation 
amongst their scope is that Wallonia may manage its own international relations (as a 
foreign office of state would), whilst Brandenburg develops bilateral partnerships 
primarily for the purpose of exchanging experiences (Interviewee 43). As a civil 
servant from the bilateral partnerships teams explained: “Citizen encounters [with out 
bilateral partners] help foster European identity the most, because people learn about 
their common heritage and perceptions and realise they share an identity. You can 
only experience this through encounters. (…) Interaction and common interests are the 
key to European identity development” (Interviewee 42). Both regions engage with 
other Europeans on a very regular basis, which cultivates a European identity. They 
have both categorically sought bilateral partnerships with other regions and countries 
of similar interests and background. These similarities were expected to foster closer 
partnerships, more relevant experience exchanges, and, down the line, opportunities 
to work together. Brandenburg invests significantly in its relations with Eastern 
European states. The region has three designated civil servants living and working in 
Poland and Romania. The reasons behind and importance of Brandenburg’s  pursuance 
of  bilateral partnerships with  Eastern European states  is their shared commonality of 
a number of key development objectives and goals, primarily in identifying and testing 
development projects. Civil servants characterize the driving force of these bilateral 
partnerships as the recognition that “a problem shared is a problem halved” 
(Interviewee 42). This true collaboration and partnership mind-set is testimony to the 
identity-building process with its neighbours to the East. In addition to the two civil 
servants delegated to Poland and Romania, Brandenburg tasked five civil servants with 
managing bilateral partnerships with regional governments: one manages partnerships 
with Poland; the second manages partnerships with Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary ad the 
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Baltic republics; the third manages cross-border partnerships with Poland and focuses 
on INTERREG cooperation opportunities; the fourth manages partnerships with the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Croatia; and the fifth manages  partnership 
developments. These countries have been selected based on the priority objective of 
tackling the transition from being an Eastern European state to opening up to Western 
European opportunities and EU programmes – developing a European mind-set and 
identifying shared interests with other Europeans. These objectives, too, can foster a 
European identity by appreciating the commonalities and shared interests amongst 
Europeans. Shared thematic orientations have been found to include, amongst others, 
education, employment, demographic change, culture, and, where relevant, INTERREG 
cross-border cooperation programmes (Interviewee 42). In Wallonia, a specific 
thematic cooperation objective revolved around the region’s political elite’s demand to 
shift priorities from francophone interests broadly defined to specific cooperation 
opportunities with strategic countries and regions, all of which having a number of 
prioritised ‘problématiques’ in common. Identifying opportunities to collaborate with 
European partners would also develop a European identity, instead of furthering a 
francophone identity only.  
 
 
Civil servants’ perceptions on the role of European identity within their 
region’s participation in European regional networks 
The objectives behind participating in a network are clearly stated by one of the civil 
servants interviewed: “Networks help [us] to get involved in cooperation” (Interviewee 
30). Whilst there is a general agreement amongst the statements of all civil servants 
of the four case study regions on the desired outcome of their participation in 
European regional networks, they also untangle how they believe networks are able to 
achieve this improved connectedness and collaboration. Networks, on the one hand, 
offer a space for regional practitioners from both public and private sectors to meet, 
discuss common thematic interests and then potentially develop a project idea in which 
each participant can contribute an original skill-set to produce a symbiotic result. The 
outcome of this is cooperation, as well as European identity-building through the 
enhanced European engagement of the project participants. However, networks also 
foster a European space and identity in order to foster collaboration of its membership 
(Interviewee 30). Cultivating a European identity amongst the membership makes 
them feel more comfortable to share ideas and experiences whilst connecting with 
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practitioners from across Europe. The membership realises that they share thematic 
interests and focus on the thematic matter at hand, instead of whether they are talking 
to somebody from the same or a different country. This open mindedness fosters a 
European identity, based on shared interests. The network thereby develops a 
European mind-set and European identity. This will be further discussed in the next 
chapter, which presents a European regional network and assesses how it fosters a 
European identity. 
 
 
Civil servants’ perceptions on their region’s European communications and 
whether European identity-building features amongst them 
The four case study regions’ civil servants developed a variety of communications and 
outreach methods, and they produced and disseminated an equally broad range of 
communications and outreach materials to inform citizens of their European 
engagement. These, in turn, are aimed and expected to have varying impacts on the 
European identity-building amongst the four case study regions. Whilst the majority of 
the South West of England’s civil servants had a very limited understanding of their 
communications and outreach role, bluntly stating that communicating to the citizens 
is not part and parcel of their many responsibilities, Brandenburg invested considerable 
manpower and material resources into informing its citizens of their region’s bouquet 
of European engagement, benefits and opportunities. Brandenburg’s communications 
strategy thereby appears to be in line with raising citizens’ awareness of European 
opportunities and cultivating a European identity through the region’s European policy 
at large – including its communications. Indeed, Brandenburg stands out amongst the 
case studies for having placed a full-time communications officer in charge of designing 
and managing Brandenburg’s European mass communication strategy.  
 
The limited communication efforts employed by the civil servants of both the South 
West of England and Nord Pas de Calais reflect their perception and understanding of 
their assigned responsibilities and interpretation of prevailing political constraints – it 
does not, however, reflect their perception of the significance of communication within 
the context of their European engagement and, to the most part, their desire to 
develop a European identity through their work. Whilst civil servants managing EU 
funding (Objectives 1 and 2) in the South West of England categorically negate having 
any responsibilities to communicate with the citizens of their region (Interviewees 32, 
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33 and 35), civil servants in Nord – Pas de Calais have strategic orders to not 
communicate about their European engagement during election campaigns; however 
they may advertise their achievements in the region’s public transportation networks 
when no elections are on the political horizon (Interviewee 17). The civil servants of 
both regions believe the reason for the elected political elites’ concern, both within the 
Conseil Régional and the national government in the UK, is rooted in widespread 
Euroscepticism throughout both regions. Politicians are weary of re-election chances if 
they publicise their European engagement, particularly if this features European 
identity-building. A civil servant representing the South West of England, however, 
criticises this political position, as she believes engaging and communicating with 
citizens can change their perceptions of Europe: “If more of us publicised and people 
realised what EU funding comes into the region and what further opportunities and 
benefits are available to the region through European programmes, they would feel 
more positive toward Europe” (Interviewee 30). 
 
In contrast to the South West of England and Nord – Pas de Calais, Brandenburg and 
Wallonia both communicate extensively throughout their respective regions. In both 
Brandenburg and Wallonia, civil servants are tasked with publicising information not 
only on their websites -  as the civil servants in Nord – Pas de Calais also do -, they 
are also charged with writing newspaper articles (Interviewee 55; Interviewee 56; 
Interviewee 18; and Interviewee 41). The gist of Wallonia’s communication and 
outreach materials focuses on its territorial cooperation programmes and future 
opportunities (Interviewee 55 and Interviewee 56). Brandenburg’s scope of 
communications is significantly wider, as it covers all of the regions’ European 
engagements, including EU-funding for Objective 1 and territorial cooperation 
programmes; developments in the bilateral partnerships; the range of European 
engagement programmes the region organises for its citizens to experience Europe 
first hand; and the transposition of new EU laws (Interviewee 41). The communication 
strategy’s central message is: ‘Europe is also here in Brandenburg’; this recognition 
however requires raising the level of citizens’ awareness, it is a call to engage them, 
and allow them to make up their own minds about Europe (Interviewee 41). Yet, the 
civil servant in charge of communications knows that the political elite would like the 
citizens to feel more European in light of the communications and the region’s 
European engagement at large (Interviewee 41). Similar to some of the civil servants 
of Nord – Pas de Calais and the South West of England, the civil servant of 
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Brandenburg is mindful of significant scepticism toward both the EU and the West 
within the region. He realises that Germany’s ‘reunification from within’ will take time. 
The civil servant further adds that: “For decades, citizens of former East Germany had 
been told by their government and teachers that cooperation with the West was not 
permitted. Changing peoples’ mind-set, ideology and habits takes time” (Interviewee 
41). However, Brandenburg’s approach of dealing with Euroscepticism differs 
considerably from the one adapted, for example, by their counterparts in Nord – Pas 
de Calais, as documented earlier. Brandenburg is confronting prevailing Eurosceptic 
sentiments in the region by pushing back, by providing a full range of Eurofriendly 
materials and organizing public events to inform and engage citizens on behalf of 
‘project Europe’. The civil servants are as actively engaged in this the pursuit of project 
and its objectives as is the elected regional political elite. If levels of European identity 
had also been measured at the regional level, it would be very significant to study how 
these two different communications approaches may have impacted the levels of 
European identity in the respective regions.  
 
The regions’ European communications and outreach approach and strategies vary 
significantly across the four case study regions. Citizens’ sentiments have a negative 
impact on political decisions in both the South West of England and in Nord – Pas de 
Calais. Thus interests of political decision-makers shape policy, and as their interests 
have been shaped by citizens’ preferences, this comes to the detriment of European 
identity-building taking shape within the regions’ respective European policies. In 
Wallonia, civil servants maintain pro-active news communications on their respective 
programmes – yet there is no overarching communications objective and it does not 
pro-actively seek to foster European identity. This may be because levels of European 
identity in Belgium are quite high; however, there are still Eurosceptics amongst the 
Europhiles. And Brandenburg, in contrast to the South West of England and Nord – Pas 
de Calais, takes a determinately proactive position in dealing with the Eurosceptic 
mind-set of its citizens by communicating strategically throughout the region and 
aiming to cultivate a European identity through its communications. The region makes 
use of all communication and outreach platforms at its disposal, including organising 
information events for citizens to get engage in their European activities. Political 
decisions on how to deal with Eurosceptic undercurrents and communicating, in 
response, a positive message about the regions’ European objectives and engagement 
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shapes and drives the tone and tenor of Brandenburg’s communication and outreach 
strategy.  
 
 
Do Foreign Direct Investment / Business Connections foster economic 
integration and European identity? Civil servants’ perspectives 
Both Brandenburg’s and the South West of England’s European teams are staffed with 
business savvy civil servants whose primary responsibility it is to  impress upon the 
regions’ business community the advantages of embracing a European perspective to 
all of their operations. The objective of this work is very clearly driven by an economic 
agenda, with no European identity-building consideration. The South West of England 
region has designated one civil servant to court European businesses into the region to 
help develop its competitiveness and employment prospects (Interviewee 38). In 
Brandenburg, a civil servant is tasked with supporting companies from the region in 
their efforts to expand their business throughout Europe (Interviewee 44).The two 
case study regions display a variation in objectives as the Southwest is attracting 
business from abroad into its region; and Brandenburg displays a more international 
mind-set by wanting to promote its business opportunities abroad – once more 
Brandenburg shows that it wants to play a pro-active role on a European an 
international stage, not only the regional one. For both regions, it is possible that a 
European identity is cultivated through more European contact and engagement due to 
business developments – however this would be a bi-product with the key objective 
being economic development and competitiveness.   
 
 
Civil servants’ perceptions on their region’s EU legal integration – does it 
foster a European identity? 
The political authority accorded to Wallonia and Brandenburg empowers the two 
regions to transpose EU directives and legislation into regional laws. In the case of 
Wallonia, the political elite had highlighted the European identity-building dimension to 
legal integration as each regional or national law changed receives a European 
dimension. The civil servant managing the transposition of EU regulations into Walloon 
law also discusses benefits of European legal integration and opportunities for 
cultivating a European identity through better communication on legal improvements 
thanks to the EU: “The EU deals with fundamental issues which improve the daily lives 
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of people; for example the public goods provision of clean air and clean water. People 
don’t often perceive the EU as making such changes; they see the EU as a regulatory 
body which imposes conditions. Maybe if people saw how the EU touches their lives 
and tries to make things easier and better, they would be more supportive, identify 
with the institutions and feel more European” (Interviewee 51). In the case of 
Brandenburg, the competent authority in charge of legal transposition and integration 
is the region’s political elite (whose findings were presented in Chapter 5). Though he 
is very Europhile and believes the legal integration to be very important European 
work; he also believes that it is not as strong of an opportunity to develop a European 
identity as are the interregional cooperation programmes; bilateral partnerships; 
European communications and Brussels office activities.  
 
 
Civil servants’ perceptions on the anticipated objectives of the regions’ 
European engagement from 2014 onwards  
Political elites identified interregional cooperation as ‘the future’ and primary driver of 
regions’ European engagement in response to the anticipated South-East drift of 
convergence and competitiveness funding. In line with this expectation, civil servants 
anticipate that the bulk of their work in the intermediate future will be focused on 
identifying and supporting interregional cooperation opportunities across the European 
Union. Whilst civil servants in Wallonia and Brandenburg are already involved in the 
planning for the next EU budget period starting in 2014 - giving them opportunities to 
provide input on how the regional European strategy should be developed -, civil 
servants in Nord – Pas de Calais and the South West of Europe are not involved in 
future strategizing. Civil servants from Nord – Pas de Calais in particular would like 
their programmes to include social integration elements and greater citizens’ 
involvement through increased and enhanced communications, exchanges and 
outreach events. And civil servants from the South West of England are keen to regain 
the political authority required to engage in interregional cooperation programmes and 
making strategic communication on European opportunities and the benefits they can 
bring to the region a key component of their responsibilities.  
 
Brandenburg’s civil servants expect the region’s European communications will 
continue to play a key role in the pursuance of its future European objectives: “Our 
political elite operating inside the European Directorate works very hard here, and in 
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his own time he promotes Europe and get citizens to experience Europe. He works 
very closely with the civil servant managing the region’s European communications. 
This has always been very close to his heart and as long as he continues to work here 
he will most likely continue to invest his efforts in communications about European 
opportunities and the relevance of Europe to citizens, as well as getting citizens 
involved” (Interviewee 43). The political interest of regional decision-makers and the 
readiness to closely collaborate with the relevant civil servants plays an important role 
in shaping the scope and objectives of the region’s European engagement. The 
importance of this finding was highlighted by civil servants from the South West of 
England. They explained that the lack in political will to more comprehensively engage 
in European affairs has a significant impact: “The politicians’ attitudes toward Europe 
definitely make a difference to the region’s European engagement” (Interviewee 30). 
As there is widespread Euroscepticism within Britain’s national government, there is 
little support for making the decision to grow the region’s European engagement. 
Further reflecting on the political interests of the central government vis-à-vis Europe 
and EU-funding, a civil servant offered these insights: “General elections are also a big 
influence on the European engagement of the region. Whatever happens, we will 
probably have further budget cuts [due to the economic recession]; we might even 
disappear entirely due to changes mentioned by the Conservative party. Whether we’re 
still around will have a massive impact for the region and territorial cooperation, as 
only the regional government may, according to EU regulations, manage the EU 
funding available to the region within the Cohesion Policy” (Interviewee 31). As 
England’s government and the system within which it operates has allowed for the 
devolution of only very limited political authority to the regions, the South West of 
England remains more removed from the European-relevant decision-making 
processes than the other three regions studied.  
 
 
Variation amongst civil servants’ perceptions of the role of European identity 
within their European work 
The four case study regions have provided illuminating variations firstly between the 
different case study regions; secondly between civil servants and political elites; and, 
thirdly between civil servants who interact with other Europeans and those who do not. 
The largest variation in perceptions on European identity emerged when the level of 
engagement with Europeans was at issue. In the South West of England, very few civil 
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servants engage with Europeans as civil servants primarily manage EU convergence 
and competitiveness funds within the region. This majority cohort either saw no 
correlation between European identity and their work, or did not identify with Europe. 
Those, who had either previously or at present dealt with their European counterparts 
acknowledged the benefit of exchanging experiences or felt a commonality; and thus 
believed the notion of a European identity to be a very realistic concept. These civil 
servants in the South West of England were disappointed by national government 
decisions to re-centralise the UK government and stop regions from being pro-actively 
engaged in interregional cooperation and bilateral partnerships – two policy dimensions 
which make it possible to foster a European identity. Furthermore, the civil servants 
were frustrated about not being able to raise awareness of the constituents regarding 
the benefits to the region by European funding and European opportunities. They 
believe this would have helped to cultivate a positive European attitude and even a 
European identity throughout the region – and in turn this might have an impact on 
top political decision makers and the way they design European policies.  
 
Civil servants of the other regions are much more involved with their European 
counterparts. They also focused more on interregional cooperation programmes 
instead of the management of convergence or competitiveness funds within the region. 
All of these civil servants were able to conceptualise European identity and articulate 
the role they perceived European identity to play within their respective European 
policy. However, civil servants had different expectations as to the influence and 
impact their European engagement might have on the facilitation of a European 
identity. Whilst most European policy dimensions of regions have as core objective the 
economic development of the region, all policy dimensions have the possibility of 
cultivating a European identity when implemented. Key causes of variation in 
implementation included the political elites’ interest in building a European identity 
through the region’s policy; whether civil servants perceived an opportunity of 
fostering a European identity through their work; whether civil servants themselves 
have a European mind-set; and the scope of regions’ European policy, as 
predominantly determined by government system and top political decision-makers’ 
interests.  
 
The first two hypotheses of this thesis proposed explanations for the variation in the 
role European identity would play in regions’ European policies. The first hypothesis 
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explained that variation would stem from political elites’ interests and consideration of 
European identity as part of the region’s policy (H1). The second hypothesis expected 
civil servants, who engage more with their European counterparts and colleagues on a 
daily basis than political elites, would feel more European and thus want to build a 
European identity through their policy implementation work (H2). Evidence from the 
interviews provides sufficient support to claim that these hypotheses are supported. 
Indeed, the interests of top regional decision-makers have shown to have had an 
impact in deciding on the scope of regions’ European policies, as well as whether they 
would feature European identity in them or not. In the case of Nord – Pas de Calais, 
the previous political elites had dramatically enhanced the role of European identity 
within the European policy, however current political elites do not support those 
objectives and have limited their programmes in comparison to those focussing on 
economic development. In contrast to this, the political elite of Brandenburg is an 
enthusiastic Europhile and translates his personal interests and preferences into his 
policy – and communicated to the civil servants that they ought to do the same to 
remain consistent with the policy they are implementing. The second hypothesis also 
holds true in most cases studied. Regional civil servants indeed talked about European 
identity with greater ease than political elites, and many suggested that their attitudes 
stemmed from the extent of their European engagement. Two civil servants in the 
South West fo England, who had had more European exposure and experience than 
others from the RDA, were very Eurofriendly and disappointed in the failure of the 
region’s European policy to feature European identity-building. The civil servants who 
did not have comparable European exposure and experience did not miss European 
identity-building’s absence within the European policy. Also in Nord – Pas de Calais, 
the civil servants managing European projects which foster European identity (the 
youths exchange programme and bilateral partnerships in particular) felt more 
European than the present political elites and therefore felt let down by the decision to 
scale down identity-building programmes and refocus the resources to economic 
development projects with identity-building as an un-stated bi-product. In Wallonia, 
the civil servants working on interregional cooperation were also more outspoken 
about European identity-building in practice than the political elite. The only exception 
to the findings is Brandenburg, where the political elite was such an enthusiastic 
Europhile that it would be impossible for the civil servants to be more Europhile than 
him – and more keen to implement European identity-building activities through their 
work. Though the third hypothesis, on European regional networks cultivating a 
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European identity, was also corroborated briefly in this chapter, based on civil 
servants’ interviews, this will be studied with more precision in the next chapter with 
research findings from network members and managers evaluated.  
 
 
 
The impact of regions’ characteristics in shaping the scope and objectives of 
their European policy  
Chapters 1 and 3 of this thesis presented research findings from political scientists, 
who hypothesised that five regional characteristics have an effect on the scope and 
objectives of regions’ European engagement. Civil servants have also identified these 
five regional characteristics, which they have found to shape their European 
engagement. They include the system of government, key political interests, the 
region’s respective geographic location, language and heritage, as well as its 
networking capacity and participation. This validates all of the regional characteristics 
identified in this thesis as having a meaningful impact on the regions’ European 
engagement. How these regional characteristics shape the scope and objectives of 
regions’ European policy will be evaluated below, based on the four case study regions’ 
civil servants experiences. This section provides an additional explanation for why 
some regions are more pro-active in their European engagement and why some 
regions perceive European identity more naturally than others.  
 
Government system and political elites’ interests 
The political constraint imposed by England’s centralised government system and the 
political interests of those wielding political power at the centre is not an experience 
shared by - nor an impediment inflicted on - the other three case study regions – at 
least not to the same extent. Due to a lack of political authority combined with a lack 
of political interest from the central government in European integration, the South 
West of England’s European policy had been shrunk to only manage EU funding 
allocated to the region for convergence and competitiveness development. European 
opportunities for which the region must identify European partners and apply for EU 
funding – or fund the projects themselves- are no longer deemed appropriate for the 
region to undertake and have been cut (Interviewees 30 and 31). Nord – Pas de Calais’ 
civil servants both share and support the English region’s claim that government 
systems and political interests heavily weigh in and impact on regions’  territorial 
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cooperation scope and objectives. And whilst Nord – Pas de Calais has established, 
over time, a substantial territorial cooperation portfolio within the EU’s-funded 
Objective 3, the region’s civil servants still feel constrained in their efforts to further 
optimize existing opportunities by their political elite. “The wide scope of activities of 
the European Directorate and, in particular, of the Institute for European Territorial 
Cooperation, was decided through a sequence of European regional reforms in the 
1980s and by regional political elites who recognised great opportunities for the region 
to be more active in European affairs. The current political elite, however, does not 
share this enthusiasm and, as a result of their different take, our budget has shrunk 
and some projects have been put on hold, such as the youth exchange programme” 
(Interviewee 19) and bilateral partnerships (Interviewee 22). Both civil servants in 
charge of the youth exchange programme and bilateral partnerships explain that their 
work fosters social integration, a European mind-set and European identity-building. 
They recognise a shift in objectives as determined by the interests of the region’s 
political elites: whilst previous political elites strongly encouraged the inclusion of a 
social dimension within their cooperation programmes (which has the ability of 
fostering a European identity), the current political elites are shifting back toward an 
economic focus.  
 
Geography 
In addition to the government system and political interests, regional civil servants 
have also found geographic factors to have a significant impact on both the objectives 
and scope of their European engagement – particularly in interregional cooperation 
projects. A civil servant from Wallonia identified projects in which geographic proximity 
to another country’s region has, for instance, fostered cooperation of hospital 
treatment and health insurances, as well as public transportation: “Citizens from one 
country may get treated in a hospital which is the geographically closest to their 
residence; however this hospital is located in a different country, or public buses don’t 
stop at the border to enable people who live and work in different regions and 
countries can more easily experience the EU’s free movement of labour and services. 
In time, we see people working together more naturally and thinking less about 
national borders” (Interviewee 56). In turn, when citizens think less about national 
borders and more about receiving equal treatment by Europeans in general, they also 
begin to embrace a European mind-set and European identity. Developing a sense of 
sameness with their European neighbours, indeed, can foster a European identity and 
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cross-border cooperation projects cultivate this exchange and feeling. The civil servant 
recounts that opportunities for interregional cooperation arise due to geographic 
factors, thus corroborating the hypothesis that geographic border location does have 
considerable impact on regions’ European engagement. A second civil servant dealing 
with interregional cooperation confirms this assessment: “Nord – Pas de Calais is 
geographically ideally located for cross-border cooperation projects; therefore, these 
come quite natural to the region” (Interviewee 28). And a civil servant from Wallonia 
confirms that based on the very positive experience with a geographically determined 
cross-border cooperation project, a larger interregional cooperation programme can 
evolve, encompassing a wider scope of European regions (Interviewee 55). Geographic 
location is documented by civil servants from both the French and Belgian case study 
regions as being an important influence in their natural participation in interregional 
cooperation, and a facilitator to building a European identity through their cross-border 
cooperation work.  
 
Geography however is a multifaceted natural phenomena, and not always a ‘natural’ 
when it comes to linking people, goods and services, and thereby cultivating a 
European identity. It can compound already existing socio-political, socio-economical, 
and socio-cultural barriers. In fact geographical barriers, according to the civil servants 
in Wallonia, the South West of England, and Brandenburg, can make the difference 
between a successful and less successful cooperation venture; it can also be the 
deciding factor for a failed cooperative initiative. A civil servant from Wallonia put it 
this way: “Cross-border cooperation in Belgium depends very much on the geographic 
location. On the one hand, regions to the North of Wallonia have easy cross-border 
opportunities to France for a range of topic areas; whereas the southern part of the 
region has a vast forest on the border area and therefore does not have as many 
cross-border cooperation opportunities beyond forestry activities” (Interviewee 56). 
Even though the region is located on a border to another European region, a forest can 
act as a border and cause a disconnect, thereby impeding cooperation. This perception 
is widely shared by civil servants in the South West of England, who blame the region’s 
geographical isolation for exacerbating an already unique set of challenges to its 
interregional cooperation efforts: “It is more difficult to conceptualise interregional 
cooperation in the South West of England due to the Channel; people do not walk back 
and forth from the South West to another European region, and therefore don’t as 
easily identify shared problems and the possibility of creating, together, shared 
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solutions” (Interviewee 31). The geographic isolation can therefore, also, further 
compound the lack of European identity-building in the South West of England, as 
there is no natural European exchange, engagement and experience. 
 
Also Brandenburg’s civil servants had mixed feelings about the region’s geographic 
location and its impact on interregional cooperation. On the one hand, being a direct 
neighbour to a Poland still much in need to develop across the board, provided 
opportunities to cooperate in innumerable areas; whereas opportunities in the more 
developed western regions of Europe were much more limited; particularly in the 
absence of access to EU funding. A civil servant explains: “We have a 250Km long 
border to Poland, which offers many collaboration opportunities in transportation, 
encounters and exchanges, amongst others” (Interviewee 43). However, the mutual 
will to cooperate is somewhat tempered by the very fact that the Oder river flows 
directly between Brandenburg and Polish regions  causing great cooperation difficulties 
because of the lack of connecting bridges: “This makes it more difficult to meet and 
communicate. We first need to build bridges and develop an interlinked transportation 
infrastructure between the regions; and then we can develop additional cooperation 
opportunities” (Interviewee 50). The region’s civil servants have identified that its 
geographic location has an impact both on the potential for people to connect and 
collaborate, and through this European engagement and experience, build a European 
identity. This is in line with statements made by civil servants from the other regions. 
Whilst sharing direct land borders can potentially be great natural assets supporting 
regions’ cooperation objectives and efforts; their lack and, moreover, natural 
geographic borders like thick forests, rivers, or the English Channel, can present 
serious impediments to cooperation and identity-building across regions. There is an 
evidence-based consensus among civil servants from Brandenburg, Wallonia and the 
South West of England and Nord – Pas de Calais that their geographic location has 
both positive and negative impacts on cross-border interregional cooperation 
experiences and, furthermore, on their European engagement in general. This 
corroborates the findings from the literature review in Chapter 1 and regional 
characteristics analysis in Chapter 3.  
 
Language / Heritage 
Further developing the civil servants’ explanations of government systems and political 
interests, as well as geographic location having a significant impact on their objectives 
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and scope of their interregional cooperation, they also identify language and heritage 
as influential factors. In Wallonia, language poses a challenge to cooperation: “If a 
project participant is calling a potential participant to discuss an idea and knows that 
that person also speaks French, communication is much easier and they can make 
decisions more quickly. However, if the potential participants do not share a common 
language, particularly when discussing very specific technicalities, it is more difficult to 
cooperate” (Interviewee 56). And when there is a lack of European collaboration and 
engagement, European identity is not cultivated in turn. Also civil servants in 
Brandenburg have identified language hurdles in their cooperation practices: “From our 
side, we have great difficulty learning Polish, whereas our Polish counterparts learn 
German quite well. So from our side, we need to overcome this linguistic challenge and 
improve our language skills so cooperation can develop more easily” (Interviewee 42). 
The impact of both language and heritage was also very much on the mind of a civil 
servant from Nord – Pas de Calais: “The French have some difficulty in working within 
other cultures. To overcome cultural differences, we organise a course teaching our 
potential French project partners how to overcome cultural differences and collaborate 
with other Europeans” (Interviewee 18). This course also fosters a European mind-set, 
which can start developing a European identity.  
 
In response to these explanations of language and heritage impacting interregional 
cooperation, civil servants from both the Nord – Pas de Calais and Brandenburg region 
prepared and introduced educational materials to overcome heritage-driven 
challenges: “We have organised bilingual Kindergarten and schools together with Polish 
regions in order to help the families with German and Polish citizenship” (Interviewee 
43). These Kindergarten and schools will, of course, also facilitate future cooperation 
opportunities of the next generation of potential project participants. Yet, not all 
language and heritage challenges can be overcome with educational materials and 
measures, no matter how innovative. In Brandenburg, the heritage it shares with its 
Polish partners is two-sided: on the one hand the political elites point toward 
commonalities between Brandenburg and Poland in terms of development stages and 
needing to integrate into Western Europe after having shared a socialist past; and on 
the other hand the civil servants in Brandenburg convey that the regions have a 
difficult heritage to cope with due to World War II and its consequences. The civil 
servants working on INTERREG programmes all agree that numerous prejudices persist 
in this area because of the war. Many people who originated from one side of the 
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border have not yet set foot across the other side of the border. They explain that 
motivating people to not become prisoners of history and break free from prejudices in 
order to work together is a challenge. A civil servant reflects on the enormity of this 
task: “[The] Polish region bordering the northern part of Brandenburg has a very small 
population because after the war it was thought that that area would go to Germany 
again at some point. However, this did not happen. Nonetheless, Polish people were 
reticent to move there. Hence, in that area, there is little immediate cross-border 
cooperation. In the southern areas of the border, the German and the Polish 
populations live much closer to the borders, naturally, and there is more immediate 
cross-border cooperation occurring there” (Interviewee 49). Brandenburg is a 
particularly interesting case study in this context as it brings to life the complexity of 
its recent history: of being part of former East Germany – and contributing perceptions 
approaches and insights into cooperation and identity-building opportunities with 
Eastern European regions which are unique when compared to those of the other case 
study regions.  
 
European regional network participation 
European regional networks have been established to help all regions engage in 
European opportunities. Particularly the regions with characteristics which challenge 
their European engagement, networks have been set up to level the playing field. In 
practice, they provide a space for regional public and private sector actors to meet 
each other, discuss their common thematic interests, and identify potential 
collaboration opportunities, if this is a bilateral partnership amongst regions or an 
interregional cooperation project. “Networks have been very useful to gain European-
wide access to thematic information and best practice advice helpful to the region – 
without needing to conduct a large scale research project on what each of the 
European regions is doing in that thematic area right now. If I am working on 
transportation policy, it is useful to know how other regions have dealt with their 
transportation policy and which elements of that I can learn from through a bilateral 
partnership and best practice sharing. The network enables me to find this information 
and the corresponding contacts quickly” (Interviewee 29). A civil servant from the 
South West of England explained how networks compensate for low levels of political 
authority in the region’s European engagement: “When we were still working in 
interregional cooperation projects, I found it very useful to attend some network 
meetings to connect with other regional representatives and brainstorm potential 
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project ideas together. I would not have had the political authority or resources to 
travel across Europe to hold meetings with regional representatives, but attending 
network meetings in Brussels fit within my scope of political authority. We met useful 
contacts to the region and developed some interregional cooperation project ideas with 
them. Unfortunately, we don’t know whether we can pursue these or not. But without 
the network, I would not have met the project participants or participating in project 
design brainstorming at all” (Interviewee 30). Networks can boost European 
cooperation, and can develop a European mind-set amongst its membership. This will 
be further investigated in the next chapter, dedicated to the analysis of ERRIN, the 
European Regions for Research and Innovation Network.  
 
The regional characteristics which have the ability to facilitate or challenge regions’ 
European engagement and identity-building have been identified by civil servants to 
include government system; political interests; geographic location; language / 
heritage; and European regional network participation. These corroborate the 
characteristics identified by political scientists, as documented in Chapter 1, and thus 
provides more evidence based support for their validity in shaping both the scope and 
objectives of regions’ European engagement and identity-building. 
 
 
 
The civil servants’ perceptions on the role of European identity within their 
European policies, as well as the impact of regional characteristics on their 
policies’ scope and objectives 
This chapter has presented the perceptions of the four case study regions’ civil 
servants implementing their respective regions’ European policies. It was assessed 
what role European identity plays in the policies the civil servants implement, and 
whether they personally want to cultivate a European identity through their work. This 
chapter also provided civil servants’ support for the claims in the literature, as 
presented in Chapter 1, on the six regional characteristics which affect the scope and 
objectives of regions’ European policies.  
 
Interview findings have documented that the majority of civil servants are enthusiastic 
about Europe and that they perceive there to be a natural link between engaging in 
European-wide programmes and developing a European identity. Furthermore, they 
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perceive European identity to be connected, predominantly, to experiencing and 
interacting with their fellow European counterparts through interregional cooperation 
(including European regional networks) and bilateral partnerships, as well as by having 
access to European communications. Hence, the more citizens are aware of European 
opportunities, the more they are involved in European projects, the more European 
identity is cultivated. The greater the recognition of the commonalities and similarities 
amongst European counterparts, the greater the likelihood of developing a European 
identity. Civil servants in Brandenburg perceived European identity to play an 
important role in their region’s European policies and programmes; civil servants in 
Nord – Pas de Calais perceived their  European engagement to also facilitate the 
development of a European identity; and civil servants from Wallonia believed that 
interregional cooperation in general facilitates a European identity; whilst civil servants 
from the South West of England, due to political and operational constraints, perceive 
no link between their European engagement and developing a European identity – and 
some civil servants deeply regret this to be the case. The hypotheses on European 
identity-building were also corroborated by civil servants’ perceptions in this chapter. 
Firstly, the European mind-set and interests of political elites determine whether 
European identity features in their European policies. Secondly, the civil servants who 
engage more with other Europeans feel more European and want to foster a European 
identity through their work. Those who cannot do so are disappointed by limitations 
typically determined by their national government system and extent of regional 
political authority; or by their political elites’ interests. Thirdly, European regional 
networks cultivate both a European identity and then interregional cooperation.  
 
Civil servants also identified a range of regional characteristics which influence and 
impact the scope and objectives of their respective regions’ European engagement. 
The five characteristics include: the government system; the political interests of top 
decision-makers; the geographic location of the region; its regional languages and 
heritage; as well as the region’s participation in European regional networks. These 
findings are of particular value as they document perceptions of implementers dealing 
with these issues on a daily basis, and they are of importance as they corroborate the 
literature’s hypotheses presented in Chapter 1 and studied in Chapter 3.  
 
Finally, this chapter documented a new range of positions as the civil servants were 
prepared to comment quite critically about the top level regional decision-makers’ 
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(notably in Nord – Pas de Calais) policy decisions and voiced their disagreement. Civil 
servants identified territorial cooperation to be a key area of regions’ European 
engagement and the domain with the highest funding potential for 2014 onwards. 
Whilst civil servants in Wallonia and in Brandenburg are optimistic about the future of 
interregional cooperation, civil servants from Nord – Pas de Calais showed signs of 
disappointment and frustration with the increasing constraints and subsequent limits of 
their scope of cooperation, whilst civil servants from the South West of England 
expressed little hope or expectation in attaining the political authority necessary to re-
engage more effectively in interregional cooperation again in future. However, civil 
servants from both Nord – Pas de Calais and the South West of England argued that 
for any European policy or programme to achieve its full potential, they must be able 
to communicate and raise awareness throughout the region – a politically unsupported 
objective. Furthermore, civil servants from the four case study regions identified the 
link between European identity building and sustainability of European-wide 
cooperation and socio-economic integration – an important link several political elites 
did not discuss. If people do not feel European and comfortable collaborating with 
other Europeans, also European economic integration will not ensue to the extent of its 
potential. Thus, regardless of whether political elites are Europhile or not, they ought 
to want European identity-building to feature within their European policy in order to 
ensure sustained economic development and competitiveness in future.  
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Chapter 7 
European Regional Networks – enhancing European engagement and identity-
building? 
 
In the previous two chapters, regional political elites and civil servants have explained 
that European regional networks help them engage in European opportunities. 
Networks have been useful particularly to civil servants in search of thematic 
information and best practice advice; building bilateral partnerships; and in meeting 
interregional cooperation project partners. By doing so, European regional networks 
provide an environment conducive to regions’ European-wide collaboration. They offer 
their membership a space in which Europeans can connect on shared thematic 
interests, be it transportation or research and innovation. Members can disseminate 
information which could be relevant to other network members and also share ideas of 
potential projects which could be developed with practitioners from within the network 
membership – where each practitioner would contribute a particular skill. Members 
participate in such networks because of their common interest in a particular field; and 
they are motivated to work together and create projects which could receive EU 
funding. The motivation of members is therefore not only European thematic 
collaboration, but also seeking economic development and potentially also seeking 
further European social integration. Indeed, it is believed that European regional 
networks also foster a European identity through their work. Fligstein (2008) 
hypothesised that networks would cultivate a European identity as a bi-product of 
participants’ European engagement with the membership. This chapter will evaluate 
whether networks foster a European identity through their work – but also whether 
they intend to cultivate a European identity within the membership to boost their 
collaboration and interregional cooperation practices. If the membership had a 
European identity, working together would come more naturally and the network would 
render its services of supporting interregional cooperation, bilateral partnerships and 
information dissemination more effectively. These key questions of this chapter directly 
relate to Hypothesis 3 of this thesis and will produce evidence-based answers to the 
role of European identity within European regional networks. As a case study, ERRIN 
(European Regions for Research and Innovation) will be evaluated – whether it fosters 
European engagement and European identity. It will also be assessed whether the 
network helps regions overcome their regional characteristics, which impede their 
European engagement. This was one of the original objectives of European regional 
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networks when they were established by the European Commission’s Directorate for 
Regional Policy.  
 
This chapter will first conceptualise the evolution of European regional networks and 
the types of networks that exist. Their aims and objectives will be explained to gain an 
understanding on whether networks intend to cultivate a European identity or merely 
foster European interregional cooperation with European identity being a potential bi-
product. Then, the case study on ERRIN will be assessed. ERRIN is an example of a 
significant European regional network; it has not only managed to sustain itself after 
EU co-financing came to an end, it has also been able to facilitate regional partnerships 
as well as EU funding for projects which were crafted by network members. As the 
network has developed regional partnerships and interregional cooperation, it will be 
assessed what role European identity plays in the network’s objectives. It will also be 
assessed how the network helps regions overcome their regional characteristics which 
hinder their European engagement, and thus also identity-building. To additionally 
provide perceptions of the network’s objectives and results, findings from semi-
structured interviews with ERRIN members will be presented.  
 
 
Evolution and Objectives of European regional networks – are they set up to 
help boost regions’ European engagement and cultivate a European identity? 
This section will look at the relatively brief history of European regional networks; what 
they aim to achieve and what their announced and actual value-added is to its 
members? This research will provide a better understanding of whether networks can 
realistically aim to bridge the cooperation hurdles posed by incompatible regional 
characteristics (including national government system, geographic location, regional 
official language, and duration of EU membership); whether the promotion of a 
European identity, either intentionally or unintentionally, is part and parcel of the 
networks’ expected value-added benefits; or whether networks are solely seeking to 
promote economic benefits to the region by securing access to an expanding European 
market.  
 
The progression of European integration has been aided by initiatives of European 
interregional cooperation, which address needs identified by supranational, national, 
regional and local organisations as well as practitioners. The EU’s Directorate-General 
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for Regional Policy was established in 1968 to strengthen the European Community by 
addressing the removal of economic disparities across the EU; the necessary 
restructuring of declining industrial areas; and the diversification of rural areas with 
declining agriculture (European Commission Website, 2009: On the history of the 
Regional Policy). The origins of policies directed at the regions dates back to 1975 with 
the European Regional Development Fund. It had a budget of EUROS 1,3 million 
(European Commission Website, 2009: On the history of the Regional Policy). The 
Single European Act in 1986 formalised the initiatives of the European Union to both 
close the gap between regional economic disparities and foster European regional 
cohesion. Whilst the first European interregional programme started in 1989 
(INTERREG I, funded by the European Regional Development Fund), the mention of 
the need to form European regional networks to foster interregional cooperation only 
came in 2000 with the INTERREG III programme, running from 2000 to 2006. It called 
for the exchange of experience and good practice, as well as networking in policy areas 
including research, technology, enterprise, information, tourism, culture, and 
environment (European Commission Website, 2009: On Regional Policy’s INTERREG 3 
programme). The current INTERREG IV programme, running from 2007 to 20013, also 
embraces interregional cooperation as its third strand, and, within it, a section on 
European regional networks for cooperation (European Commission Website, 2009: On 
Regional Policy’s INTERREG 4 programme). Especially when preparing for the 2004 
Enlargement process of twenty new EU Member States from eastern and central 
Europe backed by mostly weaker economies than those of the previous EU-15, 
cohesion and the removal of economic disparities was a key objective the EU was 
expected to tackle. In light of this, and in reaction to the increasing competitiveness of 
the global economy, the European Council adopted the Lisbon Strategy in March 2000 
and renewed it in 2005. Both placed under the spotlight the need for European 
cooperation in the fields of innovation, employment and growth in the EU (European 
Commission Website, 2008: On the Lisbon Strategy). Targeting a sustainable level of 
competitiveness of the European knowledge economy, the European Commission 
designed programmes to facilitate European interregional cooperation in the identified 
core fields. It has progressively developed these programmes in terms of scope and 
budget.  
 
In an effort to further enhance the operational force of the Lisbon Strategy and 
European regional networks, additional programmes have been developed to optimise 
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the resources of INTERREG IV, the Structural Funds and Cohesion Funds with the 
objective of facilitating cooperative ventures amongst Europeans and to strengthen the 
Union’s knowledge-based economies and making them globally more competitive and 
sustainable (Council Decision on FP7 Document in December 2006). European 
Commission funded projects fostering European regional cooperation in the fields of 
research and innovation have recently been joined together from DG Research, DG 
Enterprise, DG Regio, and the Committee of the Regions. It is expected that the 
synergies created would make the scope more comprehensive and the management of 
the Seventh Framework Programme (FP7), now housed in DG Research, more efficient 
and effective. This programme deals mainly with strengthening European interregional 
cooperation in the areas specified by the Lisbon Strategy; it also manifests a growing 
interest of both the EU and the Member state governments for substantial budgetary 
increases. Because of the programme’s relevance to the mandate and mission of the 
European regional networks  - as it covers significant policy areas, strong budget, and 
deals with issues pertinent to regional governments, universities, SMEs and other 
practitioners (Council Decision on FP7 Document in December 2006) -, the FP7’s short 
history will be briefly reviewed. 
 
FP7 runs from 2007 to 2013 with a budget of EUROS 50,521 million (FP7-Cooperation 
Website). It has four core objectives: ‘Cooperation’ (for European trans-national 
cooperation by sharing knowledge, experience and ideas; thus becoming more efficient 
and competitive) (FP7-Cooperation Website); ‘Ideas’ (for science and technology 
engineering projects) (FP7-Ideas Website);  ‘People’ (for human resources in research 
and technology) (FP7-People Website); and ‘Capacities’ (for research and innovation 
capacities of SMEs across European regions in order to strengthen European 
competitiveness in the knowledge economy) (FP7-Capacities Website). The ‘Capacities’ 
objective of FP7 touches on both the Lisbon Strategy and the key objective of 
European integration: economic strengthening through European cooperation (FP7-
Capacities Website). The European Community has boosted these initiatives by 
propelling the Lisbon Strategy to the forefront of European collaborative public sector 
activities and consistently increasing the funding for especially those projects 
supporting European interregional cooperation in the fields of research and innovation 
(European Commission Communication: “Building the era for knowledge of growth”). 
Its two predecessors, the Fifth Framework Programme (FP5), running from 1998 
to2002, funded initiatives for projects in research and innovation, competitiveness, 
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growth and the knowledge economy (European Commission FP5 Website: ‘Key’, 2008) 
with EUROS 14,960 million (European Commission FP5 Website: ‘Budget’, 2008), while 
the Sixth Framework Programme (FP6), running from 2002 to 2006, funded projects in 
research and innovation to strengthen SMEs (European Commission FP6 Website: 
‘Activities’, 2008)  with EUROS 17,883 million (European Commission FP6 Website: 
‘Budget’, 2008). FP7 shows yet an increase both in budget (EUROS 50 521 million) 
(European Commission FP5 Website: ‘Budget’, 2008) and in project scope and 
specification (European Commission FP5 Website: ‘Key’, 2008). Projects dealing with 
research and innovation, economic growth and competitiveness have improved in 
coordination and funding. Also European interregional cooperation has experienced 
increasing importance, and facilitating networks have received growing support. Are 
networks therefore established to foster economic growth, or do they also foster a 
European identity? Based on the programmes’ policy description, the objectives appear 
to be more of an economic nature than of a European identity-building nature. 
However, the ‘Cooperation’ objective under FP7, which fosters transnational 
cooperation by sharing knowledge, experience and ideas could foster European identity 
through the participants’ European-wide engagement.  
 
To test the scope of such networks’ objectives and clarify whether networks indeed 
support regions’ European engagement and whether they additionally cultivate a 
European identity, the European regional network ERRIN (European Regions for 
Research and Innovation) will serve as a case study. There are several aspects of the 
network which make its study particularly relevant and which contribute to a more 
comprehensive understanding of regional European activities and the role of European 
identity within them. Firstly, it has gained the European Commission’s as well as 
European regions’ attention because of its record of facilitating European interregional 
cooperation. Secondly, the overview of the European Community’s interest and 
increase in financial support manifests the belief that the network is indeed supporting 
regions’ access to participate in European politics. The case study network displays a 
bottom-up approach: regional representatives and practitioners perceived a need and 
desire to cooperate on the basis of grassroots level engagement. This desire resulted 
in the establishment of the network and its reaching out to the European Commission 
for financial support through its programmes. It will be illuminating to learn whether 
the bottom-up generated aims and perceived value-added of ERRIN will mirror the top-
down economic prioritisation programmes designed by the EU’s DG REGIO – or 
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whether the cultivation of a European identity also plays a central role in the network’s 
objectives. Furthermore, ERRIN’s membership includes multiple regions with a wide 
range of characteristics. These features and characteristics can pose challenges to 
regions’ European engagement, as has been explained in the previous chapters. Most 
members also operate from within unitary national government systems, and they are 
geographically isolated. They have different regional languages which are not EU 
working languages; they are seeking to strengthen their economies; and they do not 
participate regularly in other European networks, thus have little networking and 
collaboration experience at a European level. Therefore, examining the network more 
closely will help understand how European regional networks facilitate all regions’ 
access to European politics and indeed help regions overcome their constraints posed 
by various regional characteristics. Furthermore, as the membership does not draw on 
a vast cooperation experience, this network will be a useful assessment of whether it 
cultivates a European identity purposefully in order to more naturally and effectively 
foster cooperation opportunities. 
 
 
Case study on ERRIN - European Regions for Research and Innovation 
Network 
This section will examine ERRIN in more detail, including its history, aims, objectives, 
activities, effectiveness and member satisfaction rates. Furthermore, it will assess the 
network’s ability to bridge existing regional capacity gaps, irrespective of their causal 
relationships (national government systems, geographic location or economic 
situation).  
 
ERRIN started off as a pioneering network. It was established by regional governments 
and chambers of commerce representatives in 2001 when regions’ European 
engagement, European interregional cooperation and the establishment of European 
regional networks gathered momentum and when networking at the heights of the 
information and communication revolution became the preferred modus operandi. It 
was mandated to enhance regional awareness of cooperation opportunities and 
thereby help foster and enhance the extent of their European engagement. In 
operational terms, ERRIN set out to provide a platform for regional practitioners from 
small and medium sized enterprises, universities, chambers of commerce, and local 
and regional authorities to network, exchange information and best practice, and, 
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through a cooperative approach, jointly design and execute projects on a European 
level with EU funding.  
 
ERRIN is an example of a successful initiative brought to life with European 
Commission support within the FP6 / Regions of Knowledge Programme. It received 
Commission co-funding from 2004 to 2006 and then successfully transitioned from 
being a partly Commission funded pilot project to a sustainable and independent not-
for-profit organisation with 65 paying members from as many European regions. The 
network has managed a difficult transition period from being primarily dependent on 
public funding from the Commission to relying on membership’s financing. This 
underlines that ERRIN has successfully identified and addressed regions’ needs, as 
otherwise its membership would not contribute to the financing of irrelevant or 
unsatisfactory services – particularly not during an economic recession with stringent 
budget cuts.  
 
ERRIN 2001 to 2006 
European Regions for Research and Innovation Network (ERRIN) was established in 
2001 by a number of regional representatives based in Brussels. They had perceived 
an increasing need for regional involvement in the thematic area of research and 
innovation and were aware of growing opportunities offered by the European 
Commission (ERRIN Prospectus Document from January 2007) – yet they needed help 
in identifying cooperation partners and connecting with them in a way that 
collaboration could evolve. They also wanted to raise awareness of the potential for 
economic gains by linking and cooperating in that area. The network, in short, was to 
provide a platform for the exchange of ideas, information, contacts; it was to be ‘a 
marketplace’ where everybody benefits from the accumulative input (Letter from 
Glynis Whiting, West Midlands in Europe Director and ERRIN 2004-2006 Management 
Board Member and Chair, 2006). 
 
Three years after its establishment, ERRIN received European Commission co-funding 
through FP6 / Regions of Knowledge Pilot Action. By receiving funding, the network 
was able to grow its membership, expand network activities, and further promote and 
optimise its key objective: jointly identifying and implementing projects with a 
European approach.  
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The network’s central administration was tasked to facilitate coordination and 
communication amongst members; their regional representatives in Brussels; regional 
decision makers; regional practitioners; as well as designated EU officials (ERRIN 
Prospectus Document from April 2004). Having the central administration manage 
these tasks would further increase the benefits to participating European regions 
(Letter from Glynis Whiting, West Midlands in Europe Director and ERRIN 2004-2006 
Management Board Member and Chair, 2006).  
 
From April 2004 to March 2006, ERRIN was co-funded by the European Commission. 
During this time, its free membership had grown steadily to 181 members, including 
the following numbers of regions per European country: Austria (9); Belgium (7); 
Cyprus (1); Czech Republic (2); Denmark (11); Estonia (2); Finland (10); France (15); 
Germany (15); Hungary (3); Ireland (3); Italy (18); Latvia (1); Lithuania (1); 
Netherlands (10); Norway (6); Poland (14); Poland (14); Slovenia (1); Spain (18); 
Sweden (9); United Kingdom (25) (ERRIN Document: Membership Contacts as 
updated in March 2006). The breadth of regional members demonstrated that 
irrespective of regions’ different national government systems, geographic locations, 
regional languages and economic situations they identified in a jointly designed and 
operationalised European regional network - an instrument of mutual purpose and 
benefit. Founding members included regional administrations, universities, and non-
profit regional public and private organisations (ERRIN Document: ERRIN Prospectus, 
2006). The members were steered by the Management Board, headed by 8 network 
members: West Midlands (Chair); City of Helsinki; Regione Piemonte; Freie Hansestadt 
Bremen; Unioncamere Lombardia; Scotland Europa; Ministry of the Brussels-Capital 
Region; and Uusimaa Regional Council (Letter from Glynis Whiting, West Midlands in 
Europe Director and ERRIN 2004-2006 Management Board Member and Chair, 2006).  
 
In the case of the Management Board, a pattern of engagement emerged: regions not 
located on a border to another European region and operating within unitary national 
government systems took a leading role in the network’s activities, whilst regions 
located at a border to another European region and conducting their affairs within the 
confines of federal national government systems opted to adopt a more passive role. It 
indicates that the more active regions are those which are by virtue of their geographic 
location or levels of authority obtained from their central government more isolated 
from European engagement and interregional cooperation. They are the network 
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participants which needed to benefit from the network’s services the most and possibly 
this encouraged them to engage the most in steering the network during its 
establishment. Network activities included policy area specific working groups; 
information sessions on calls for proposals for Commission funded projects; seminars 
and workshops; as well as high profile annual general events (ERRIN Document: 
ERRIN Prospectus, 2004). Through these activities, members would be able to connect, 
based on their thematic interests, and discuss and develop potential collaboration 
ideas. European identity could be cultivated through this engagement of European 
members; however it is not clearly stated as an objective of the activities. 
 
In its first few years of operation, three interregional cooperation projects were born 
from the network’s membership: Net Bio CluE involving 8 European countries; an e-
Health Biotechnology project coordination between 2 ERRIN members; and an 
entrepreneurial innovation project between 2 other ERRIN members (ERRIN 
Document: Final Report 2006). ERRIN also received positive feedback from its 
members based on its ability to bridge the gap between regional characteristics which 
threatened to interfere with cooperation and coordinating activities; to design novel 
approaches for dealing with research and innovation initiatives on a regional level; to 
provide a central and efficiently managed location in Brussels to gain fast access to 
information and face time with EU institutions staff (ERRIN Document: Member 
Feedback Forms March – April 2006). Thus, network members were happy to be 
engaging more with their European colleagues and some were working together 
particularly closely within their projects – it can be assumed that European identity 
building became a bi-product of the enhanced collaboration on both fronts. 
 
It is significant that ERRIN members feel the network is able to not let the challenging 
effects of regional characteristics, including the pros and cons of respective national 
government systems, geographic locations, and economic situations impede on 
regions’ opportunities for cooperative action and mutual benefits. The feedback forms 
also indicated that 88% of the members are satisfied with the networks ability to 
facilitate interregional communication – thus the members perceive to be developing 
European mind-sets and discussing their ideas more freely than they had prior to 
joining the network. Improved and natural communication is very important in 
developing relationships and identity, and a perceive 88% improvement on this can be 
expected to boost the level of European identity within the membership. A further 72% 
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of the network membership stated to be satisfied with the network’s ability to 
encourage best practice exchange amongst other members; and 70% were satisfied 
with the network’s ability to connect ERRIN members with officials of the European 
Commission (ERRIN Document: Member Feedback Forms March – April 2006). The 
network, in the eyes of its members, has thus successfully facilitated European 
engagement and interregional cooperation by fostering cohesion amongst its diverse 
membership, and it has brought benefits to its members through the activities, 
services and project funding. Left unaddressed in the documents, however, is whether 
ERRIN also aims to facilitate European identity in addition to its multiple cooperation 
objectives. Less explicitly, these survey results also show that the membership is 
communicating better and growing together as a closer community – which not only 
fosters improved collaboration but also cultivated a European identity amongst the 
European membership as a bi-product. 
 
ERRIN 2006 onwards 
In response to the members’ interest in continuing the network post co-financing from 
the European Commission, a voluntary steering group of 25 members formulated the 
following objectives of the network (ERRIN Document: Draft Prospectus April 2006):  
 Facilitate information and dialogue on research and innovation at the EU level;  
 Promote interregional exchange and support on selected issues of interest;  
 Develop practitioner contacts for future project cooperation;  
 Strengthen policy and thematic knowledge by sharing best practice experience;  
 Co-operate with other European networks. 
 
These objectives show that the membership, during this time of transition, was opting 
for further enhancing the extent of their collaboration. They perceived benefits of their 
collaboration and wanted to continue to grow as a community founded on a shared 
thematic interest and willingness to collaborate. Although identity-building does not 
feature as an explicit objective in the list above, a shared group identity has been 
established from 2001 to 2006 and members pro-actively decided to further develop 
this – at their own expense. During the transition period, members provided ERRIN 
with free of charge office space for its secretariat as well as financing for its re-
organisation and re-launch. This suggests members were confident about the 
Network’s ability to generate value-added for the membership (Letter from Glynis 
Whiting, West Midlands in Europe Director and ERRIN 2004-2006 Management Board 
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Member and Chair, 2006). As with the composition of the Management Board, it is 
significant to note that the most active regions during the transition phase were 
regions from unitary states as well as regions geographically isolated from European 
regional cooperation opportunities – thus the regions which needed the network’s 
services the most in order to boost their European engagement.  
 
The transition period of ERRIN indicates a demand for European interregional 
cooperation from the grassroots level and that the membership from the previous 
lifespan of ERRIN assessed the network as being useful in boosting their European 
engagement. As a regional Brussels office Director explained, there are always budget 
cuts to public organisations such as regional governments, and therefore they must 
very carefully consider which initiatives demonstrate the largest potential for success, 
and they would then be the ones to focus on and grant financing and manpower 
investment to (Interviewee 67). 
 
With the support of its members, ERRIN was successfully re-launched in January 2007 
with around 50 members. It has since grown to encompass 65 members with the 
following number of regions from each European country: Belgium (3); Cyprus (1); 
Denmark (4); Finland (4); France (9); Germany (3); Hungary (1); Italy (13), 
Netherlands (2); Norway (3); Poland (1); Slovenia (1); Spain (9); Sweden (2); and 
the United Kingdom (9) (ERRIN Document: ERRIN Members Contact List, 2006). 
Compared with membership levels covering the period from 2000 to 2006, it is not 
surprising that the network experienced a decrease in membership due to regions’ 
budgetary constraints. An analysis of the type of regions which predominantly 
remained in the network shows that they were primarily those from unitary states 
experiencing geographical isolation from other European regions and encountering 
significant linguistic challenges within the EU. Once more, the regions most isolated 
from European engagement and also European identity-building capacities were the 
ones to join the network.  
 
ERRIN structure 
ERRIN is now composed of the Secretariat, the Management Board, Working Groups, 
and 65 members (Information from ERRIN Statutes Document, 2007). The 
Secretariat’s staff is led by a director and an EU advisor. It is routinely supported by a 
stagiaire ‘on loan’ from an ERRIN member office. The director and the EU advisor are 
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the ‘engines’ of the network, driving and manoeuvring ERRIN initiatives designed by 
the Management Board and voted on by the members. The Secretariat is in charge of 
providing guidance and support to the Management Board on the preparation and 
execution of the Network’s annual work programme; it ensures the organisation’s 
financial management and assists the ERRIN working groups. In addition, The 
Secretariat manages the smooth running of information dissemination, partner 
searches, project ideas and market places. It is also the contact hub for ERRIN 
members. With a network of 65 members, these tasks are a lot to handle, and it is in 
discussion how the Secretariat’s role could more regularly be assisted by a stagiaire. 
The former director explained that a more sustainable solution must be found in order 
to manage the network more effectively by permanent staff (Interviewee 59). 
 
The ERRIN Management Board is composed of fifteen ERRIN members and is elected 
every year for a 3, 2 or 1 year membership to the Management Board. A limit has 
been placed on regions’ representation; maximally 2 regions per Member state can be 
elected to sit on the Management Board to make for a truly European representation 
(Interviewee 67). The present Management Board members are: Eindhoven Region; 
Stuttgart Region; Lombardy Chamber of Commerce; West Midlands; Brussels Capital 
Region; Helsinki Region; Ile-de-France Region; Piedmont Chamber of Commerce; 
Espace Interrégional Européen Bretagne, Pays de la Loire et Poitou Charentes; 
Flanders Region; Basque Region; Valencia Region; South Denmark; Lodz Region; and 
North West UK.  
 
The emergence of a regional pattern of activity is clearly evolving: most management 
Board members are from unitary states and represent geographically isolated regions. 
The Management Board is in charge of preparing the annual work programme and 
budget proposal. It also decides on the strategies for policy, projects, communications, 
and budget. The Board’s strategy is then implemented by the secretariat. The 
Management Board monitors the implementation of the work programme by leading 
thematic working groups and ensures that ERRIN members participate and share 
information and ideas. The thematic working groups reflect the policy area interests of 
the members. They include, amongst others: biotechnology; energy; health; 
innovation & funding; ICT; space; and transport. In addition, the Management Board 
liaises with working groups engaged in related but relevant issues to the membership 
with European institutions. All of the network’s roles and initiatives have been decided 
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and agreed upon by the members by consensus to ensure democratic representation 
and the broadest possible support within the network.  
 
ERRIN aims and activities 
The core aim of ERRIN is to facilitate European interregional cooperation in the field of 
research and innovation (European identity being a bi-product of enhanced European 
engagement and collaboration; but not an explicit objective). The official, intended 
value added is to secure economic benefits through cooperation. This is to be achieved 
through the following strategic objectives: knowledge sharing at EU level; interregional 
exchange; practitioner development; policy and thematic development; and 
networking. Yet, to achieve these objectives, the network must also foster a European 
mind-set and identity amongst the membership to make them feel comfortable to 
share their ideas and want to work together. This is particularly important for the 
regions lacking in European experiences when joining the network, and not knowing 
the fellow network members when joining. As civil servants from the four case study 
regions had expressed on several occasions – trust must be developed before 
cooperation projects can come to fruition. Therefore, the network must create a 
European environment conducive to building trust and a European identity, in order to 
foster cooperation. That this is not mentioned explicitly in the network’s objectives 
comes as no surprise – this would come across as quite forceful considering that it is 
the development of an emotion which is required. Yet, the network’s Director during 
this transition and relaunch phase explained that providing a European space, mind-set 
and even cultivating a European community and identity were key objectives which 
she personally had in mind when meeting with members, and which she and the 
Management Board agreed needed to be promoted by them when meeting with 
members and particularly new joiners (interviewee 59). Therefore, European identity-
building is not only a bi-product of the network’s activities; it is also an objective of the 
network’s culture and general atmosphere.  
 
The network kept these identity-building objectives close to heart when participating in 
the activities run by the network. Firstly, the Secretariat organises information services 
delivered by the network’s website. It also organises events aimed at increasing the 
understanding of research and innovation funding opportunities in Europe. The network 
also manages the seven thematic working groups which facilitate members’ 
information exchange and presentations of regional project ideas. In both the events 
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and working groups, members are encouraged to share best practice experiences and 
disseminate calls for project proposals from the European Commission. Furthermore, 
the working groups’ leaders try to involve European Commission officials in briefing 
sessions with the objective of ensuring that the members properly understand EU 
opportunities – and constraints - and gain access to Commission representatives 
(ERRIN Document: Overview – ERRIN Thematic Working Groups, 2008). A review of 
the Work Programme 2009 (ERRIN Document: Work Programme 2009) revealed that 
the two core initiatives on which the network will focus in subsequent years will be to 
strengthen ERRIN internally through enhancing networking capabilities, services and 
projects and to profile the network externally through policy dialogue, public relations 
and marketing. These are the explicit core initiatives and objectives – the unpublished 
in policy but nonetheless important additional objective is that of European identity-
building amongst the membership, as guided by the Director and Management Board 
(Interviewee 59). All activities planned do promote regional cohesion by strengthening 
relationships, exchanging information, expertise and best practice, and thereby 
improving regions’ economies. While the documents state that the network is open to 
all regions and practitioners involved in or wanting to be involved in European projects, 
the type of region most visibly engaged in the network are the ones operating within 
unitary state government systems and, by virtue of geographic location, are the most 
isolated from other European regions. These regions are in particular need of engaging 
more with other Europeans and developing a European identity to do so. 
 
ERRIN interview Participants 
In order to discern the perceptions of as many ERRIN members as possible, twelve 
semi-structured interviews were conducted with representatives from both regional 
Brussels offices as well as regional chambers of commerce Brussels offices during the 
network’s Annual General Assembly events at the seat of the European Commission. 
Interviewees selected represented a cross section of EU Member states, regional size, 
regional Brussels office size and staff, and years of Brussels experience of the regional 
representatives. As was the case in previous chapters, the respective regions’ national 
government system, regional geographic location, regional language, regional 
economy, and European regional network participation beyond ERRIN was taken into 
consideration. In order to encourage discussants to share their views and perceptions 
openly, their identity will not be disclosed. A table providing information on their profile 
characteristics is listed in Table 2.5 in Chapter 2. In addition to the interviews with 
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members, former ERRIN director was interviewed to provide both a historical and 
holistic account of the network since its conception. The findings of the interviews will 
provide much needed insider information and insights on how ERRIN brings together 
such a diverse group of European regions and facilitate their cooperation. In other 
words, how does the network cultivate a European identity and foster cooperation? In 
particular, the members’ perceptions on how the network manages to bridge the gaps 
between the various regional political structures and the differing geographic and 
economic capacities will be presented and reviewed. Furthermore, members’ 
perceptions about the added-value of the network with regard to securing economic 
benefits and facilitating a European identity will be related and assessed. 
 
 
Value added by ERRIN - Findings from membership interviews  
ERRIN’s mission is to add value to its members by disseminating information on EU 
policies and programmes, facilitating funding opportunities for projects, and providing 
a platform for partner searches and project market places. By providing these 
resources and activities, ERRIN contends to contribute to the interregional cooperation 
of its European members. ERRIN’s satisfaction rate in 2008 was very high; 4.5 out of 5 
(ERRIN Document: ERRIN Satisfaction Survey 2008). That said, any bottom-up, 
grassroots-type organisation will by definition be very responsive to what its 
membership, its shareholders, wants. Therefore, it needs to be explained what kind of 
value-added the members expect from the network, and how it manages and 
manoeuvres to cater to the different demands and needs of the regions. Particularly in 
light of the membership’s diversity, regions require support on a host of different 
issues and at differing scales. It also needs to be clarified why in fact regions choose to 
make a European network its instrument of choice to pursue their European objectives. 
Are they in fact primarily seeking the regional economic benefits the European 
Commission and literature are postulating? Do they want to be more immersed in 
European wide activities and projects because they identify with Europe at large? Are 
they seeking to strengthen their European identity through increased cooperation? 
Interviews conducted with twelve network members and its former director will provide 
their perceptions about these – and other - questions; the interviews will also allow a 
more thorough understanding of the perspectives of the receiving end of ERRIN’s 
activities, and they will clarify how the network intervenes to promote members’ 
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interests in the priority areas of support needed, and whether the network succeeds in 
adding the expected value to the regions.  
 
As explained in the previous section, ERRIN’s membership is very diverse and ranges 
from old to new member states, regions with strong and weaker economies, regions on 
borders to other European regions and those which are isolated, regions which have a 
different official language from the EU’s working language, and regions which are more 
and less involved in European networks. The core activities of the Network have been 
determined by the entire membership, and while they reflect the regions’ 
characteristics, varying expectations may continue to persist, and particular 
considerations for assistance for specific regions may trump assistance sought 
elsewhere.  
 
A resounding, top priority value-added sought from the membership is the network’s 
mission to disseminate information and assist in partner searches. All interviewees 
identified these as key value-added deliverables to their region’s European activities. 
Particularly the representatives from smaller regional offices with less manpower and / 
or infrastructure capacity at their disposal underlined the network’s information 
dissemination services (Interviewees 61, 64, 65, 66 and 68) as a significant value-
added. One interviewee stated that it would be impossible to keep up to date with all 
the relevant news and updates for a sole representative in Brussels (Interviewee 61). 
This perceived value added fosters, as a bi-product, European identity.    
Other regional representatives named assistance in overcoming language challenges as 
a second value-added deliverable (Interviewees 69, 70 and 71). Without this service 
they would be unable to properly and in a timely manner disseminate pertinent EU 
information on policies and programmes to their respective regions. One member 
made very clear that more often than not civil servants in the regions do not have a 
good command of the EU working languages, English and French, making the 
translation of documents for them a necessity to ensure active and substantive 
dialogue and engagement with the European Commission (Interviewee 60). 
Furthermore, the EU routinely publishes information resorting to the use of ‘EU jargon’ 
when addressing technical issues. ‘Insider speak’ is difficult for those to understand 
who are not involved in EU exchanges on a daily basis (Interviewee 66). Therefore, 
technical documents must be translated using more commonly understood, non-
technical vocabulary. The regional representatives also stated that language can be a 
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challenge in either communicating new developments in the pipeline and changes 
made in EU policies and programmes, or in making these policies and programmes 
more readily accessible to their respective regions (Interviewees 61, 62, 66 and 68). 
Another interviewee added that the regions with more office staff assist regions with 
less capacity; in addition to being very appreciative of this assistance gestures of this 
nature do their part in facilitating a sense of unity and common interest (Interviewee 
61). This demonstration of sharing and supporting those in need was also evident in 
the larger context of information dissemination, one of the memberships’ key expected 
value-added. Several interviewees made it a point that members with larger and better 
staffed Brussels offices routinely volunteer to offer additional input (be it mere 
information sharing or the financing of events) to the benefit of all (Interviewees 60, 
62, 67 and 69). This attitude and approach documents a supportive and cooperative 
spirit within the network, and it suggests that the regions enjoy the European 
experience and perspective of having a hand in bringing about a more equitable EU.  
 
A third expected value-added by the members is the network’s ability to provide a 
platform for regional representatives to network and work together. Interviewees with 
more extensive networking experiences on a European scale explained they had 
developed mechanisms to do so efficiently (Interviewees 63, 67, 69 and 71); whereas 
other interviewees, who were either new to Brussels themselves or whose region was 
comparatively new to the idea of European cooperation, stated they had difficulty 
networking and received substantial support from ERRIN in taking the plunge 
(Interviewees 64, 65 and 68). This value-added links very closely with the Director’s 
and the Management Board’s objective of cultivating a European community identity 
within the network. By doing so, the members can more easily meet and discuss 
opportunities together. One interviewee in particular mentioned that the Network very 
successfully connects members with each other and integrates new members into the 
network to ensure all can benefit equally from their membership. The interviewee felt 
that without the guidance and assistance of the network he, depending on his own 
efforts, would not have been able to engage as quickly and as effectively in such short 
time (Interviewee 65). Two interviewees mentioned that their European cooperation 
links date back a very long time and have occurred nearly naturally because they 
share a border (Interviewees 63 and 69). And another interviewee made the point that 
without international business links and especially European cooperation the region’s 
economy would not be stable and as strong as it is now. In terms of networking 
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experience, the findings suggest that regions geographically located on European 
borders have a strong history of cooperation and network with ease; regions which 
economically need to cooperate with other European regions also have a long standing 
history of cooperation and network competently and comfortably.  
 
The fourth expected value-added by member regions is for the network to boost the 
regions’ standing vis-à-vis the European Commission. Senior representatives and staff 
of the European Commission regularly attend ERRIN events in order to present specific 
calls for proposals or explain new initiatives and programmes. The European 
Commission staff gains from these efforts because it is the most time efficient way to 
engage 65 European regional representatives (Interviewee 59). The benefits for the 
members vary however. Most members perceive direct bilateral and multilateral 
contacts, additional information and explanations to be important value-added the 
network provides which they, on their own, would not be able to attain (Interviewees 
60, 61, 64, 65, 66, 69 and 70). Some members also expressed their appreciation of 
being able to establish direct lines of contact with high ranking European Commission 
staff; access which their region in view of their size and influence but also lack of 
integration into the European sphere would find difficult to bring about (Interviewees 
61, 64, 66, 68 and 69). Being a member of a European network with a track record 
gives them access to the European Commission and its senior representatives and 
support staff; it also ensures them access to exclusive information - a very important 
expected value-added by the membership. 
 
The key perceived value-added from the network are information collection and 
dissemination and assistance in partner searches; networking opportunities with 
regional representatives and practitioners; as well as access to European Commission 
representatives and staff. These are the primary activities aimed at facilitating 
European interregional cooperation. These activities also, however, foster a European 
identity. Identity is cultivated through the enhanced engagement of the membership 
with their European colleagues, and it is fostered in the network’s mind-set and 
atmosphere by the Director and Management Board.  
 
The findings suggest that regions with limited financial backing and office capacities at 
their disposal in, for example the conduct of information research or event hosting, 
benefit greatly from the network’s information collection and dissemination activity and 
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event organisation. The findings also suggest that regions located on or near a border 
of another EU member region have had better access to networking and cooperation 
opportunities than geographically more isolated regions. They indicate, furthermore, 
that regions with strong financial support have generally large Brussels representation 
offices and are very active in the network. The finding also showed that regions with 
weak economies and very limited financial resources are also very active in the 
network and in the pursuit of cooperation opportunities. And, finally, the findings 
suggest that some regions from unitary government systems feel they have not yet 
been fully integrated in the European sphere because of both their limited 
understanding of how ‘the system works’ and a lack of experience in how European 
interregional cooperation could work for them. All of these regions feel they are, 
ultimately, beneficiaries of the activities offered by the network. The perception is that 
the network is quite successful in bridging the gap between regional characteristics and 
disparities which, according to the regions, pose a challenge to their European 
engagement and interregional cooperation efforts.   
 
 
Importance of European interregional cooperation – and how European 
identity features in it 
All members seek information on opportunities of cooperation, network opportunities 
to meet practitioners active in similar fields with whom they can brainstorm and 
exchange ideas and best practice for future project ideas, and, ultimately, identify and 
engage with prospective project partners. Projects in terms of scope and support vary 
according to the policy areas of interest to the regions. For some regions, the policy 
areas of high relevance are fisheries (Interviewee 66), some are particularly keen on 
engineering in the automotive industry (Interviewee 67), and others seek opportunities 
in the textile industries (Interviewee 69). Regional practitioners use the network to 
gain access to their colleagues operating in either the same field or complementary 
ones, and they try to establish cooperative links to further develop their knowledge, 
ideas, products, and build opportunities for future endeavours (Interviewee 59). This 
expected value-added is very much based on the expectation of securing economic 
benefits to the region, at least in the long run.  
 
There is however a second benefit sought which is not related to economic growth: the 
fostering of a European identity. A common understanding amongst the membership of 
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the conception of European identity revolved around the notion that regional 
representatives perceived their professional colleagues to be just like them – they were 
“European” and eager to establish working relationships across the board. One 
interviewee noted there is no bias in the selection of regional practitioners and no ‘pre-
selection’ in their preference of working with somebody from a specific country or 
region. As long as the skills and experience relevant for the successful acquisition of 
projects and project funding are evident and potential partners are prepared to 
proceed on the basis of a unified European approach to cooperation (Interviewee 63), 
they are open-minded and ready to engage.  
 
Some interviewees had been part of the network for some time already; considerably 
longer than those representing regions from the newer EU Member States. Clearly, as 
is the case in any organisation, the established members have shaped and influenced 
over time the Network’s dynamics; yet it was open to welcome its new members and 
help them become an integral part of a closely knit group; they have become “almost 
like a family” (Interviewee 62). They assist each other in full recognition that by 
sharing information and ideas better project proposals will emerge and chances for 
project funding increase (Interviewee 61). Thus, the collaboration of network members 
cultivates, in a time, a European identity. 
 
All members clearly strive to work together, with the end goal being successful in 
creating common projects delivering economic benefits to their respective regions. And 
while all members expressed their open-mindedness in approaching programmes and 
projects, the source of their European approach cannot be fully grasped. Surely, the 
network facilitates the continuation of the European approach and helps different 
members work together more closely. Whether the determination to collaborate on the 
basis of a European approach also signifies that their sense of being European, and 
thus their European identity, had already been cultivated before they became 
members of the network or is the result of network membership could not be 
definitively established in the interviews. It is reasonable to make the argument 
however that multiple ‘inputs’ over time form perceptions, as was so vividly expressed 
by the interviews conducted with the political elites and civil servants in the four case 
study regions (Chapters 5 and 6). The general interpretation and perception of the 
interviewees was that European identity is greatly shaped by an increased number of 
interactions with European counterparts and by engaging in European events, be they 
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high-level ‘top-down’ events with political leaders or low-level ‘bottom-up’ information 
sessions in schools or artist exchanges. Whilst it can be assumed that members in the 
course of their engagement in network activities with other European members 
develop a heightened perception and awareness – and notion of adopting - a European 
identity, this correlation cannot be established based on the evidence at hand.  
 
 
Do European regional networks cultivate a European identity and succeed in 
boosting regions’ European engagement?  
The example of ERRIN has shown, that European regional networks can cultivate a 
European identity by fostering a European-minded atmosphere and helping regional 
representatives with little to no European collaboration background connect, openly 
communicate, share ideas and work together. The collaboration in turn fosters a 
European identity. Furthermore, the network helps regions participate in European 
collaboration because it helps them overcome the hurdles of their European 
engagement hindering regional characteristics. The network thus encourages European 
identity to foster enhanced European engagement, which further produces the bi-
product of a stronger European identity – and potentially more European engagement. 
 
In light of the growing support by both the European Commission and the EU member 
states for European interregional cooperation, European regional networks have been 
created to provide guidance and assistance. Alongside the European objective of 
increasing European competitiveness by initiating European regional economic growth 
through, amongst others, research and innovation, European Commission programmes 
were launched to support the emergence of European regional networks and projects 
in the field of European interregional cooperation in R&D. Based on expressed demand, 
ERRIN was founded to facilitate, on a not-for-profit basis, European interregional 
cooperation in the field of research and innovation in a variety of policy areas relevant 
to its regional members. Its 65 members have managed to successfully transition 
ERRIN from an organisation dependent on the European Commission’s co-funding to 
one of financial independence. And in terms of its ability to serve its members well 
across the board, a 2008 member survey gave ERRIN high marks (4.5 out of 5) for the 
services and opportunities provided. Members clearly feel that their financial and 
manpower investment in the network is being rewarded with benefits of particularly in 
the area of information flow, enhanced regional profile, broadening and deepening of 
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European-wide contacts both in the European Commission and with practitioners in 
European regions – and beyond. 
 
The evolution of European interregional cooperation and the demand for European 
regional networks have not been one without substantial challenges. Regional 
characteristics will persist irrespective of ongoing integration and cooperation efforts, 
and they continue to influence the ability and ease of regions to participate in 
European-wide cooperation. ERRIN is very ably manoeuvring its membership around 
these challenges. It has its sight set on meeting the objectives set and overcoming 
cooperation hurdles and instilling, in the process, a sense of common purpose around a 
growing range of cooperation activities.  
 
Interview findings and documents analyses have substantiated this tentative 
conclusion. Of particular importance – and concern - is the challenge to manage five 
regional characteristics which greatly contribute to variations in the respective regions’ 
ability to participate and cooperate. They encompass: national government system, 
geographic location, language, economy and regional budget for European affairs, and 
the regions’ network experience. These cooperation challenging characteristics have 
been identified by both the regional representatives in Brussels and the regional 
political elites and civil servants. Scholars in political science have postulated that 
networks would be able to level the playing field, mined by regional characteristics, 
and offer all regions an equal chance at engaging in European politics, particularly 
regional cooperation projects. Indeed, the evaluation of ERRIN has shown that 
networks can level the playing field and facilitate European interregional cooperation in 
a range of EU regions – regardless of their challenging characteristics. The network 
provides a platform for regions which usually are politically, linguistically or 
geographically isolated from European politics and cooperation, or lack the financial 
resources to participate effectively in the European sphere. Also, it cultivates a sense 
of solidarity and unity amongst the regions which, to one degree or another, partake in 
European activities and initiatives. All member regions appear to believe they are 
benefiting from the services provided by the network and the inputs offered by the 
membership. Regions are in the process of coming closer together and the network is 
facilitating the linkages through fostering cooperation. In sum, ERRIN is on track to 
achieve its mandate and mission of facilitating European interregional cooperation in 
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both regions’ which share common characteristics and features and regions where 
political, geographic, linguistic and financial challenges persist.  
 
The network’s value-added, however, extends beyond its official objectives of fostering 
interregional cooperation. The membership interviewed in the course of this case study 
have indicated that there is a sense of unity amongst the members, that they are not 
merely representatives of their region and / or country, that they feel alike, as 
Europeans. Working together in the network is in fact propagating a notion of 
European identity. Due to the nature and scope of this research, it is not possible to 
establish whether the notion of a European identity was in fact established through the 
collaboration within the network; whether it had already existed in some form 
previously; and whether existing traces encouraged regions and their regional 
representatives to seek opportunities of working together more closely in an 
institutionalised, ERRIN-type setting. It is still significant, however, that the 
interviewed regional representatives all expressed feeling a sense of ‘Europneanness’. 
It is also important to note that they select potential cooperation partners by expertise 
and not national identity or cultural or linguistic preferences; this underlines their 
perception of ‘everyone being equal’, of being European. They are willing, if not eager, 
to reach out, collaborate and engage in a European experience devoid of physical and 
mental borders. Moreover, the network Director explained that cultivating a sense of 
European community identity within the network, particularly for the new network 
members, would most likely boost their network participation and collaboration – in 
turn producing the bi-product of European identity. Thus, it is the objective of the 
network’s Director and Management Board to cultivate a European identity throughout 
the network. 
 
This case study has provided evidence that European regional networks can help 
overcome collaborative impediments prompted by regional characteristics, support 
European regional cohesion and pave a path toward a more integrated Europe with 
enhanced European engagement in the field of European interregional cooperation. The 
case study has also shown that there is a high level of European identity and 
awareness at ERRIN and that this is fostered by the network’s Director and 
Management Board with the intention of boosting collaboration amongst the 
membership. Whether the members’ European identity predates them joining the 
network or was fostered within the network could not be determined in this study. 
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What can be said with confidence is that the network provides a ‘cultivating 
environment’ for the germination of a sense of unity, solidarity, collaboration and focus 
on expertise. Though the network does not, in its official set objectives, make the 
cultivation of a European identity its main mandate, it does facilitate this value-added 
and thus has a political as well as social impact on the process of European integration, 
regions’ European engagement and European identity formation. 
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Chapter 8 
The scope and objectives of regions’ European engagement – lessons learned 
and more questions revealed 
 
The most significant finding of this thesis shows that EU regions can and do, indeed, 
cultivate a European identity through their European policies. The four case study 
regions have provided evidence to show that both the administrative political elites of 
regions and their civil servants intentionally foster a European identity within the policy 
design and through policy implementation - if they are Europhile.  
 
In two of the four case study regions (Brandenburg and Nord – Pas de Calais), 
members of the political elite have shaped their European policy objectives to include a 
European identity-building nature; and in both cases these political elites themselves 
were at the time Europhile and interested in furthering European social integration 
through their work. In one of the two cases (Nord – Pas de Calais), the personal 
preferences of the political elites changed from Europhile to less pro-European. 
Alongside the change in political elites emerged a change in the region’s policy 
objectives from fostering European social integration and identity-building to merely 
capturing economic development opportunities and benefits for the region. Regions 
which do not have the political authority to influence their region’s European policy 
cannot cultivate a European identity through their work. In a further case study region 
(the South West of England), the region distinctly lacks the political authority to design 
its own European policy or influence the objectives thereof. As the region has more 
political authority, its civil servants participated in European regional networks and 
sought interregional cooperation opportunities for the region. Thereby, they were able 
to foster a European identity through these activities because they had a significant 
interest in cultivating European identity through their work. However, the extent of 
political authority changed as the interests of central government’s political elites 
changed, and the region now no longer is able to participate in domains of European 
policy which offer the opportunity to build a European identity. This case showed that, 
on the one hand, civil servants who engage in European politics more than their 
political elites feel more European and want to develop a European identity through 
their work. However, this case also shows that the regional characteristic of 
government system and thus the region’s extent of political authority has an impact in 
shaping the scope and objectives of the region’s European policy. Further regional 
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characteristics have been discussed throughout this thesis and validated as affecting 
regions’ extent of European engagement and identity-building. These regional 
characteristics include the government system; political elites’ interests; geographic 
location; European regional network participation; EU membership duration; and a 
region’s language and heritage. In particular, it has been found that European regional 
networks can help regions overcome their European engagement hindering 
characteristics and boost not only their participation but also cultivate a European 
identity.  
 
This chapter will look more closely at the research findings produced in the course of 
this thesis; it will reflect on contributions made to the existing body of political science 
research, as discussed in Chapter 1; and it will also identify some questions which 
remain unanswered by the scope of this study and pave the path for further research 
to be undertaken within this field.  
 
 
The role of regional political elites in determining whether European identity 
features in the European policy (Hypothesis 1) 
The key distinction for whether regions’ European policies foster a European identity or 
not lies with the interests of their national and regional political elites. When political 
elites are Europhile and want the European policy they design to include a European 
identity-building nature, this preference tends to shape the policy objectives. However, 
when political elites are not particularly Europhile, or indeed are Eurosceptic, their 
region’s policy tends to focus on developing the region’s economy through their 
European engagement, instead of also addressing European identity-building. These 
findings corroborate Hypothesis 1, which suggested: “If an administrative political elite 
has personal interests in European identity, this will result in that regional political 
leader’s region’s European policy featuring identity-building objectives, as opposed to 
the policy only being economy related.” 
 
This hypothesis was particularly verified by the two case studies Brandenburg and 
Nord – Pas de Calais. In both regions, the administrative political elites had 
implemented European programmes which have social integration as their key 
objective – and a European identity was cultivated within these projects intentionally. 
These programmes stood out when the European policies of all four regional case 
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studies were compared – and when the members of the political elite and the civil 
servants discussed their European policies’ objectives. In both regions, these European 
social integration and identity-building projects were developed whilst the regions had 
very Europhile political leaders. However, in the case of Nord – Pas de Calais, when the 
political leaders were replaced by less Europhile ones, the European social integration 
and identity-building policies were cut and their funding was shifted toward the 
economic development objective of the region’s European policy. In Brandenburg, the 
administrative political elite remains Europhile and the European policy continues to 
cultivate European identity with a key priority. Furthermore, in the case of the South 
West of England, the national political elites have also shaped the objectives of regions’ 
European engagement. With a Labour government, regionalisation had been supported 
and regions were not only developed to engage in and manage a range of European 
programmes; they were also provided with the political authority to participate in 
European opportunities, which would enhance European collaboration and identity-
building. However, with the Conservative, more Eurosceptic national leadership, 
regionalisation has been retracted and regions’ scope to engage in European-wide 
collaboration and identity-building has been demolished. Here, it was shown that 
national political elites’ interests are translated into policy objectives and affect 
whether European identity features in regions’ European policies or not. 
 
 
The role of civil servants in including European identity-building objectives 
within regions’ European policies (Hypothesis 2) 
The four case studies have shown that civil servants, on balance, are more likely to 
feel European and want to cultivate a European identity through their work as 
compared to their political leaders. Though this contradicts the expectation derived 
from Spence (1998), that political elites are more likely to feel European and be more 
in favour of further European integration, it confirms the theory of Fligstein (2008) that 
those who engage more in European activities will also be more in favour of European 
identity. In turn, the latter theory and this thesis’ research findings corroborate the 
second hypothesis of this thesis: “Regional civil servants implementing regions’ 
European policies have developed a stronger personal interest in European identity-
building and focus more on this in their work than political elites do.” The Brandenburg 
case study has shown that, when the administrative political elite was Europhile, civil 
servants were also keen to promote European identity-building through their work. 
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However, in the case of the South West of England and Nord – Pas de Calais, civil 
servants were enthusiastic about European social integration and identity-building, 
whereas their respective political leaders were not. In none of the case study regions 
did it occur that civil servants were not interested in promoting European identity when 
political elites were. Thus, on balance, civil servants feel more interested in cultivating 
European identity through their work than their corresponding political leaders. This 
was particularly the case with civil servants who regularly work with other Europeans 
or had previously done so. The extent of their European experience can be assumed to 
have developed their European mind-set and approach to their work. As was explained 
by both civil servants and European regional network members, when Europeans work 
together, they appreciate their similarities and common interests, and naturally 
develop a European identity.  
 
 
The role of European regional networks in cultivating a European identity 
(Hypothesis 3) 
European regional networks have been established to help all regions engage in 
European opportunities – particularly the regions which have regional characteristics 
hindering their European engagement. In the case of ERRIN (European Regions for 
Research and Innovation), this thesis has found that in order to boost regions’ 
European engagement, the network in fact aims to cultivate a European identity within 
its membership. This allows the regional practitioners to work together more naturally 
and in turn more effectively develop European cooperation projects – and fulfil the 
objective of the network. In addition to pro-actively cultivating a European identity, the 
network’s outcome of enhanced European engagement further strengthens the 
European identity amongst the membership – as a bi-product. Thus, European 
networks build a European identity in two ways; which supports the third hypothesis of 
this thesis: “European regional networks are likely to intentionally build a European 
identity so regions participating in the networks cultivate a European identity and in 
turn cooperate with greater ease amongst the European membership.” Part of the 
corroborated hypothesis could be expected, as based on the theory advanced by 
Fligstein (2008), that European networks foster enhanced engagement and, as a 
result, European identity. However, it is a surprising result that the network ERRIN 
intentionally tries to cultivate a European identity amongst its membership in order to 
boost their participation in the network and European cooperation. 
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European identity: cultivated intentionally or as a bi-product? 
As was discussed previously, Fligstein (2008) had hypothesised that enhanced 
European engagement fosters a European identity. The evidence gathered in the four 
case study regions as well as in the ERRIN case study on European regional networks 
supports Fligstein’s theory. Those who engage regularly with their European colleagues 
discussed their work from a European perspective and were keen to strengthen 
European-wide social integration and identity-building through their work. Those who 
did not have any European experience did not perceive the benefits of adopting a 
European approach and also were not interested in European identity featuring in their 
work. The administrative political elite had had significant European experience, having 
been the Director of the region’s Brussels representation office prior to leading the 
regional government’s European directorate. His European experience most likely 
influenced his strong European identity and interest in spreading European identity 
throughout the region. He also explained that he wishes his constituents to experience 
Europe so that they, too, may understand the benefits of a European approach and 
develop a European identity. In contrast to this, civil servants in the South West of 
England, who had had no European experience and whose work remained strictly 
within the region’s border, did not feel European and also perceived no relevance in 
promoting European identity through their work. Yet, in the same region, the two civil 
servants who had had European experience prior to their work for the RDA’s European 
policy team felt very strongly about their European identity and were disappointed that 
they were no longer allowed to pro-actively seek European cooperation or identity-
building opportunities for their region. The extent of European experience and 
engagement, as Fligstein (2008) had predicted, indeed has an impact on European 
identity-building. Yet, it is important to differentiate between European engagement 
which cultivates European identity as a bi-product and European identity which is 
fostered intentionally in policy design and implementation. In the case of 
Brandenburg’s administrative political elite, identity-building is a core intentional 
priority and objective. However, the civil servants in the South West of England, Nord 
– Pas de Calais and Wallonia explained that European identity emerges amongst those 
who engage in European cooperation projects or interact with their European 
neighbours regularly. They explained that a European mind-set is developed through 
European engagement and that this in turn cultivates a European identity naturally. 
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Thus, the distinction between European identity-building by intention or as bi-product 
must be made.   
 
 
Regional characteristics affecting their European policies’ scope and 
objectives 
In addition to the influence of regional administrative political elites, civil servants and 
European regional networks, regional characteristics have also been explained to affect 
region’s European engagement and identity-building. Whether regions participate in 
programmes providing opportunities to engage with other Europeans or whether 
regional leaders can design European policies to include identity-building features are 
significantly determined by the region’s national government system and the extent of 
political authority it has. Indeed, this impact has been studied at great length in 
political science; particularly within the work edited by Keating & Jones (1995) and 
Hooghe; Marks & Schakel (2010). Their findings have been fortified by all of the four 
case study regions’ representatives. However, the regional political elites, civil servants 
and representatives in Brussels also named additional regional characteristics, which 
have an impact on the scope and objectives of their European engagement – and these 
characteristics validated the theories which have been proposed by political scientists 
and discussed in Chapters 1 and 3 of this thesis. The list of regional characteristics 
which have been found to challenge regions’ European engagement and, ultimately, 
European identity-building include: government system; political elites’ interests; 
geographic location of a region; whether regions’ participate in a European regional 
network; the language / heritage of a region; as well as how long regions have been 
part of the EU and engaged in European opportunities.  
 
The regional political elites provided primarily three explanations for the variation in 
regions’ European policies and programmes. They included the regions’ respective 
government systems, top-level political decision-makers’ interests, and the geographic 
location of a region vis-à-vis its proximity to a European neighbour. The civil servants 
and regional representatives in Brussels however drew on a broader set of 
explanations of the variation in their European engagement. Furthermore, the 
perception of whether European identity plays or ought to play a role in the respective 
regions’ European policies and programmes differed quite significantly both from 
region to region and according to players’ level of power and responsibility (for 
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instance, civil servants felt that European identity should play a more central role 
within European politics than some of the political elites). The semi-structured 
interviews with the political elites and civil servants from the four case study regions 
and the semi-structured interviews with the regional representatives in Brussels shed 
considerable light on the correlation between regional characteristics identified in this 
thesis and the variation of regions’ respective scope and objectives vis-à-vis their 
respective European policies and programmes.  
 
The regional political elites highlighted the impact of national government systems on 
a region’s level of political authority, and thus the opportunities and constraints they 
felt in developing the scope and objectives of their region’s European engagement. 
Thus, even if the political elites in Nord – Pas de Calais and the South West of England 
would have liked to engage more actively in cultivating a European identity and the 
political elites in the South West of England would be keen to participate in and pursue 
more interregional cooperation opportunities, they felt constrained by the lack of 
political authority to execute those decisions and widen the scope of their regions’ 
European engagement in the process.  
 
Civil servants of the French and British case study regions were indeed very keen to 
engage in a wider scope of interregional cooperation opportunities than they were 
authorised to pursue by their political leaders and as determined by constitutional 
constraints. They would have liked to embrace and cultivate through their work a 
European identity. They felt that citizens who identify more with Europe will also seek 
more European focused opportunities – and in turn bring significant economic benefits 
to the regions. However, the civil servants were not only as disappointed as their 
political elites about the political restraints put in place by constitutional constraints. 
They were also disheartened because of their inability to operate on the basis of a 
concept designed to promote a European identity within the region. The sole exception 
to these European identity impeding constraints were found in the Brandenburg region 
where the political elite enjoyed a relatively wide scope of political authority and 
political support from top regional decision-makers. These observations and 
explanations of the political elites and civil servants verify the impact of government 
system on scope and objectives of regions’ European policy.  
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Regional political elites and civil servants also identified the interests of core decision-
makers (whether they are Europhiles or Eurosceptics) as a key factor affecting scope 
and objectives of their European engagement. Top political decision-makers in three of 
the four case study regions were in principle very keen to secure interregional 
cooperation opportunities for their respective region and procuring future EU funded 
programmes; the British top political decision-makers being the sole exception. Even in 
the French region, which benefits from a relatively wide scope of European policies and 
programmes, the change of political leadership and, in its wake, political priorities and 
interests at the top regional level negatively affected the scope of engagement within 
the past couple of years. In both the French and the British case study regions, the top 
political decision-makers not being interested in furthering European integration 
caused the regions to forego economic, social and political opportunities and 
disappointed those working on the regions’ European engagement at both the political 
elite and the civil servant level. The civil servants in particular observed that agenda 
changes by the top political decision-makers significantly impact all aspects of 
European interregional cooperation. It matters whether politicians at the highest levels 
of government are Europhile or Eurosceptic. With Europhile political interests 
supporting the work of the European departments, regions are more likely to have a 
broader scope of European policies and programmes. It provides them with the space 
needed to also include initiatives into their work programs designed to cultivate a 
European identity. Civil servants very pointedly observed that such initiatives greatly 
facilitate their efforts to promote interest in and demand for European opportunities, 
and they further support their economic objectives within the European portfolio. The 
findings of both political elites and civil servants from the four case study regions 
thereby verify that political elites’ interests shape the scope and objectives of region’s 
European engagement. 
 
The third regional characteristic identified by the political elites and civil servants as 
playing a key role in shaping the dimensions (scope and objectives) of their respective 
regions’ European engagement was the proximity of a region to a European border and 
neighbour. On a very practical level, some regions are in need of finding and 
establishing cooperative links with their neighbours from other countries and regions to 
successfully pursue their development aspirations. Proximity is critical in this context. 
Whilst civil servants from Nord – Pas de Calais, Wallonia and Brandenburg attribute 
collaboration opportunities and experience with their immediate neighbours in great 
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measures to physical proximity, civil servants in the South West of England point out 
that it is more difficult to establish close cooperation with other EU regions because of 
their region’s geographically isolated location. This sense of lack of natural 
‘connectedness’ expressed by civil servants was shared by the political elites who also 
felt that it adds an additional challenge to the already existing constraints set by the 
prevailing government system and political interests. Regional representatives in 
Brussels, who participate in the ERRIN network, also shared their perception of 
geographic distance causing challenges in their European engagement. The feeling was 
that particularly the regions most isolated from their European neighbours had to 
overcome difficult and costly  logistical challenges to connect with potential European 
interregional cooperation partners, making it very complicated to fully and successfully 
chase  European opportunities and better integrate economically, politically and 
socially.  
 
The finding that regions sharing borders with other European regions more naturally 
develop a European identity than regions which are geographically isolated from 
European neighbours underlines the significance of geographic location and daily 
interactions across the entire social, economic and political spectrum matter. 
Geographic location in particular is not only a significant factor in shaping a European 
identity, it also plays an important role in the development of cooperation 
opportunities as it can promote and/or inhibit developments prospects. Based on the 
accounts of the political elites, civil servants and regional representatives in Brussels, 
their region’s geographic location has an impact on both the scope and objectives of 
their European engagement and the cultivation of a European identity.  
 
Language and heritage were also noted by regional civil servants and representatives 
in Brussels as significant regional characteristics affecting the extent of regions’ 
European engagement. Language, on the one hand, was described by the French 
speaking regions to facilitate cooperation amongst other regions and countries among 
and within francophone areas. With language being an important component of 
identity, there is a natural way for francophone countries to feel more European due to 
the shared language and cultural heritage. And, in turn, countries which do not share a 
common language with other European countries may not feel this natural European 
identity connectedness. They also have been found to have more difficulties in 
successfully collaborating in a European context and environment. Civil servants from 
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Brandenburg described their linguistic challenges when engaged with Polish-speaking 
representatives eager to cooperate, but finding it difficult to communicate. And 
regional representatives in Brussels shared the difficulties they experienced when 
trying to timely disseminate vital information on European opportunities throughout 
their region because of the time needed to translate each piece of information.  
 
In addition to language, heritage was also depicted by a number of civil servants from 
the four case study regions as an influential factor. On the one hand, shared 
francophone heritage facilitated cooperation, as did a common mining heritage for 
Wallonia and its bilateral partners; on the other hand, memories of the recent war with 
forced migration and redrawing of country boundaries in Germany and Poland 
generated negative responses of a shared heritage. These greatly challenged 
interregional affairs between Brandenburg and some of its developing partnerships 
with Central and Eastern European countries and regions. Thus, regional civil servants 
and representatives in Brussels have confirmed the impact of both language and 
heritage on their European engagement and, in turn, common identity building. 
 
Both regional civil servants and regional representatives in Brussels also verified the 
impact European regional network participation has on regions’ European engagement. 
Where regions had little political authority or little top-level political interest in the 
region’s European engagement and (oftentimes therefore) a small European budget at 
their disposal, networks helped to provide access to ‘weaker’ regions and facilitated 
participation. And where regions had to overcome linguistic challenges when pursuing 
European opportunities, the membership coordinated translation needs while the 
network’s head office provided translation support services. Participation in a European 
regional network has proven to be especially critical for the newer EU members with 
little European experience and/or considerable regional developmental needs. Because 
of their inexperience and lack of knowledge about accessing and procuring European 
cooperation programmes, participation in a European regional network was key to 
facilitate such cooperation opportunities. In addition, network members also credited 
the network with promoting a sense of European community and European identity 
through its events and membership interactions. Civil servants and particularly 
regional representatives in Brussels who participate in the ERRIN network verified the 
positive impact of network participation on both the scope of regions’ European 
engagement and their influence on cultivating a European identity.  
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The duration of EU membership, as stated by both regional civil servants and Brussels 
representatives, not only has an impact on the degree to which a region is competently 
engaging in European affairs, it also greatly influences the scope and objectives of 
those regions’ European policies. The Brandenburg region, a relatively recent EU 
member, while actively developing ties with the more established members continues 
to cooperate extensively with the more familiar Central and Eastern European states, 
who are also new to identifying and seeking European opportunities. As European 
identity grows in tandem with enhanced European interactions, it is expected that it 
will come to fruition in the newer EU Member States somewhat later than in the 
countries which have been members of the European community and have engaged 
within the European domain for a longer period of time. Membership duration thus has 
been explained to have an impact on regions’ European engagement and identity-
building. 
 
The semi-structured interviews conducted found a three-fold explanation of the 
variation in regions’ European engagements’ scope and objectives by the political 
elites, whilst they produced a six-fold explanation by the civil servants and regional 
representatives in Brussels. The three categories of actors independently identified the 
regions’ government system (and levels of regions’ political authority); top regional 
political decision-makers’ interests; and the regions’ geographical location and 
proximity to European neighbours with having either a positive or negative impact on 
the scope and objectives of regions’ European engagement. Beyond these three 
influential characteristics, civil servants and Brussels representatives identified four 
additional characteristics with effectively influencing the scope and objectives of their 
European engagement: language and heritage; European regional network 
participation; duration of EU membership and European engagement. This thesis has 
therefore assessed both the variation in scope and objectives of four case study 
regions’ European policies and programmes and providing six explanations for the 
variation. It thus directly evaluates the regional characteristics which shape regions’ 
European policy scope, including European identity objectives. The next section will 
illustrate and interpret the potential implications of the explanation of variation across 
the 97 EU regions.  
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Potential implications of research findings across 97 EU regions – further 
questions revealed  
Six regional characteristics have been identified in this thesis and verified by actors in 
four regions’ European policies and programmes to be influential in either facilitating or 
challenging the scope and objectives of regions’ European engagement. This section 
will summarise how the regional characteristics are represented across the 97 EU 
regions, and therefore what impact these characteristics can be expected to have on 
all of the 97 EU regions’ European policies and programmes – though further research 
will be required to verify this.  
 
The impact of government systems on the scope and objectives of regions’ European 
policies and programmes has been verified by regional political elites and civil 
servants. It has been shown in the Political Authority Index (Hooghe, Marks & Schakel, 
2010) that regions in federal states enjoy more political authority than regions in 
unitary states. With 76% of EU regions being in unitary states, it can therefore be 
expected that only 24% of EU regions have been constitutionally provided with political 
authority necessary to develop a wider scope and set of European policy and 
programme objectives. However, as the example of the Nord – Pas de Calais case 
study has shown, regionalisation also plays an important role in this categorisation; 
therefore further research on the remaining 93 EU regions’ scope of European 
engagement is required to gain a more fuller and more detailed understanding of all 
regions’ European engagement.  
 
With regions’ geographic location being verified as having an impact on their extent of 
European engagement and European identity means that with 54% of EU regions being 
located on a border to another European country’s region, only a slim majority of EU 
regions can expect to reap the benefits of the positive border location impacts. This 
also means that 46% of EU regions must find ways and means to compensate for their 
unfavourable geographic location. They clearly must work harder to develop and 
establish the necessary working connections with their European counterparts before 
they can effectively cooperate in European projects. It also means that 41% of the 
European population does not live in a border region and thus does not have natural 
access to other Europeans and, by extension, the possibility of developing a European 
identity through organic daily interactions with their European neighbours. However, to 
corroborate the impact of geographic location, further research is required in the area 
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of regional level data collection on European identity and the extent of regions’ 
European engagement across the remaining 93 EU regions. 
 
With 12 of 27 EU Member States just having joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 
respectively, nearly half of the EU members have not had the opportunity to engage in 
European affairs for any period of time. Their focus has been less on European 
interregional cooperation and more on managing EU funding for regional infrastructure 
development. It can therefore be expected that the scope of European engagement by 
the regions of the more recent 12 EU Member States will become broader when they 
no longer receive convergence funding from the EU, and the levels of European 
identity will increase once opportunities for systematic and prolonged engagement with 
other Europeans become an integral part of their “European project”. However, to 
glean such insights, data on regional levels of European identity must be made 
available.  
 
Regional civil servants and representatives in Brussels in particular have verified that 
language and heritage act as either facilitators or inhibitors to European engagement 
and the cultivation of a European identity. Whether a region’s official language is also 
one of the European working languages determines the ease with which they 
communicate and cooperate with one another. The language barrier affects about 70% 
of the EU population, and with only about 30% of EU regions able to easily conduct 
their business in the EU working languages. European cooperation and the fostering 
and cultivating of a European identity will be a multi-generation challenge. Clearly, it 
would proceed much faster if a higher percentage of Europeans were conversant in the 
most common European languages.  
 
Preliminary research has shown that all regions participate in a European regional 
network. Participation in European regional networks constitutes part of regions’ 
European engagement, while the extent and intensity of their participation varies. 
Interview findings presented in this thesis verified that networks boost regions’ 
European engagement because, as this thesis documented, they help regions 
overcome impeding regional characteristics and geographical challenges. It can 
therefore be expected that regions which systematically and actively participate in a 
European regional network will be able to draw on continued support in order to widen 
the extent, scope and objectives of their European policies and programmes. It has 
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been corroborated that networks help regions to more effectively manage limited 
political authority caused by their prevailing government system; overcome isolating 
geographic locations; fast-track their European engagement when becoming EU 
members at a later stage; support regions with small European affairs budgets and 
limited human resources through; and provide language support services. Continued 
participation in European regional networks by those regions which are faced with 
challenging characteristics and circumstances can thus be expected to lead to more 
effective engagement in European programmes and enhanced and accelerated levels of 
European identity. 
 
If the regional characteristics identified by regional political elites, civil servants and 
representatives in Brussels were also to hold for regions with similar characteristics, 
their impact on the scope and objectives of regions across Europe would be 
considerable. However, this section has also pointed out the critical lack of data 
available at the regional level. With regions increasingly active at the European level 
and the number of EU member regions increasing, it is essential to continue the 
research efforts of the regions to fill the apparent knowledge gaps.  
 
 
Final considerations 
This thesis has started the investigation on whether EU regions’ European policies 
feature European-identity building, and if so, whether this was mainly due to political 
elites’ or civil servants’ interests – or other factors. Indeed, the study has shown that 
European identity is cultivated through three of four case study regions’ European 
policies. In two of those three cases, European identity had been intentionally 
considered in the policy design due to the personal European interests of the political 
decision-makers within the respective regions. Civil servants in all four case study 
regions believed European identity-building to be relevant within their work, thus 
making civil servants more likely to want to include identity-building objectives within 
their implementation work than political elites in their policy design work. Also 
European regional networks were found to intentionally develop European identity 
amongst their membership in order to boost their participation and collaboration. 
However, European identity was not only found to be fostered by intent. It also 
naturally develops through enhanced European engagement of a range of actors 
participating in European-wide cooperation projects; bilateral partnerships, European 
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regional networks, European communications and legal integration. In these European 
encounters and activities, participants gain a European mind-set, learn about shared 
interests or commonalities, and naturally develop a European identity as a bi-product 
of their primary European engagement. Thus, European identity has been shown to 
evolve through both intentionally designed policies and as a bi-product of other 
activities. As a secondary study to whether European identity intentionally features in 
the design and implementation of European policies, this thesis also looked into the 
regional characteristics affecting the scope and objectives of regions’ European 
policies. Here, it was found that regional characteristics including government systems; 
political interests; geographic location; European regional network participation; 
duration of EU membership, as well as language and heritage can affect both the scope 
and identity-building objectives of regions’ European policies.  
 
This thesis has provided evidence-based contributions to the studies on regions’ 
European politics and European identity-building – a field within political science that 
has been identified as under-studied and in need of substantive research. This thesis 
also proposes a new range of findings to the broader field of European integration – 
what are the objectives and desired outcomes of regions’ participation in the European 
project. However, in answering the three hypotheses and looking further into reasons 
behind regions’ European policy variation, this thesis has also uncovered more 
questions. The findings are based on the four case study regions and the one European 
regional network and are not generalizable. In order to glean a better understanding 
on all 97 regions’ European policy’s scope and objectives; the role of their designers 
and implementers; and the role of European regional networks in cultivating European 
identity and collaboration, more research in this area is required. This thesis has 
already paved the path for that further research, having probed and clarified the three 
hypotheses and confirmed the theoretical regional characteristics which affect 
variation. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
Regional Data used (split into 4 page-long tables) 
Country Region 
Reg GDP 
(ERU 
millions) 
Reg GDP 
PPS / 
capita 
Population 
in 
thousands 
Geo-
graphy 
coded 
Reg 
Langu
age 
Gov’t 
Syst
em 
Austria 
East Austria 120,649 32,000 3,545 1 
 
1 
 
2 
South Austria 49,472 26,300 1,766 1 
 
1 
 
2 
West Austria 100,661 31,500 3,005 1 
 
1 
 
2 
Belgium 
Brussels capital 
Region 
62,579 55,000 1,040 3 
 
2 
 
2 
Flemish Region 194,421 29,000 3,935 1 
 
1 
 
2 
Walloon Region 77,948 20,700 5,651 1 
 
2 
 
2 
Bulgaria 
Severna I 
Iztochna 
11,572 7,200 3,994 1 
 
1 
 
1 
Yugozapadna I 
Yuzhna 
Tsentralna 
17,326 11,800 3,657 1 
 
1 
 
1 
Cyprus Cyprus 15,951 23,300 84 3 
 
1 
 
1 
Czech 
Republic 
Czech Republic 127,331 19,900 10,334 1 
 
1 
 
1 
Germany 
Baden-
Wuerttemberg 
358,357 32,600 10,744 1 
 
1 
 
2 
Bavaria 433,988 33,900 12,507 1 
 
1 
 
2 
Berlin 84,943 24,400 3,410 3 
 
1 
 
2 
Brandenburg 53,289 20,500 2,542 1 
 
1 
 
2 
Bremen 26,824 39,500 664 3 
 
1 
 
2 
Hamburg 86,251 47,800 1,762 3 
 
1 
 
2 
Hessen 215,661 34,700 6,074 3 
 
1 
 
2 
Mecklenburg-
Vorpommern 
34,858 20,200 1,687 2 
 
1 
 
2 
Lower Saxony 207,727 25,400 7,977 2 
 
1 
 
2 
North-Rhine-
Westphalia 
525,898 28,500 18,013 1 
 
1 
 
2 
Rhineland-
Palatinate 
104,807 25,300 4,049 2 
 
1 
 
2 
Saarland 30,363 28,500 1,040 1 
 
1 
 
2 
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Country Region 
Reg GDP 
(ERU 
millions) 
Reg GDP 
PPS / 
capita 
Population 
in 
thousands 
Geo-
graphy 
coded 
Reg 
Langu
age 
Gov’t 
Syst
em 
Germany 
(cont.) 
 
Saxony 
 
92,950 
 
21,400 
 
4,235 
2 
 
1 
 
2 
Saxony-Anhalt 51,730 20,800 2,427 3 
 
1 
 
2 
Schleswig-
Holstein 
71,923 24,800 2,836 2 
 
1 
 
2 
Thuringia 48,662 20,700 2,300 3 
 
1 
 
2 
Denmark Denmark 227,025 30,200 5,461 2 
 
1 
 
1 
Estonia Estonia 15,627 17,100 1,341 2 
 
1 
 
1 
Spain 
North West 90,377 23,100 4,355 2 
 
1 
 
1 
North east 123,432 31,800 4,328 1 
 
1 
 
1 
Community of 
Madrid 
186,800 34,100 6,242 3 
 
1 
 
1 
Centre 109,350 22,100 5,525 2 
 
1 
 
1 
East 326,046 27,900 13,017 2 
 
1 
 
1 
South 174,891 20,500 9,513 2 
 
1 
 
1 
Canary Islands 41,834 23,100 2,059 3 
 
1 
 
1 
Finland 
Mainland 
Finland 
178,546 29,400 5,262 3 
 
1 
 
1 
Aland 1,113 35,700 27 3 
 
1 
 
1 
France 
Ile-de-France 537,451 42,000 11,636 3 
 
2 
 
1 
Parisian Basin 273,934 23,300 10,688 3 
 
2 
 
1 
Nord-Pas-de-
Calais 
97,122 22,000 4,022 2 
 
2 
 
1 
East 326,046 23,300 13,017 2 
 
2 
 
1 
West 217,995 23,700 8,372 3 
 
2 
 
1 
South West 178,023 24,100 6,725 2 
 
2 
 
1 
Centre East 216,130 26,500 7,430 2 
 
2 
 
1 
Mediterranean 204,035 23,900 7,758 1 
 
2 
 
1 
Overseas 
Departments 
33,175 16,600 1,862 3 
 
2 
 
1 
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Country Region 
Reg GDP 
(ERU 
millions) 
Reg GDP 
PPS / 
capita 
Population 
in 
thousands 
Geo-
graphy 
coded 
Reg 
Langu
age 
Gov’t 
Syst
em 
Greece 
Voreia Ellada 54,547 17,500 3,569 3 
 
1 
 
1 
Kentriki Ellada 38,468 17,800 2,465 3 1 1 
 
Attica 
 
113,046 
 
31,900 
 
4,075 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
Nisia Aigaiou 
Kriti 
20,376 20,900 1,112 3 
 
1 
 
1 
Hungary 
Central 
Hungary (Kozep 
Magyarorszag) 
47,670 25,600 2,911 3 
 
 
1 
 
1 
Transdanubia 
(Dunantual) 
26,795 13,500 3,069 1 
 
1 
 
1 
Great Plain and 
North (Alfold es 
Eszak) 
26,621 10,100 4,102 1 
 
1 
 
1 
Ireland Ireland 189,751 36,900 4,357 2 
 
2 
 
2 
Italy 
North West 90,377 31,400 4,355 2 
 
1 
 
1 
North East 123,432 30,900 4,328 1 
 
1 
 
1 
Centre 109,350 28,700 5,525 2 
 
1 
 
1 
South 174,891 17,100 9,513 2 
 
1 
 
1 
Islands 116,236 17,200 6,686 3 
 
1 
 
1 
Lithuania Lithuania 28,577 14,800 3,376 1 
 
1 
 
1 
Luxem-
bourg 
Luxembourg 37,464 68,500 480 1 
 
2 
 
1 
Latvia Latvia 21,111 13,900 2,276 1 
 
1 
 
1 
Malta Malta 5,456 19,000 412 3 
 
1 
 
1 
Nether-
lands 
North 
Netherlands 
56,240 31,300 1,703 1 
 
1 
 
1 
East 
Netherlands 
103,373 28,200 3,476 1 
 
1 
 
1 
West 
Netherlands 
288,277 35,700 7,654 3 
 
1 
 
1 
South 
Netherlands 
120,774 32,300 3,548 1 
 
1 
 
1 
Poland 
Central 
(Centralny) 
86,833 18,600 7,741 3 
 
1 
 
1 
Poludniowy 63,265 13,300 7,937 1 
 
1 
 
1 
Wschodni 38,778 9,600 6,739 2 1 1 
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Country Region 
Reg GDP 
(ERU 
millions) 
Reg GDP 
PPS / 
capita 
Population 
in 
thousands 
Geo-
graphy 
coded 
Reg 
Langu
age 
Gov’t 
Syst
em 
Poland 
(cont.) 
Polnocno-
Zachodni 
48,528 13,300 6,084 1 
 
1 
 
1 
Poludniowo-
Zachodni 
32,583 13,800 3,920 1 
 
1 
 
1 
Polnocny 41,015 1,200 5,700 2 
 
1 
 
1 
Portugal 
Mainland 
Portugal 
(Continente) 
154,882 18,700 10,119 1 
 
1 
 
1 
Azores 3,346 16,800 244 3 
 
1 
 
1 
 
Madeira 
4,822 24,000 247 3 
 
1 
 
1 
Romania 
 
 
Macroregion  
One 
30,042 10,300 5,251 2 
 
1 
 
1 
Macroregion 
Two 
27,078 7,400 6,555 2 
 
1 
 
1 
Macroregion 
Three 
44,337 14,400 5,536 3 
 
1 
 
1 
Macroregion 
Four 
23,273 9,900 4,205 3 
 
1 
 
1 
Sweden 
East Sweden 141,725 30,600 3,463 3 
 
1 
 
1 
South Sweden 134,033 28,400 3,980 3 
 
1 
 
1 
North Sweden 55,390 27,500 1,704 3 
 
1 
 
1 
Slovenia Slovenia 34,568 22,100 2,018 1 
 
1 
 
1 
Slovakia Slovakia 54,898 16,900 5,397 1 
 
1 
 
1 
United 
Kingdom 
North East 
England 
66,621 22,500 2,565 3 
 
2 
 
1 
North West 
England 
195,699 24,700 6,864 3 
 
2 
 
1 
Yorkshire and 
the Humber 
145,022 24,300 5,178 3 
 
2 
 
1 
East Midlands 130,219 25,700 4,399 3 
 
2 
 
1 
West Midlands 154,130 24,800 5,385 3 
 
2 
 
1 
East of England 181,521 27,800 5,665 3 
 
2 
 
1 
Greater London 427,841 49,100 7,562 3 
 
2 
 
1 
 
South East 
England 
296,643 31,000 8,309 3 
 
2 
 
1 
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Country Region 
Reg GDP 
(ERU 
millions) 
Reg GDP 
PPS / 
capita 
Population 
in 
thousands 
Geo-
graphy 
coded 
Reg 
Langu
age 
Gov’t 
Syst
em 
United 
Kingdom 
(cont.) 
 
South West 
England 
158,657 26,600 5,172 3 
 
2 
 
1 
Wales 74,375 21,600 2,980 3 
 
2 
 
1 
Scotland 166,542 28,100 5,144 3 
 
2 
 
1 
Northern 
Ireland 
46,864 23,100 1,759 2 2 1 
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APPENDIX 2: 
National Data used (split into 2 tables) 
Appendix 2.1 
Country 
 National 
Polulation 
2010  
Total EU Regional 
Policy funding 
2007-2013 (EUR 
millions) 
Government 
System 
(coded) 
Austria 8,375,290 1,461 2 
Belgium 10,839,905 2,258 2 
Bulgaria 4,563,710 6,853 1 
Cyprus 803,147 640 1 
Czech 
Republic 
10,506,813 26,692 
 
1 
Germany 81,802,257 26,340 2 
Denmark 5,534,738 613 1 
Estonia 1,340,127 3,456 1 
Spain 45,989,016 35,217 1 
Finland 5,351,427 1,716 1 
France 64,714,074 14,319 1 
Greece 11,305,118 20,420 1 
Hungary 10,014,324 25,307 1 
Ireland 4,467,854 901 2 
Italy 60,340,328 28,812 1 
Lithuania 3,329,039 6,885 1 
Luxembourg 502,066 65 1 
Lativia 2,248,374 4,620 1 
Malta 412,970 855 1 
Netherlands 16,574,989 1,907 1 
Poland 38,167,329 67,285 1 
Portugal 10,637,713 21,511 1 
Romania 21,462,186 19,668 1 
Sweden 9,340,682 1,891 1 
Slovenia 2,046,976 4,205 1 
Slovakia 5,424,925 11,588 1 
United 
Kingdom 
62,008,048 10,613 
 
1 
[Source: Population: Eurostat 2010; EU Regional Policy Funding 2007-2013: European 
Commission Directorate General for Regional Policy Website; Government system: 
governments’ websites as in June 2012.] 
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Appendix 2.2 
Country 
1990 
European 
identity 
"NO" 
1990 
European 
identity 
"YES" 
2006 
European 
identity 
"NO" 
2006 
European 
identity 
"YES" 
2010 
European 
identity 
"NO" 
2010 
European 
identity 
"YES" 
Austria 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Belgium 46% 54% 39% 61% 16% 84% 
Bulgaria 0% 0% 43% 57% 46% 54% 
Cyprus 0% 0% 42% 58% 36% 64% 
Czech 
Republic 0% 0% 45% 55% 40% 60% 
Germany 58% 42% 42% 58% 32% 68% 
Denmark 51% 49% 38% 62% 18% 82% 
Estonia 0% 0% 46% 54% 39% 61% 
Spain 49% 51% 42% 58% 32% 68% 
Finland 0% 0% 32% 68% 21% 79% 
France 42% 58% 45% 55% 48% 52% 
Greece 42% 58% 28% 72% 42% 58% 
Hungary 0% 0% 42% 58% 27% 73% 
Ireland 67% 33% 46% 54% 36% 64% 
Italy 43% 57% 40% 60% 24% 76% 
Lithuania 0% 0% 46% 54% 39% 61% 
Luxembourg 45% 55% 32% 68% 15% 85% 
Lativia 0% 0% 48% 52% 39% 61% 
Malta 0% 0% 37% 63% 32% 68% 
Netherlands 61% 39% 41% 59% 22% 78% 
Poland 0% 0% 34% 66% 36% 64% 
Portugal 49% 51% 38% 62% 34% 66% 
Romania 0% 0% 40% 60% 31% 69% 
Sweden 0% 0% 47% 53% 29% 71% 
Slovenia 0% 0% 9% 91% 28% 72% 
Slovakia 0% 0% 35% 65% 19% 81% 
United 
Kingdom 72% 28% 68% 32% 46% 54% 
[Source: Eurostat Newsrelease Issue 25 / 2010, 18 February 2010.] 
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